diff options
author | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-10-09 18:53:29 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-10-09 18:53:29 +0100 |
commit | 4f2d7949f03e1c198bc888f2d05f421d35c57e21 (patch) | |
tree | ba5f07bf3f9d22d82e54a462313f5d244036c768 /net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files |
reinit the tree, so we can have metadata
Diffstat (limited to 'net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files')
16 files changed, 773 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82c26398b69d --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5315) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * buffer and ACK the fragment + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + data->in_frag_pos += len; + if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " +@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + return NULL; + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, + EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); +@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * we're buffering and this is the last fragment + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", + (int) len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + } +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bfc4c74e95ca --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5314) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + /* + * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " + "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", +@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + data->in_frag_pos += len; ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", + (int) len); + return; +@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3088f6a6dcda --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message + +If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity +exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and +data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() +did not take this corner case into account and could end up +dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid +message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 75ceef1..892b590 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + + fin: +- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); ++ if (data->grp) ++ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); + BN_clear_free(x); + BN_clear_free(y); + if (data->outbuf == NULL) { +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..acad6be0a4dc --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as +STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or +WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated +the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from +an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should +such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file +could become invalid and fail to be parsed. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c +index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.c ++++ b/src/utils/common.c +@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { ++ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h +index 701dbb2..a972240 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.h ++++ b/src/utils/common.h +@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c +index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c +@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) + cred->key_len--; + #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ + } ++ ++ ++ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && ++ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); ++ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", ++ cred->key, cred->key_len); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + return 0; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..507a96e47c06 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase + character + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase +includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of +almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration +file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., +opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, +load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. +This would allow code from that library to be executed under the +wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, + } + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", + (u8 *) value, len); ++ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", ++ line); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && + os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { + /* No change to the previously configured value */ +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..684d25de9651 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network + output + +Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the +wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block +parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have +been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control +characters in the psk parameter. + +Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c +index 27b7c02..9856463 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.c ++++ b/src/utils/common.c +@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_newline(const char *str) ++{ ++ while (*str) { ++ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') ++ return 1; ++ str++; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h +index a972240..d19927b 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.h ++++ b/src/utils/common.h +@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); + int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_newline(const char *str); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { + const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; +- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) +- return field->writer(field, ssid); ++ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { ++ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); ++ ++ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", ++ var); ++ os_free(ret); ++ ret = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++ } + } + + return NULL; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2dd38fee318b --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without +filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, +unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the credential value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + + if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && + os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { ++ if (has_newline(value)) ++ return -1; + str_clear_free(cred->password); + cred->password = os_strdup(value); + cred->ext_password = 1; +@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + } + + val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); +- if (val == NULL) { ++ if (val == NULL || ++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ has_newline(val))) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " + "value '%s'.", line, var, value); ++ os_free(val); + return -1; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5f42aa9219c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings +without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the +value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, + return -1; + } + ++ if (has_newline(pos)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", ++ line, data->name); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + tmp = os_strdup(pos); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_cli.sh b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_cli.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c581bc1c7543 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_cli.sh @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Copyright 1999-2011 Gentoo Foundation +# Written by Roy Marples <uberlord@gentoo.org> +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 +# Alternatively, this file may be distributed under the terms of the BSD License + +if [ -z "$1" -o -z "$2" ]; then + logger -t wpa_cli "Insufficient parameters" + exit 1 +fi + +INTERFACE="$1" +ACTION="$2" + +# Note, the below action must NOT mark the interface down via ifconfig, ip or +# similar. Addresses can be removed, changed and daemons can be stopped, but +# the interface must remain up for wpa_supplicant to work. + +if [ -f /etc/gentoo-release ]; then + EXEC="/etc/init.d/net.${INTERFACE} --quiet" +else + logger -t wpa_cli "I don't know what to do with this distro!" + exit 1 +fi + +case ${ACTION} in + CONNECTED) + EXEC="${EXEC} start" + ;; + DISCONNECTED) + # Deactivated, since stopping /etc/init.d/net.wlanX + # stops the network completly. + EXEC="false ${EXEC} stop" + ;; + *) + logger -t wpa_cli "Unknown action ${ACTION}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# ${EXEC} can use ${IN_BACKGROUND} so that it knows that the user isn't +# stopping the interface and a background process - like wpa_cli - is. +export IN_BACKGROUND=true + +logger -t wpa_cli "interface ${INTERFACE} ${ACTION}" +${EXEC} || logger -t wpa_cli "executing '${EXEC}' failed" diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0f340c9566d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c +index 45623f3..0fc3d08 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c +@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ void wpa_dbus_mark_property_changed(struct wpas_dbus_priv *iface, + const struct wpa_dbus_property_desc *dsc; + int i = 0; + +- if (iface == NULL) ++ if (iface == NULL || path == NULL) + return; + + dbus_connection_get_object_path_data(iface->con, path, diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-libressl.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-libressl.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..458628c577dc --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.5-libressl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From c987191de92bacbf27df5d345a9d18aea8ea8a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Beh=C3=BAn?= <kabel@blackhole.sk>
+Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:18:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Check for LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER in tls_openssl.c
+
+LibreSSL does not yet support the new API, so do not use it
+when LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER macro is defined.
+---
+ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 12 ++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+index c2bb8c5..3883465 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+@@ -3163,7 +3163,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_data *data, SSL *ssl, PKCS12 *p12,
+ }
+
+ if (certs) {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
+ while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
+@@ -3746,7 +3746,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
+ if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ ssl = conn->ssl;
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->s3 == NULL || ssl->session == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+@@ -3775,7 +3775,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
+ #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
+ static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *h;
+ int md_size;
+@@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@ static int openssl_tls_prf(struct tls_connection *conn,
+ "mode");
+ return -1;
+ #else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ SSL *ssl;
+ u8 *rnd;
+ int ret = -1;
+@@ -4328,7 +4328,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1);
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ #if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST)
+ if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) {
+ /*
+@@ -4917,7 +4917,7 @@ static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+ struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
+ int ret;
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+--
+2.4.10
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0f340c9566d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c +index 45623f3..0fc3d08 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c +@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ void wpa_dbus_mark_property_changed(struct wpas_dbus_priv *iface, + const struct wpa_dbus_property_desc *dsc; + int i = 0; + +- if (iface == NULL) ++ if (iface == NULL || path == NULL) + return; + + dbus_connection_get_object_path_data(iface->con, path, diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-libressl.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-libressl.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0394ab545b16 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.6-libressl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From d53b107120af86a0c711bac950bfc2fa728cb4e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julian Ospald <hasufell@hasufell.de> +Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 17:45:46 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix LibreSSL compatibility +Upstream: pending, http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2016-October/036458.html + +This basically just follows +587b0457e0238b7b1800d46f5cdd5e1d2b06732f +with the same pattern, which was missed here. + +Signed-off-by: Julian Ospald <hasufell@hasufell.de> +--- + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 4 ++-- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 8 ++++---- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +index 19e0e2b..b3d1b07 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ void crypto_cipher_deinit(struct crypto_cipher *ctx) + + void * dh5_init(struct wpabuf **priv, struct wpabuf **publ) + { +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + DH *dh; + struct wpabuf *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL; + size_t publen, privlen; +@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ err: + + void * dh5_init_fixed(const struct wpabuf *priv, const struct wpabuf *publ) + { +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + DH *dh; + + dh = DH_new(); +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 23ac64b..a7d4880 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf) + } + #endif /* OPENSSL_FIPS */ + #endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */ +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + SSL_load_error_strings(); + SSL_library_init(); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 +@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ void tls_deinit(void *ssl_ctx) + + tls_openssl_ref_count--; + if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) { +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE_cleanup(); + #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */ +@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@ static int tls_connection_client_cert(struct tls_connection *conn, + return 0; + + #ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* + * Clear previously set extra chain certificates, if any, from PKCS#12 + * processing in tls_parse_pkcs12() to allow OpenSSL to build a new +@@ -3976,7 +3976,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_params(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn, + engine_id = "pkcs11"; + + #if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST) +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, + "OpenSSL: Use TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST"); +-- +2.10.1 + diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-conf.d b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-conf.d new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..104b9dc5d8c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-conf.d @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# conf.d file for wpa_supplicant +# +# Please check man 8 wpa_supplicant for more information about the options +# wpa_supplicant accepts. +# +wpa_supplicant_args="" diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-init.d b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-init.d new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..380387a3bc75 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-init.d @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +#!/sbin/openrc-run +# Copyright (c) 2009 Roy Marples <roy@marples.name> +# All rights reserved. Released under the 2-clause BSD license. + +command=/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant +: ${wpa_supplicant_conf:=/etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf} +wpa_supplicant_if=${wpa_supplicant_if:+-i}$wpa_supplicant_if +command_args="$wpa_supplicant_args -B -c$wpa_supplicant_conf $wpa_supplicant_if" +name="WPA Supplicant Daemon" + +depend() +{ + need localmount + use logger + after bootmisc modules + before dns dhcpcd net + keyword -shutdown +} + +find_wireless() +{ + local iface= + + case "$RC_UNAME" in + Linux) + for iface in /sys/class/net/*; do + if [ -e "$iface"/wireless -o \ + -e "$iface"/phy80211 ] + then + echo "${iface##*/}" + return 0 + fi + done + ;; + *) + for iface in /dev/net/* $(ifconfig -l 2>/dev/null); do + if ifconfig "${iface##*/}" 2>/dev/null | \ + grep -q "[ ]*ssid " + then + echo "${iface##*/}" + return 0 + fi + done + ;; + esac + + return 1 +} + +append_wireless() +{ + local iface= i= + + iface=$(find_wireless) + if [ -n "$iface" ]; then + for i in $iface; do + command_args="$command_args -i$i" + done + else + eerror "Could not find a wireless interface" + fi +} + +start_pre() +{ + case " $command_args" in + *" -i"*) ;; + *) append_wireless;; + esac +} diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant.conf b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant.conf new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3a29e50d9ca --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant.conf @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# This is a network block that connects to any unsecured access point. +# We give it a low priority so any defined blocks are preferred. +network={ + key_mgmt=NONE + priority=-9999999 +} + |