git is acting weird on me lately

author: V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> 2018-04-12 16:09:15 +0100
committer: V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> 2018-04-12 16:09:15 +0100
commit: 8d7700344360c308ad67f4a7343a099cf6a9ab01 (patch)
tree: c1662d711f9cc233621f729f64ce916cd0113f69 /sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files
parent: d93832cc9b421b5bb503c0b547598bc4b59976b9 (diff)
1 files changed, 2725 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/linux-hardened-v2.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/linux-hardened-v2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8ec7b812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/linux-hardened-v2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2725 @@
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
+--- linux-4.16/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.805694357 +0200
+@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
+-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+ CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+ CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+--- linux-4.16/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.806694357 +0200
+@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+  */
+-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x100000000UL
+ 
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+ 
+@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@
+ /* 1GB of VA */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ #define STACK_RND_MASK			(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
+-						0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+-						0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
++						((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
++						((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+ #else
+-#define STACK_RND_MASK			(0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
++#define STACK_RND_MASK			(((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef __AARCH64EB__
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/arm64/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/arch/arm64/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.806694357 +0200
+@@ -974,6 +974,7 @@
+ 
+ config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+ 	bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
+ 	  user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
+@@ -1127,6 +1128,7 @@
+ 	bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
+ 	select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
+ 	select RELOCATABLE
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
+ 	  loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+--- linux-4.16/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-12 15:57:20.807694356 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
+ config DEBUG_WX
+ 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
+ 	select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
++	default y
+ 	---help---
+ 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.807694356 +0200
+@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@
+ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	if (is_compat_task())
+-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
+ 	else
+-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/arch/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/arch/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.808694356 +0200
+@@ -454,6 +454,11 @@
+ 	  is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
+ 	  irq processing.
+ 
++	  When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line,
++	  entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the
++	  runtime memory allocator is being initialized.  This costs even more
++	  slowdown of the boot process.
++
+ 	  Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
+ 	  secure!
+ 
+@@ -541,7 +546,7 @@
+ choice
+ 	prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
+ 	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+-	default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
++	default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
+ 	help
+ 	  This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
+ 	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+@@ -747,7 +752,7 @@
+ 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
+ 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+ 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
+-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
++	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+ 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+ 	help
+ 	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+@@ -781,7 +786,7 @@
+ 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
+ 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+ 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
+-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
++	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+ 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+ 	help
+ 	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+@@ -968,6 +973,7 @@
+ 
+ config REFCOUNT_FULL
+ 	bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
+ 	  unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.808694356 +0200
+@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
+ # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set
+-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+ CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+ CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y
+ CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.808694356 +0200
+@@ -204,55 +204,9 @@
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+-/*
+- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized
+- * offset.  This way there is no hole in the middle of address space.
+- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack
+- * top.  This doesn't give that many random bits.
+- *
+- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso
+- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end.
+- *
+- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos.
+- */
+-static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len)
+-{
+-	unsigned long addr, end;
+-	unsigned offset;
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Round up the start address.  It can start out unaligned as a result
+-	 * of stack start randomization.
+-	 */
+-	start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+-
+-	/* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */
+-	end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK;
+-	if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+-		end = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+-	end -= len;
+-
+-	if (end > start) {
+-		offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
+-		addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT);
+-	} else {
+-		addr = start;
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware
+-	 * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons.
+-	 */
+-	addr = align_vdso_addr(addr);
+-
+-	return addr;
+-}
+-
+ static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image)
+ {
+-	unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start);
+-
+-	return map_vdso(image, addr);
++	return map_vdso(image, 0);
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.809694356 +0200
+@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+  */
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+-						  (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2))
++						  0x100000000UL)
+ 
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+@@ -313,8 +313,8 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ 
+-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff)
+-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff)
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+ 
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO		ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
+ 
+@@ -323,7 +323,11 @@
+ #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+ 
+ /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */
+-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff)
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#else
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#endif
+ #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32())
+ 
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO							\
+@@ -381,5 +385,4 @@
+ } ____cacheline_aligned;
+ 
+ extern struct va_alignment va_align;
+-extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.809694356 +0200
+@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@
+ 
+ 	local_irq_save(flags);
+ 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+ 	if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4)
+ 		__cr4_set(cr4 | mask);
+ 	local_irq_restore(flags);
+@@ -273,6 +274,7 @@
+ 
+ 	local_irq_save(flags);
+ 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+ 	if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4)
+ 		__cr4_set(cr4 & ~mask);
+ 	local_irq_restore(flags);
+@@ -283,6 +285,7 @@
+ 	unsigned long cr4;
+ 
+ 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++        BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+ 	__cr4_set(cr4 ^ mask);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -389,6 +392,7 @@
+ 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
+ 
+ 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+ 	/* toggle PGE */
+ 	native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
+ 	/* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.810694356 +0200
+@@ -1208,8 +1208,7 @@
+        default X86_LEGACY_VM86
+ 
+ config X86_16BIT
+-	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments"
+ 	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+ 	---help---
+ 	  This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit
+@@ -2299,7 +2298,7 @@
+ choice
+ 	prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
+ 	depends on X86_64
+-	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
++	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
+ 	help
+ 	  Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
+ 	  to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
+@@ -2380,8 +2379,7 @@
+ 	  be set to 'N' under normal conditions.
+ 
+ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+-	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)"
+ 	---help---
+ 	  Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
+ 	  Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-12 15:57:20.810694356 +0200
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
+ config DEBUG_WX
+ 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
+ 	select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
++	default y
+ 	---help---
+ 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.811694355 +0200
+@@ -1617,7 +1617,6 @@
+ 	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
+ 	barrier();
+ 
+-	x86_configure_nx();
+ 	x2apic_setup();
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/process.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/process.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/process.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.812694355 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+ #include <asm/switch_to.h>
+ #include <asm/desc.h>
+ #include <asm/prctl.h>
++#include <asm/elf.h>
++#include <linux/sizes.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
+@@ -572,7 +574,10 @@
+ 
+ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+-	return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
++	if (mmap_is_ia32())
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
++	else
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.812694355 +0200
+@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@
+ 	return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
+ }
+ 
+-unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
+-{
+-	unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
+-	addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
+-	return addr | get_align_bits();
+-}
+-
+ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
+ {
+ 	/* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
+@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	*begin	= get_mmap_base(1);
+-	if (in_compat_syscall())
+-		*end = task_size_32bit();
+-	else
+-		*end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
++	*end	= get_mmap_base(0);
+ }
+ 
+ unsigned long
+@@ -210,7 +200,7 @@
+ 
+ 	info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
+ 	info.length = len;
+-	info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
++	info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
+ 	info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.812694355 +0200
+@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
+ 	permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base);
+ }
+ 
+-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+ 
+ /* user-defined highmem size */
+@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+-int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly;
++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
+ 
+ void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+ {
+@@ -918,12 +918,11 @@
+ 	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
+ 	unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start;
+ 
++	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
+ 	set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n",
+ 		size >> 10);
+ 
+-	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n",
+ 		start, start+size);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+--- linux-4.16/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.813694355 +0200
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+  * around without checking the pgd every time.
+  */
+ 
+-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+ 
+ int force_personality32;
+@@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@
+ 	mem_init_print_info(NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-int kernel_set_to_readonly;
++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
+ 
+ void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+ {
+@@ -1244,9 +1244,8 @@
+ 
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n",
+ 	       (end - start) >> 10);
+-	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+-
+ 	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
++	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!)
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/block/blk-softirq.c linux-4.16-p/block/blk-softirq.c
+--- linux-4.16/block/blk-softirq.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/block/blk-softirq.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.813694355 +0200
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+  * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them
+  * while passing them to the queue registered handler.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void)
+ {
+ 	struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list;
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-4.16-p/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+--- linux-4.16/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt	2018-04-12 15:57:20.815694354 +0200
+@@ -496,16 +496,6 @@
+ 			nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting.
+ 			nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting.
+ 
+-	checkreqprot	[SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value.
+-			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+-			See security/selinux/Kconfig help text.
+-			0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes
+-				any implied execute protection).
+-			1 -- check protection requested by application.
+-			Default value is set via a kernel config option.
+-			Value can be changed at runtime via
+-				/selinux/checkreqprot.
+-
+ 	cio_ignore=	[S390]
+ 			See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
+ 	clk_ignore_unused
+@@ -2943,6 +2933,11 @@
+ 			the specified number of seconds.  This is to be used if
+ 			your oopses keep scrolling off the screen.
+ 
++	extra_latent_entropy
++			Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction
++			from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator
++			passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator.
++
+ 	pcbit=		[HW,ISDN]
+ 
+ 	pcd.		[PARIDE]
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt linux-4.16-p/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+--- linux-4.16/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt	2018-04-12 15:57:20.815694354 +0200
+@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
+ - sysctl_writes_strict
+ - tainted
+ - threads-max
++- tiocsti_restrict
+ - unknown_nmi_panic
+ - watchdog
+ - watchdog_thresh
+@@ -1014,6 +1015,26 @@
+ 
+ ==============================================================
+ 
++tiocsti_restrict:
++
++This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
++from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into other processes
++which share a tty session.
++
++When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
++the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
++one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
++have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
++
++When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
++CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
++opened the tty.
++
++The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
++default value of tiocsti_restrict.
++
++==============================================================
++
+ unknown_nmi_panic:
+ 
+ The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/ata/libata-core.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/ata/libata-core.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/ata/libata-core.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.817694353 +0200
+@@ -5148,7 +5148,7 @@
+ 	struct ata_port *ap;
+ 	unsigned int tag;
+ 
+-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
++	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+ 	ap = qc->ap;
+ 
+ 	qc->flags = 0;
+@@ -5165,7 +5165,7 @@
+ 	struct ata_port *ap;
+ 	struct ata_link *link;
+ 
+-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
++	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+ 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE));
+ 	ap = qc->ap;
+ 	link = qc->dev->link;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/char/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/drivers/char/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/char/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/char/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.817694353 +0200
+@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
+ 
+ config DEVMEM
+ 	bool "/dev/mem virtual device support"
+-	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device.
+ 	  The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
+@@ -568,7 +567,6 @@
+ config DEVPORT
+ 	bool "/dev/port character device"
+ 	depends on ISA || PCI
+-	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
+ 	  device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.818694353 +0200
+@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@
+ 	return cx24116_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.818694353 +0200
+@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@
+ 	return cx24117_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.818694353 +0200
+@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@
+ 	return cx24120_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.819694353 +0200
+@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+-static int cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.819694353 +0200
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_SEARCH_ERROR;
+ }
+ 
+-static int cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_CUSTOM;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.819694353 +0200
+@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@
+ 	kfree(state);
+ }
+ 
+-static int mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.819694353 +0200
+@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-static int s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.820694352 +0200
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return dst_algo ? DVBFE_ALGO_HW : DVBFE_ALGO_SW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.820694352 +0200
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.820694352 +0200
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+ 	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/tty/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/drivers/tty/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/tty/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/tty/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.820694352 +0200
+@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@
+ 
+ config LEGACY_PTYS
+ 	bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support"
+-	default y
+ 	---help---
+ 	  A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two
+ 	  halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/tty/tty_io.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/tty/tty_io.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/tty/tty_io.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.820694352 +0200
+@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@
+ 	put_device(tty->dev);
+ 	kfree(tty->write_buf);
+ 	tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
++	put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
+ 	kfree(tty);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2155,11 +2156,19 @@
+  *	FIXME: may race normal receive processing
+  */
+ 
++int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
++
+ static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
+ {
+ 	char ch, mbz = 0;
+ 	struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+ 
++	if (tiocsti_restrict &&
++		!ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
++		dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev,
++			"Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n");
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
+ 	if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 	if (get_user(ch, p))
+@@ -2839,6 +2848,7 @@
+ 	tty->index = idx;
+ 	tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
+ 	tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
++	tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
+ 
+ 	return tty;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/drivers/usb/core/hub.c linux-4.16-p/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+--- linux-4.16/drivers/usb/core/hub.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/drivers/usb/core/hub.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.821694352 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
+ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY	40	/* ns */
+ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX	65535	/* ns */
+ 
++extern int deny_new_usb;
++
+ /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members
+  * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can
+  * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */
+@@ -4839,6 +4841,12 @@
+ 			goto done;
+ 		return;
+ 	}
++
++	if (deny_new_usb) {
++		dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1);
++		goto done;
++	}
++
+ 	if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
+ 		unit_load = 150;
+ 	else
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/fs/exec.c linux-4.16-p/fs/exec.c
+--- linux-4.16/fs/exec.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/fs/exec.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.822694352 +0200
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <linux/oom.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@
+ 	arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma);
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
++	if (randomize_va_space)
++		bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ 	return 0;
+ err:
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/fs/namei.c linux-4.16-p/fs/namei.c
+--- linux-4.16/fs/namei.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/fs/namei.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.822694352 +0200
+@@ -882,8 +882,8 @@
+ 		path_put(&last->link);
+ }
+ 
+-int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0;
+-int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
++int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1;
++int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+ 
+ /**
+  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/fs/nfs/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/fs/nfs/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/fs/nfs/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.822694352 +0200
+@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@
+ 	bool
+ 	depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG
+ 	select CRC32
+-	default y
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/fs/proc/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/fs/proc/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/fs/proc/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/fs/proc/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.822694352 +0200
+@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@
+ config PROC_VMCORE
+ 	bool "/proc/vmcore support"
+ 	depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP
+-	default y
+         help
+         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/fs/stat.c linux-4.16-p/fs/stat.c
+--- linux-4.16/fs/stat.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/fs/stat.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.823694351 +0200
+@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@
+ 	stat->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ 	stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ 	stat->size = i_size_read(inode);
+-	stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
+-	stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
++		stat->atime = inode->i_ctime;
++		stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime;
++	} else {
++		stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
++		stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
++	}
+ 	stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
+ 	stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+ 	stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks;
+@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@
+ 	stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS;
+ 	request_mask &= STATX_ALL;
+ 	query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS;
+-	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
+-		return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask,
+-					    query_flags);
++	if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
++		int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
++		if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
++			stat->atime = stat->ctime;
++			stat->mtime = stat->ctime;
++		}
++		return retval;
++	}
+ 
+ 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
+ 	return 0;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/cache.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/cache.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/cache.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/cache.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.823694351 +0200
+@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
+ #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
+ #endif
+ 
++#define __read_only __ro_after_init
++
+ #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
+ #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
+ #endif
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/capability.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/capability.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/capability.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/capability.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.823694351 +0200
+@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
+ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+ 				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ extern bool capable(int cap);
++extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
+ extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ #else
+@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@
+ {
+ 	return true;
+ }
++static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
++{
++	return true;
++}
+ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+ {
+ 	return true;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/fs.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/fs.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/fs.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/fs.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.823694351 +0200
+@@ -3407,4 +3407,15 @@
+ extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path);
+ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode);
+ 
++extern int device_sidechannel_restrict;
++
++static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++	umode_t mode;
++	if (!device_sidechannel_restrict)
++		return false;
++	mode = inode->i_mode;
++	return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH)));
++}
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/fsnotify.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/fsnotify.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/fsnotify.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.823694351 +0200
+@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@
+ 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ 	__u32 mask = FS_ACCESS;
+ 
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
++		return;
++
+ 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ 		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
+ 
+@@ -199,6 +202,9 @@
+ 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ 	__u32 mask = FS_MODIFY;
+ 
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
++		return;
++
+ 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ 		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/gfp.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/gfp.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/gfp.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/gfp.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.824694351 +0200
+@@ -513,9 +513,9 @@
+ extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
+ extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
+ 
+-void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
++void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size);
+-void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
++void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ 
+ #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \
+ 		__get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0)
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/highmem.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/highmem.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/highmem.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/highmem.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.824694351 +0200
+@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@
+ 	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+ }
+ 
++static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page)
++{
++	void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
++	BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE));
++	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
++}
++
+ static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page,
+ 	unsigned start1, unsigned end1,
+ 	unsigned start2, unsigned end2)
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/interrupt.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/interrupt.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/interrupt.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/interrupt.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.824694351 +0200
+@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
+ 
+ struct softirq_action
+ {
+-	void	(*action)(struct softirq_action *);
++	void	(*action)(void);
+ };
+ 
+ asmlinkage void do_softirq(void);
+@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *));
++extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void));
+ extern void softirq_init(void);
+ extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr);
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/kobject_ns.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/kobject_ns.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/kobject_ns.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.824694351 +0200
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
+ 	void (*drop_ns)(void *);
+ };
+ 
+-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
+ int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
+ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
+ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/mm.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/mm.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/mm.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/mm.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.824694351 +0200
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node);
++extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+ {
+ 	return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/percpu.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/percpu.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/percpu.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/percpu.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
+ 				pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn);
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr);
+ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
+ 
+@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@
+ extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp);
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata);
+ extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr);
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/perf_event.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/perf_event.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/perf_event.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/perf_event.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -1151,6 +1151,11 @@
+ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ 				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ 
++static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
++{
++	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
++}
++
+ static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
+ {
+ 	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/slab.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/slab.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/slab.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/slab.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@
+ /*
+  * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators
+  */
+-void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
+-void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
++void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
++void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2)));
+ void kfree(const void *);
+ void kzfree(const void *);
+ size_t ksize(const void *);
+@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@
+ }
+ #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
+ 
+-void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
++void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
+ void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *);
+ 
+@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+-void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
++void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
+ #else
+ static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@
+  * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of
+  * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h.
+  */
+-static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+ {
+ 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+ 		if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
+@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+ {
+ #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
+ 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/slub_def.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/slub_def.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/slub_def.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/slub_def.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@
+ 	unsigned long random;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++	unsigned long random_active;
++	unsigned long random_inactive;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node.
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/string.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/string.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/string.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/string.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -235,10 +235,16 @@
+ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter");
+ void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1)
++#else
++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0)
++#endif
++
+ #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+ 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ 		__write_overflow();
+ 	if (p_size < size)
+@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@
+ 
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+ 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ 		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
+ 	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
+@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
+ {
+ 	__kernel_size_t ret;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+ 
+ 	/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
+ 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
+@@ -274,7 +280,7 @@
+ extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+ 	__kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
+ 	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
+ 		fortify_panic(__func__);
+@@ -286,8 +292,8 @@
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+ {
+ 	size_t ret;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+ 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ 		return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
+ 	ret = strlen(q);
+@@ -307,8 +313,8 @@
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
+ {
+ 	size_t p_len, copy_len;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+ 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ 		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
+ 	p_len = strlen(p);
+@@ -421,8 +427,8 @@
+ /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+ 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ 		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
+ 	memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/tty.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/tty.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/tty.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/tty.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.825694351 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/llist.h>
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+ 
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -335,6 +336,7 @@
+ 	/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
+ 	struct work_struct SAK_work;
+ 	struct tty_port *port;
++	struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
+ } __randomize_layout;
+ 
+ /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
+@@ -344,6 +346,8 @@
+ 	struct list_head list;
+ };
+ 
++extern int tiocsti_restrict;
++
+ /* tty magic number */
+ #define TTY_MAGIC		0x5401
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/include/linux/vmalloc.h linux-4.16-p/include/linux/vmalloc.h
+--- linux-4.16/include/linux/vmalloc.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/include/linux/vmalloc.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.826694350 +0200
+@@ -68,19 +68,19 @@
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
+-extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
+-extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot);
++extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
+ 			unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
+ 			pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
+-			const void *caller);
++			const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
+ static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/init/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/init/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/init/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/init/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.826694350 +0200
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@
+ config AUDIT
+ 	bool "Auditing support"
+ 	depends on NET
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
+ 	  kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
+@@ -1039,6 +1040,12 @@
+ 
+ endchoice
+ 
++config LOCAL_INIT
++	bool "Zero uninitialized locals"
++	help
++	  Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length
++	  arrays. Requires compiler support.
++
+ config SYSCTL
+ 	bool
+ 
+@@ -1296,8 +1303,7 @@
+ 	  which may be appropriate on small systems without swap.
+ 
+ config AIO
+-	bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable AIO support"
+ 	help
+ 	  This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used
+ 	  by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling
+@@ -1502,7 +1508,7 @@
+ 
+ config SLUB_DEBUG
+ 	default y
+-	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT
++	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support"
+ 	depends on SLUB && SYSFS
+ 	help
+ 	  SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can
+@@ -1526,7 +1532,6 @@
+ 
+ config COMPAT_BRK
+ 	bool "Disable heap randomization"
+-	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
+ 	  also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
+@@ -1573,7 +1578,6 @@
+ 
+ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+ 	bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
+-	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
+ 	  merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
+@@ -1586,9 +1590,9 @@
+ 	  command line.
+ 
+ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
+-	default n
+ 	depends on SLAB || SLUB
+ 	bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
+ 	  security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
+@@ -1597,12 +1601,56 @@
+ config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+ 	bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
+ 	depends on SLUB
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
+ 	  other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
+ 	  sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
+ 	  freelist exploit methods.
+ 
++config SLAB_HARDENED
++	default y
++	depends on SLUB
++	bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure"
++	help
++          Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab
++          allocator.
++
++config SLAB_CANARY
++	depends on SLUB
++	depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
++	bool "SLAB canaries"
++	default y
++	help
++	  Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing
++	  some performance and memory usage for security.
++
++	  Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations
++	  are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides
++	  basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY.
++
++	  Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate
++	  non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero
++	  byte and provide basic double-free detection.
++
++config SLAB_SANITIZE
++	bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations"
++	depends on SLUB
++	default y
++	help
++	  Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
++	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
++
++	  For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact.
++
++config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY
++	depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE
++	default y
++	bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations"
++	help
++	  Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect
++	  write-after-free bugs.
++
+ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
+ 	default y
+ 	depends on SLUB && SMP
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/audit.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/audit.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/audit.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/audit.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.826694350 +0200
+@@ -1578,6 +1578,9 @@
+ 
+ 	if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
+ 		audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
++	else if (!audit_ever_enabled)
++		audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED;
++
+ 	if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
+ 		panic("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default);
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/capability.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/capability.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/capability.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/capability.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.826694350 +0200
+@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@
+ 	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
++
++bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
++{
++	return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
+ 
+ /**
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/events/core.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/events/core.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/events/core.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/events/core.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.828694350 +0200
+@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@
+  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
+  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
+  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
++ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
++#else
+ int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
+ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
+@@ -9915,6 +9920,9 @@
+ 	if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/fork.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/fork.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/fork.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/fork.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.828694350 +0200
+@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@
+ 
+ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+ #include <trace/events/task.h>
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#else
++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
+@@ -1591,6 +1596,10 @@
+ 	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
+ 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ 
++	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
+ 	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
+@@ -2385,6 +2394,12 @@
+ 	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
+ 		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
+ 
++	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			goto bad_unshare_out;
++	}
++
+ 	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/power/snapshot.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/power/snapshot.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/power/snapshot.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.828694350 +0200
+@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
+ 
+ void clear_free_pages(void)
+ {
+-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)
+ 	struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map;
+ 	unsigned long pfn;
+ 
+@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 	memory_bm_position_reset(bm);
+ 	pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n");
+-#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */
++#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/rcu/tiny.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/rcu/tiny.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/rcu/tiny.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.829694349 +0200
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
+ {
+ 	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk);
+ 	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/rcu/tree.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/rcu/tree.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/rcu/tree.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/rcu/tree.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.829694349 +0200
+@@ -2906,7 +2906,7 @@
+ /*
+  * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
+ {
+ 	struct rcu_state *rsp;
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/sched/fair.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/sched/fair.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/sched/fair.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/sched/fair.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.830694349 +0200
+@@ -9387,7 +9387,7 @@
+  * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick.
+  * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set).
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void)
+ {
+ 	struct rq *this_rq = this_rq();
+ 	enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ?
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/softirq.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/softirq.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/softirq.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/softirq.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.830694349 +0200
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_stat);
+ #endif
+ 
+-static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
++static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+ 
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd);
+ 
+@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@
+ 		kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr);
+ 
+ 		trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr);
+-		h->action(h);
++		h->action();
+ 		trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr);
+ 		if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
+ 			pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n",
+@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@
+ 	or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr);
+ }
+ 
+-void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
++void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void))
+ {
+ 	softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
+ }
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule);
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void)
+ {
+ 	struct tasklet_struct *list;
+ 
+@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a)
++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void)
+ {
+ 	struct tasklet_struct *list;
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/sysctl.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/sysctl.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/sysctl.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/sysctl.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.831694349 +0200
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include <linux/bpf.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
++#include <linux/tty.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -99,12 +100,19 @@
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
+ 
+ /* External variables not in a header file. */
++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
++int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
++#endif
+ extern int suid_dumpable;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
+ extern int core_uses_pid;
+ extern char core_pattern[];
+ extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#endif
+ extern int pid_max;
+ extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
+ extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
+@@ -116,40 +124,43 @@
+ 
+ /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
+-static int sixty = 60;
++static int sixty __read_only = 60;
+ #endif
+ 
+-static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
++static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1;
+ 
+ static int zero;
+-static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
+-static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
+-static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
+-static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
+-static int one_hundred = 100;
+-static int one_thousand = 1000;
++static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1;
++static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2;
++static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4;
++static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1;
++static int one_hundred __read_only = 100;
++static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
+-static int ten_thousand = 10000;
++static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+-static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
++static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024;
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */
+-static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
++static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ 
+ /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
+-static int maxolduid = 65535;
+-static int minolduid;
++static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535;
++static int minolduid __read_only;
+ 
+-static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
++static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX;
+ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
+ 
+ /*this is needed for proc_doulongvec_minmax of sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
+-static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
++static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
+ #endif
+ 
++int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
+ #include <linux/inotify.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -289,19 +300,19 @@
+ };
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
+-static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
+-static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+-static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns;			/* 0 usecs */
+-static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
++static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
++static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
++static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only;			/* 0 usecs */
++static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+-static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
+-static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
++static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
++static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION
+-static int min_extfrag_threshold;
+-static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000;
++static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only;
++static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000;
+ #endif
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -515,6 +526,15 @@
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++	{
++		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
++		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "tainted",
+@@ -857,6 +877,37 @@
+ 		.extra2		= &two,
+ 	},
+ #endif
++#if defined CONFIG_TTY
++	{
++		.procname	= "tiocsti_restrict",
++		.data		= &tiocsti_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
++#endif
++	{
++		.procname	= "device_sidechannel_restrict",
++		.data		= &device_sidechannel_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
++	{
++		.procname	= "deny_new_usb",
++		.data		= &deny_new_usb,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
++#endif
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
+ 		.data		= &ngroups_max,
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/time/hrtimer.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/time/hrtimer.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/time/hrtimer.c	2018-04-12 15:57:40.443687638 +0200
+@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void)
+ {
+ 	struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/time/timer.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/time/timer.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/time/timer.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/time/timer.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.831694349 +0200
+@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@
+ /*
+  * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void)
+ {
+ 	struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]);
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/kernel/user_namespace.c linux-4.16-p/kernel/user_namespace.c
+--- linux-4.16/kernel/user_namespace.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/kernel/user_namespace.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.831694349 +0200
+@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
+ #include <linux/bsearch.h>
+ #include <linux/sort.h>
+ 
++/* sysctl */
++int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++
+ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/lib/irq_poll.c linux-4.16-p/lib/irq_poll.c
+--- linux-4.16/lib/irq_poll.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/lib/irq_poll.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.831694349 +0200
+@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete);
+ 
+-static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void)
+ {
+ 	struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll);
+ 	int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/lib/Kconfig.debug linux-4.16-p/lib/Kconfig.debug
+--- linux-4.16/lib/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/lib/Kconfig.debug	2018-04-12 15:57:20.832694348 +0200
+@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@
+ 
+ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
+ 	bool "Panic on Oops"
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
+ 	  has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
+@@ -954,7 +955,7 @@
+ 	  anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data
+ 	  corruption or other issues.
+ 
+-	  Say N if unsure.
++	  Say Y if unsure.
+ 
+ config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE
+ 	int
+@@ -1309,6 +1310,7 @@
+ config DEBUG_LIST
+ 	bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
+ 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
+ 	  walking routines.
+@@ -1949,6 +1951,7 @@
+ config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ 	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
+ 	select DEBUG_LIST
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
+ 	  data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
+@@ -1988,6 +1991,7 @@
+ config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM
+ 	bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem"
+ 	depends on STRICT_DEVMEM
++	default y
+ 	---help---
+ 	  If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
+ 	  io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/lib/kobject.c linux-4.16-p/lib/kobject.c
+--- linux-4.16/lib/kobject.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/lib/kobject.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.832694348 +0200
+@@ -956,9 +956,9 @@
+ 
+ 
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock);
+-static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES];
++static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init;
+ 
+-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
+ {
+ 	enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type;
+ 	int error;
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/lib/nlattr.c linux-4.16-p/lib/nlattr.c
+--- linux-4.16/lib/nlattr.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/lib/nlattr.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.832694348 +0200
+@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@
+ {
+ 	int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src));
+ 
++	BUG_ON(minlen < 0);
++
+ 	memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen);
+ 	if (count > minlen)
+ 		memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/lib/vsprintf.c linux-4.16-p/lib/vsprintf.c
+--- linux-4.16/lib/vsprintf.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/lib/vsprintf.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.832694348 +0200
+@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@
+ 	return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
+ }
+ 
+-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
++int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2;
+ 
+ static noinline_for_stack
+ char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/Makefile linux-4.16-p/Makefile
+--- linux-4.16/Makefile	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/Makefile	2018-04-12 15:57:20.833694348 +0200
+@@ -734,6 +734,9 @@
+ endif
+ 
+ ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
++ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT
++KBUILD_CFLAGS   += -fsanitize=local-init
++endif
+ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/mm/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/mm/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.833694348 +0200
+@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@
+ config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+         int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+ 	depends on MMU
+-        default 4096
++	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
++	default 65536
+         help
+ 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+ 	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/mmap.c linux-4.16-p/mm/mmap.c
+--- linux-4.16/mm/mmap.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/mmap.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.833694348 +0200
+@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@
+ 
+ 	newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk);
+ 	oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk);
++	/* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */
++	if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) {
++		if (brk == min_brk)
++			newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
++		if (mm->brk == min_brk)
++			oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
++	}
+ 	if (oldbrk == newbrk)
+ 		goto set_brk;
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/page_alloc.c linux-4.16-p/mm/page_alloc.c
+--- linux-4.16/mm/page_alloc.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/page_alloc.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.834694348 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+ #include <linux/lockdep.h>
+ #include <linux/nmi.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+@@ -101,6 +102,15 @@
+ DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex);
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain);
+ 
++bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy;
++
++static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str)
++{
++	extra_latent_entropy = true;
++	return 0;
++}
++early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+ volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
+@@ -1069,6 +1079,13 @@
+ 		debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page),
+ 					   PAGE_SIZE << order);
+ 	}
++
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) {
++		int i;
++		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
++			clear_highpage(page + i);
++	}
++
+ 	arch_free_page(page, order);
+ 	kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
+ 	kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
+@@ -1286,6 +1303,21 @@
+ 	__ClearPageReserved(p);
+ 	set_page_count(p, 0);
+ 
++	if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) {
++		unsigned long hash = 0;
++		size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash;
++		const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page);
++
++		for (index = 0; index < end; index++)
++			hash ^= hash + data[index];
++#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
++		latent_entropy ^= hash;
++		add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
++#else
++		add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash));
++#endif
++	}
++
+ 	page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages;
+ 	set_page_refcounted(page);
+ 	__free_pages(page, order);
+@@ -1754,8 +1786,8 @@
+ 
+ static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void)
+ {
+-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) &&
+-		page_poisoning_enabled();
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) ||
++		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled());
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
+@@ -1812,6 +1844,11 @@
+ 
+ 	post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags);
+ 
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) {
++		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
++			verify_zero_highpage(page + i);
++	}
++
+ 	if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO))
+ 		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+ 			clear_highpage(page + i);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/slab_common.c linux-4.16-p/mm/slab_common.c
+--- linux-4.16/mm/slab_common.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/slab_common.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.834694348 +0200
+@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "slab.h"
+ 
+-enum slab_state slab_state;
++enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init;
+ LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
+ DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
+-struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
++struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init;
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
+ /*
+  * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
+  */
+-static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
++static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
+ 
+ static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
+ {
+@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@
+  * of two cache sizes there. The size of larger slabs can be determined using
+  * fls.
+  */
+-static s8 size_index[24] = {
++static s8 size_index[24] __ro_after_init = {
+ 	3,	/* 8 */
+ 	4,	/* 16 */
+ 	5,	/* 24 */
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/slab.h linux-4.16-p/mm/slab.h
+--- linux-4.16/mm/slab.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/slab.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.835694347 +0200
+@@ -312,7 +312,11 @@
+ static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s,
+ 				      struct kmem_cache *p)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
++	return p == s;
++#else
+ 	return true;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s)
+@@ -364,18 +368,26 @@
+ 	 * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root
+ 	 * will also be a constant.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
++	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) &&
++	    !memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
+ 	    !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS))
+ 		return s;
+ 
+ 	page = virt_to_head_page(x);
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
++	BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page));
++#endif
+ 	cachep = page->slab_cache;
+ 	if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s))
+ 		return cachep;
+ 
+ 	pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
+ 	       __func__, s->name, cachep->name);
++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++	BUG_ON(1);
++#else
+ 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
++#endif
+ 	return s;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -400,7 +412,7 @@
+ 	 * back there or track user information then we can
+ 	 * only use the space before that information.
+ 	 */
+-	if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER))
++	if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+ 		return s->inuse;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/slub.c linux-4.16-p/mm/slub.c
+--- linux-4.16/mm/slub.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/slub.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.835694347 +0200
+@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s)
++{
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON));
++}
++
++static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s)
++{
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s);
++}
++
+ void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
+ {
+ 	if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
+@@ -299,6 +309,35 @@
+ 	*(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
++{
++	if (s->offset)
++		return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
++	return object + s->inuse;
++}
++
++static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value)
++{
++	return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK;
++}
++
++static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
++{
++	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
++	*canary = get_canary_value(canary, value);
++}
++
++static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
++{
++	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
++	BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value));
++}
++#else
++#define set_canary(s, object, value)
++#define check_canary(s, object, value)
++#endif
++
+ /* Loop over all objects in a slab */
+ #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \
+ 	for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \
+@@ -486,13 +525,13 @@
+  * Debug settings:
+  */
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON)
+-static slab_flags_t slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
++static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+ #else
+-static slab_flags_t slub_debug;
++static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init;
+ #endif
+ 
+-static char *slub_debug_slabs;
+-static int disable_higher_order_debug;
++static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init;
++static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init;
+ 
+ /*
+  * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata.  This memory lies
+@@ -552,6 +591,9 @@
+ 	else
+ 		p = object + s->inuse;
+ 
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *);
++
+ 	return p + alloc;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -690,6 +732,9 @@
+ 	else
+ 		off = s->inuse;
+ 
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		off += sizeof(void *);
++
+ 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+ 		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
+ 
+@@ -819,6 +864,9 @@
+ 		/* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
+ 		off += sizeof(void *);
+ 
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		off += sizeof(void *);
++
+ 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+ 		/* We also have user information there */
+ 		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
+@@ -1420,8 +1468,9 @@
+ 				void *object)
+ {
+ 	setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
++	set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
+ 	kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object);
+-	if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
++	if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
+ 		kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
+ 		s->ctor(object);
+ 		kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
+@@ -2719,9 +2768,21 @@
+ 		stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
++	if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) {
++		size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++		BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
++		if (s->ctor)
++			s->ctor(object);
++		if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++			memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *));
++	} else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
+ 		memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
+ 
++	if (object) {
++		check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
++		set_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
++	}
++
+ 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
+ 
+ 	return object;
+@@ -2928,6 +2989,27 @@
+ 	void *tail_obj = tail ? : head;
+ 	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
+ 	unsigned long tid;
++	bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s);
++
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) {
++		__maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++		void *x = head;
++
++		while (1) {
++			check_canary(s, x, s->random_active);
++			set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive);
++
++			if (sanitize) {
++				memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset);
++				if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor)
++					s->ctor(x);
++			}
++			if (x == tail_obj)
++				break;
++			x = get_freepointer(s, x);
++		}
++	}
++
+ redo:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab.
+@@ -3106,7 +3188,7 @@
+ 			  void **p)
+ {
+ 	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
+-	int i;
++	int i, k;
+ 
+ 	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
+ 	s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
+@@ -3143,13 +3225,29 @@
+ 	local_irq_enable();
+ 
+ 	/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
+-	if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
++	if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
++		int j;
++
++		for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++			size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++			BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
++			if (s->ctor)
++				s->ctor(p[j]);
++			if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++				memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *));
++		}
++	} else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
+ 		int j;
+ 
+ 		for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ 			memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size);
+ 	}
+ 
++	for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
++		check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive);
++		set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active);
++	}
++
+ 	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
+ 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p);
+ 	return i;
+@@ -3181,9 +3279,9 @@
+  * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
+  * take the list_lock.
+  */
+-static int slub_min_order;
+-static int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
+-static int slub_min_objects;
++static int slub_min_order __ro_after_init;
++static int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
++static int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init;
+ 
+ /*
+  * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
+@@ -3353,6 +3451,7 @@
+ 	init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
+ 	init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
+ #endif
++	set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active);
+ 	kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
+ 		      GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	init_kmem_cache_node(n);
+@@ -3509,6 +3608,9 @@
+ 		size += sizeof(void *);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		size += sizeof(void *);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
+ 	if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+ 		/*
+@@ -3579,6 +3681,10 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+ 	s->random = get_random_long();
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++	s->random_active = get_random_long();
++	s->random_inactive = get_random_long();
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+ 		s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+@@ -3846,6 +3952,8 @@
+ 		offset -= s->red_left_pad;
+ 	}
+ 
++	check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active);
++
+ 	/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
+ 	if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
+ 	    offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
+@@ -3879,7 +3987,11 @@
+ 	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+ 
+ 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++		BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
++#else
+ 		WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page));
++#endif
+ 		return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -4744,7 +4856,7 @@
+ #define SO_TOTAL	(1 << SL_TOTAL)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
+-static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
++static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
+ 
+ static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str)
+ {
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/mm/swap.c linux-4.16-p/mm/swap.c
+--- linux-4.16/mm/swap.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/mm/swap.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.836694347 +0200
+@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@
+ 	if (!PageHuge(page))
+ 		__page_cache_release(page);
+ 	dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
++	if (!PageHuge(page))
++		BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page
++#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
++			&& dtor != free_transhuge_page
++#endif
++		);
++
+ 	(*dtor)(page);
+ }
+ 
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/net/core/dev.c linux-4.16-p/net/core/dev.c
+--- linux-4.16/net/core/dev.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/net/core/dev.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.837694346 +0200
+@@ -4196,7 +4196,7 @@
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni);
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void)
+ {
+ 	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
+ 
+@@ -5745,7 +5745,7 @@
+ 	return work;
+ }
+ 
+-static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void)
+ {
+ 	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
+ 	unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/net/ipv4/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/net/ipv4/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.837694346 +0200
+@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@
+ 
+ config SYN_COOKIES
+ 	bool "IP: TCP syncookie support"
++	default y
+ 	---help---
+ 	  Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
+ 	  flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/scripts/mod/modpost.c linux-4.16-p/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+--- linux-4.16/scripts/mod/modpost.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/scripts/mod/modpost.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.837694346 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ static int warn_unresolved = 0;
+ /* How a symbol is exported */
+ static int sec_mismatch_count = 0;
++static int writable_fptr_count = 0;
+ static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1;
+ static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0;
+ /* ignore missing files */
+@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@
+ 	ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT,
+ 	EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT,
+ 	EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
++	DATA_TO_TEXT
+ };
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -1091,6 +1093,12 @@
+ 	.good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL},
+ 	.mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
+ 	.handler = extable_mismatch_handler,
++},
++/* Do not reference code from writable data */
++{
++	.fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL },
++	.bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL },
++	.mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT
+ }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1240,10 +1248,10 @@
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION)
+ 			continue;
+-		if (sym->st_value == addr)
+-			return sym;
+ 		/* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */
+ 		d = sym->st_value - addr;
++		if (d == 0)
++			return sym;
+ 		if (d < 0)
+ 			d = addr - sym->st_value;
+ 		if (d < distance) {
+@@ -1402,7 +1410,11 @@
+ 	char *prl_from;
+ 	char *prl_to;
+ 
+-	sec_mismatch_count++;
++	if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT)
++		writable_fptr_count++;
++	else
++		sec_mismatch_count++;
++
+ 	if (!sec_mismatch_verbose)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -1526,6 +1538,14 @@
+ 		fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, "
+ 		      "we should never get here.");
+ 		break;
++	case DATA_TO_TEXT:
++#if 0
++		fprintf(stderr,
++		"The %s %s:%s references\n"
++		"the %s %s:%s%s\n",
++		from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p);
++#endif
++		break;
+ 	}
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+@@ -2539,6 +2559,14 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	free(buf.p);
++	if (writable_fptr_count) {
++		if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) {
++			warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n"
++			     "To see full details build your kernel with:\n"
++			     "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n",
++			     writable_fptr_count);
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	return err;
+ }
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/security/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/security/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/security/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/security/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.837694346 +0200
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ 
+ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+ 	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+-	default n
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+ 	  syslog via dmesg(8).
+@@ -18,10 +18,34 @@
+ 
+ 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+ 
++config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
++	depends on PERF_EVENTS
++	default y
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
++	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
++	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
++	  changed.
++
++config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
++	default y
++	help
++	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
++	  into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
++	  ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
++
++	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
++	  unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
++
++	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
++
+ config SECURITY
+ 	bool "Enable different security models"
+ 	depends on SYSFS
+ 	depends on MULTIUSER
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
+ 	  configured into your kernel.
+@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@
+ config SECURITY_NETWORK
+ 	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
+ 	depends on SECURITY
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
+ 	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+@@ -155,6 +180,7 @@
+ 	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ 	select BUG
+ 	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+ 	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+@@ -192,10 +218,36 @@
+ config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ 	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+ 	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+ 	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+ 
++config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
++	bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows"
++	depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE
++	depends on EXPERT
++	help
++	  Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects
++	  for common C string functions rather than only between objects.
++
++	  This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding.
++
++config PAGE_SANITIZE
++	bool "Sanitize pages"
++	default y
++	help
++	  Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
++	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
++
++config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY
++	bool "Verify sanitized pages"
++	depends on PAGE_SANITIZE
++	default y
++	help
++	  Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect
++	  write-after-free bugs.
++
+ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+ 	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
+ 	help
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/security/selinux/include/objsec.h linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+--- linux-4.16/security/selinux/include/objsec.h	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/include/objsec.h	2018-04-12 15:57:20.837694346 +0200
+@@ -154,6 +154,6 @@
+ 	u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+ };
+ 
+-extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
++extern const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
+ 
+ #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/security/selinux/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/security/selinux/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.838694346 +0200
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ 	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
+ 	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+ 	select NETWORK_SECMARK
+-	default n
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+ 	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@
+ 	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+ 	  /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+ 	  tools such as avcstat.
+-
+-config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
+-	int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
+-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+-	range 0 1
+-	default 0
+-	help
+-	  This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
+-	  that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
+-	  by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
+-	  kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
+-	  mmap and mprotect calls.  If this option is set to 0 (zero),
+-	  SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
+-	  by the kernel.  If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
+-	  default to checking the protection requested by the application.
+-	  The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
+-	  'checkreqprot=' boot parameter.  It may also be changed at runtime
+-	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
+-
+-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+--- linux-4.16/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c	2018-04-12 15:57:20.838694346 +0200
+@@ -41,16 +41,7 @@
+ #include "objsec.h"
+ #include "conditional.h"
+ 
+-unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+-
+-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+-{
+-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+-		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+-	return 1;
+-}
+-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
++const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
+ 
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
+ 
+@@ -610,10 +601,9 @@
+ 		return PTR_ERR(page);
+ 
+ 	length = -EINVAL;
+-	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
++	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+ 	length = count;
+ out:
+ 	kfree(page);
+diff -Naur linux-4.16/security/yama/Kconfig linux-4.16-p/security/yama/Kconfig
+--- linux-4.16/security/yama/Kconfig	2018-04-01 23:20:27.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-4.16-p/security/yama/Kconfig	2018-04-12 15:57:20.838694346 +0200
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ config SECURITY_YAMA
+ 	bool "Yama support"
+ 	depends on SECURITY
+-	default n
++	default y
+ 	help
+ 	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
+ 	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
author	V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org>	2018-04-12 16:09:15 +0100
committer	V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org>	2018-04-12 16:09:15 +0100
commit	8d7700344360c308ad67f4a7343a099cf6a9ab01 (patch)
tree	c1662d711f9cc233621f729f64ce916cd0113f69 /sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files
parent	d93832cc9b421b5bb503c0b547598bc4b59976b9 (diff)