diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys-kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch | 1312 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild (renamed from sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild) | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch | 1312 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild (renamed from sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild) | 0 |
8 files changed, 2444 insertions, 210 deletions
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest index e9c22b9a..2847081b 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest @@ -1 +1 @@ -DIST linux-4.19.104.tar.xz 103438092 BLAKE2B 10324dae2d3e29048f4ae9474eb3b9dc6c210e7d0fad017b07620ca600cf76bf144b026a47ef7ff11e1dbb9ed7e60bba7d51e8ef6b278b32cae2205ac478a48c SHA512 08bd31c37e413a5f1f785a0fd53d7f044255fc30bf6af15876c15a88ad533c1895d905f8708d93c7fa769b4f6b13af46b442ff213b8ac8a936fee433c8fcd012 +DIST linux-4.19.108.tar.xz 103408396 BLAKE2B d8130982ef7b1bbcdc6b1e4099b6bf5bd707f722b74b2e8cf8bcd45e510f3e39c8418851c923013a6919c4c45c43c65fae8f39ba92563f4645c1c3a3fcfd2937 SHA512 c39099f314fe22e902f561f0dd17fad021a9b8d4ad3c154709a7680e710980a44bcadf46092da7f1a0a9c6910a9b2a8116cc874f8991e197ff05fafe4312da2d diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config index 274f6f27..7dbc8f7a 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86 4.19.95-redcore-lts Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86 4.19.108-redcore-lts-legacy Kernel Configuration # # @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y CONFIG_UTS_NS=y CONFIG_IPC_NS=y CONFIG_USER_NS=y +# CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED is not set CONFIG_PID_NS=y CONFIG_NET_NS=y # CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is not set @@ -8743,6 +8744,16 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y # CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor" + +# +# Hardened Enhancements +# +CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO=y +# CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD is not set CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS=m CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE=m CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch index 3cba43ca..2f477148 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -index a29301d6e6c6..d3a259e762fa 100644 +index 8bf0c0532046..c81c652ecf44 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ index a29301d6e6c6..d3a259e762fa 100644 cio_ignore= [S390] See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. clk_ignore_unused -@@ -3165,6 +3155,11 @@ +@@ -3207,6 +3197,11 @@ the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if your oopses keep scrolling off the screen. @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ index 37a679501ddc..59b747920f4d 100644 The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index f7e7e365e2ff..7c69091b65a0 100644 +index 313f0c8dd66f..8e66fca67fd0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile -@@ -693,6 +693,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong +@@ -696,6 +696,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y) ifeq ($(cc-name),clang) @@ -115,10 +115,10 @@ index a336548487e6..bbe821420e7a 100644 Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -index 8790a29d0af4..265c6edd859f 100644 +index 51fe21f5d078..f345755446d9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -@@ -1031,6 +1031,7 @@ endif +@@ -1033,6 +1033,7 @@ endif config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching" @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ index 8790a29d0af4..265c6edd859f 100644 help Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved -@@ -1206,6 +1207,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE +@@ -1208,6 +1209,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES select RELOCATABLE @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ index 69c9170bdd24..a786227db0e3 100644 Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -index db8d364f8476..67441db36c07 100644 +index 1a4f8b67bbe8..85273063eb56 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ @@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ index 433b9554c6a1..1f4b06317c9f 100644 #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -index 7f1628effe6d..38bd2f95a961 100644 +index d6a49bb07a5f..16e4214c2305 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) +@@ -517,9 +517,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (is_compat_task()) @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ index 7f1628effe6d..38bd2f95a961 100644 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 +index af35f5caadbe..34e88af114bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1189,8 +1189,7 @@ config VM86 @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL ---help--- This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit -@@ -2274,7 +2273,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO +@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO choice prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" depends on X86_64 @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 help Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in -@@ -2355,8 +2354,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE +@@ -2400,8 +2399,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE be set to 'N' under normal conditions. config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -index 7d68f0c7cfb1..85f04bbeadd8 100644 +index 687cd1a213d5..29075c2bc51f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP @@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ index 79ec7add5f98..2950448e00ac 100644 native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE); /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -index 1073118b9bf0..2e34aede5c36 100644 +index a6458ab499c2..0be5291ec42e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1748,7 +1748,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) +@@ -1790,7 +1790,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); barrier(); @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ index 6a78d4b36a79..715009f7a96c 100644 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 +index 79b95910fd9f..fcda13aa03d0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c @@ -560,9 +560,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void) @@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); -@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) - #endif +@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ void arch_remove_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, + } #endif -int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly; @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { -@@ -925,12 +925,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) +@@ -922,12 +922,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start; @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", start, start+size); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 +index 81e85a8dd300..f0403d1ba1b0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); -@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) +@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) mem_init_print_info(NULL); } @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { -@@ -1250,9 +1250,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) +@@ -1239,9 +1239,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n", (end - start) >> 10); @@ -567,10 +567,10 @@ index 15c1f5e12eb8..ff72cccec5b8 100644 struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list; diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -index adf28788cab5..cd4b3501eda9 100644 +index 75d582ca917f..38ba030b8e27 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -@@ -5158,7 +5158,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) +@@ -5161,7 +5161,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) struct ata_port *ap; unsigned int tag; @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ index adf28788cab5..cd4b3501eda9 100644 ap = qc->ap; qc->flags = 0; -@@ -5175,7 +5175,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) +@@ -5178,7 +5178,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) struct ata_port *ap; struct ata_link *link; @@ -608,6 +608,306 @@ index 1df9cb8e659e..eb71148a4a69 100644 help Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports. +diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c +index 53e822793d46..c97b295338ce 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/random.c ++++ b/drivers/char/random.c +@@ -281,11 +281,20 @@ + /* + * Configuration information + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 18 ++#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 16 ++#else + #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 +-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) + #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 ++#endif ++#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) + #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 32768 ++#else + #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512 ++#endif + #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 + + +@@ -294,9 +303,6 @@ + /* + * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is + * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. +- * +- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in +- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. + */ + #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 + #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +@@ -361,15 +367,27 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; + */ + static struct poolinfo { + int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; +-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) +- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; +-} poolinfo_table[] = { ++#define S(x) \ ++ .poolbitshift = ilog2(x)+5, \ ++ .poolwords = (x), \ ++ .poolbytes = (x)*4, \ ++ .poolbits = (x)*32, \ ++ .poolfracbits = (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) ++ int tap[5]; ++} __randomize_layout poolinfo_table[] = { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++ /* x^8192 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ ++ { S(8192), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } }, ++ /* x^2048 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ ++ { S(2048), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } } ++#else + /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ + /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ +- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, ++ { S(128), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } }, + /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ + /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ +- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, ++ { S(32), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } }, ++#endif + #if 0 + /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ + { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, +@@ -413,7 +431,7 @@ struct crng_state { + __u32 state[16]; + unsigned long init_time; + spinlock_t lock; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + struct crng_state primary_crng = { + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), +@@ -475,7 +493,7 @@ struct entropy_store { + unsigned int initialized:1; + unsigned int last_data_init:1; + __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, + size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); +@@ -486,6 +504,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); + static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); + static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; + static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; ++/* this actually doesn't need latent entropy */ ++static __u32 secondary_xfer_buffer[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; + + static struct entropy_store input_pool = { + .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], +@@ -504,9 +524,78 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { + push_to_pool), + }; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++static __u32 const twist_table[64][4] = { ++ { 0x6a09e668, 0xbb67ae86, 0x3c6ef373, 0xa54ff53a }, ++ { 0x510e5280, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ac, 0x5be0cd19 }, ++ { 0xcbbb9d5e, 0x629a292a, 0x9159015a, 0x152fecd9 }, ++ { 0x67332668, 0x8eb44a87, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x47b5481e }, ++ { 0xae5f9157, 0xcf6c85d4, 0x2f73477d, 0x6d1826cb }, ++ { 0x8b43d457, 0xe360b597, 0x1c456003, 0x6f196331 }, ++ { 0xd94ebeb2, 0x0cc4a612, 0x261dc1f3, 0x5815a7be }, ++ { 0x70b7ed68, 0xa1513c69, 0x44f93636, 0x720dcdfe }, ++ { 0xb467369e, 0xca320b76, 0x34e0d42e, 0x49c7d9be }, ++ { 0x87abb9f2, 0xc463a2fc, 0xec3fc3f4, 0x27277f6d }, ++ { 0x610bebf3, 0x7420b49f, 0xd1fd8a34, 0xe4773594 }, ++ { 0x092197f6, 0x1b530c96, 0x869d6343, 0xeee52e50 }, ++ { 0x1107668a, 0x21fba37c, 0x43ab9fb6, 0x75a9f91d }, ++ { 0x8630501a, 0xd7cd8174, 0x007fe010, 0x0379f514 }, ++ { 0x066b651b, 0x0764ab84, 0x0a4b06be, 0x0c3578c1 }, ++ { 0x0d2962a5, 0x11e039f4, 0x1857b7bf, 0x1a29bf2e }, ++ { 0x1b11a32f, 0x1cdf34e8, 0x23183042, 0x25b89093 }, ++ { 0x2a0c06a1, 0x2ae79843, 0x2c9cda69, 0x2f281f24 }, ++ { 0x32841259, 0x3502e64e, 0x377c9c21, 0x39204cda }, ++ { 0x3b91bf66, 0x3ecc38ca, 0x40665609, 0x43947938 }, ++ { 0x47830769, 0x484ae4b8, 0x4c2b2b75, 0x4cf03d21 }, ++ { 0x4f3cbb11, 0x50c2d3b5, 0x5308af16, 0x560a7a9a }, ++ { 0x5788d981, 0x584769b4, 0x59c34f06, 0x5e2d564c }, ++ { 0x6116d760, 0x62894c10, 0x6569b58c, 0x66d7b394 }, ++ { 0x68f9f8dc, 0x6d34f03d, 0x6de8372f, 0x742687a4 }, ++ { 0x76356021, 0x799d1235, 0x7ba455f4, 0x7da8d73b }, ++ { 0x7e546743, 0x80554bdc, 0x83a63a3c, 0x85a01e39 }, ++ { 0x879774ac, 0x883eac9f, 0x8a32aae0, 0x8c243210 }, ++ { 0x8d6e8781, 0x8e134b6f, 0x91ea5892, 0x95166fe4 }, ++ { 0x95b817e6, 0x96faa747, 0x98dca135, 0x9abc6593 }, ++ { 0x9b5bd55a, 0x9f136df7, 0xa04ebd79, 0xa225f6ed }, ++ { 0xa4970e49, 0xa79f5a6b, 0xaa0869af, 0xad06dcbd }, ++ { 0xaf68312e, 0xb12efe0b, 0xb2f3ef5b, 0xb420e03a }, ++ { 0xb6785656, 0xb837d738, 0xb9613115, 0xbbb18efb }, ++ { 0xbcd89621, 0xc0db3814, 0xc3b2f2a3, 0xc71638d9 }, ++ { 0xc7a6240f, 0xca73166e, 0xcb01f3ba, 0xcc1f293d }, ++ { 0xccad81c8, 0xcf72acaf, 0xd34c7258, 0xd4649b7a }, ++ { 0xd4f07147, 0xd607a013, 0xd9d3b47b, 0xdae803b5 }, ++ { 0xdb71ef1a, 0xdc854e24, 0xe1dcf0ea, 0xe2eca719 }, ++ { 0xe50a4ad8, 0xe7ac0990, 0xe9c46d3a, 0xeacfc33c }, ++ { 0xec5fb417, 0xedee611c, 0xf18bc533, 0xf292ef77 }, ++ { 0xf41cab36, 0xf5a531ec, 0xf7aeb45d, 0xf93474e9 }, ++ { 0xfc3c7559, 0xfd3e1962, 0xfebf9bc1, 0xff3fdbf2 }, ++ { 0x01bf3cab, 0x023ebd6b, 0x03bc8288, 0x06365a0f }, ++ { 0x06b4c1d2, 0x092afcc1, 0x09a8ad2c, 0x0b21093c }, ++ { 0x0f83d25e, 0x107c1074, 0x10f803d0, 0x11ef938d }, ++ { 0x136212e8, 0x14d390a4, 0x16beab25, 0x182dd7d5 }, ++ { 0x199c09bf, 0x1ed27f46, 0x1f4b2d3e, 0x21a502bc }, ++ { 0x23849e06, 0x25d9d3da, 0x273ef0ca, 0x28a326f6 }, ++ { 0x2a7cb5e4, 0x2d4019ba, 0x2e2b1e73, 0x2f8aec73 }, ++ { 0x30e9ddcc, 0x315ea828, 0x32bc75cf, 0x357587f0 }, ++ { 0x37b7de93, 0x3bc31ec6, 0x3c35b24a, 0x3d1a949b }, ++ { 0x3e713d15, 0x3ee347da, 0x4038e0bf, 0x411c2bae }, ++ { 0x418daf9a, 0x4270749e, 0x4516b0b0, 0x45876dcb }, ++ { 0x46d92246, 0x4e448a56, 0x4f9141c0, 0x50dd3e71 }, ++ { 0x5296c45b, 0x56738aac, 0x58961d02, 0x5b9010c1 }, ++ { 0x5c6913ae, 0x5cd577f2, 0x5dae0649, 0x5ef24aeb }, ++ { 0x60a199af, 0x6178ce9b, 0x61e44c97, 0x6326551c }, ++ { 0x65a86b29, 0x67bd7e12, 0x6827e41c, 0x68fc7925 }, ++ { 0x6966a836, 0x6a3acfa3, 0x6b78828a, 0x6df2017d }, ++ { 0x7068fdbb, 0x720c4495, 0x747f226b, 0x75b7a753 }, ++ { 0x7687a9e0, 0x77bf2d48, 0x795d98d4, 0x7a2c690b }, ++ { 0x7bc93fa8, 0x7c974690, 0x7f6653f3, 0x80333127 }, ++ { 0x81660244, 0x81cc2760, 0x829840e3, 0x83c9edd4 } ++}; ++#else + static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { + 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, + 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; ++#endif + + /* + * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not +@@ -521,17 +610,14 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { + static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, + int nbytes) + { +- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; ++ unsigned long i, n, t1, t2, tap[5]; + int input_rotate; + int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; + const char *bytes = in; + __u32 w; + +- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; +- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; +- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; +- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; +- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; ++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) ++ tap[n] = r->poolinfo->tap[n]; + + input_rotate = r->input_rotate; + i = r->add_ptr; +@@ -543,14 +629,17 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, + + /* XOR in the various taps */ + w ^= r->pool[i]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; ++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) ++ w ^= r->pool[(i + tap[n]) & wordmask]; + + /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++ t1 = rol32(w, 14) & 0x1FFF; // 0-63, 1111111111111 ++ t2 = rol32(w, t1) & 0x3; // 0-3, 11 ++ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[t1][t2]; ++#else + r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; ++#endif + + /* + * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. +@@ -588,7 +677,7 @@ struct fast_pool { + unsigned long last; + unsigned short reg_idx; + unsigned char count; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + /* + * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness +@@ -683,7 +772,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) + /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ + + do { +- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); ++ __u64 anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); + unsigned int add = + ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; + +@@ -1061,7 +1150,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) + + extract_crng(tmp); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); +- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } +@@ -1089,9 +1178,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) + struct timer_rand_state { + cycles_t last_time; + long last_delta, last_delta2; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + +-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; ++#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { .last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES }; + + /* + * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help +@@ -1334,20 +1423,18 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) + + static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) + { +- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; +- + int bytes = nbytes; + + /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ + bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); + /* but never more than the buffer size */ +- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); ++ bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(secondary_xfer_buffer)); + + trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, + ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); +- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, ++ bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes, + random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); +- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); ++ mix_pool_bytes(r, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes); + credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); + } + +@@ -1572,7 +1659,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, + + extract_buf(r, tmp); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); +- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } +@@ -2276,7 +2363,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { + }; + unsigned int position; + spinlock_t batch_lock; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + /* + * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig index e0a04bfc873e..ec93f827c599 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig @@ -661,10 +961,10 @@ index ac8025cd4a1f..a89e48f53fba 100644 return tty; } diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 +index 27486b0a027a..82689c97b660 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ +@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY 40 /* ns */ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX 65535 /* ns */ @@ -673,7 +973,7 @@ index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */ -@@ -4940,6 +4942,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, +@@ -4961,6 +4963,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, goto done; return; } @@ -686,8 +986,35 @@ index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) unit_load = 150; else +diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c +index e5126fad57c5..2a59499ba24d 100644 +--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c ++++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c +@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount; + static int debugfs_mount_count; + static bool debugfs_registered; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++extern int sysfs_restricted; ++#endif ++ + static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb) + { + struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb); +@@ -517,6 +521,11 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) + if (unlikely(!inode)) + return failed_creating(dentry); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ if (sysfs_restricted) ++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU; ++ else ++#endif + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; + inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c -index 433b1257694a..f86201f25a4c 100644 +index 561ea64829ec..5d40794103eb 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ @@ -708,10 +1035,21 @@ index 433b1257694a..f86201f25a4c 100644 err: up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index 914178cdbe94..7422b5ce077a 100644 +index 327844fedf3d..c1b2eafa3b30 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -885,10 +885,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) +@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ + + #define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX (PATH_MAX - offsetof(struct filename, iname)) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++extern int fifo_restrictions; ++#endif ++ + struct filename * + getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty) + { +@@ -885,10 +889,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) path_put(&last->link); } @@ -726,8 +1064,57 @@ index 914178cdbe94..7422b5ce077a 100644 /** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations +@@ -3252,6 +3256,32 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, + return error; + } + ++/* ++ * Handles possibly restricted FIFO operations ++ * if the user doesn't own this directory. ++ */ ++static int fifo_restricted(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const struct dentry *dir, ++ const int flag, ++ const int acc_mode) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++ const struct cred *cred; ++ struct inode *inode, *dir_inode; ++ ++ cred = current_cred(); ++ inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); ++ dir_inode = d_backing_inode(dir); ++ ++ if (fifo_restrictions && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) && ++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && ++ !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_inode->i_uid) && ++ !uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid)) ++ return -EACCES; ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* + * Handle the last step of open() + */ +@@ -3370,6 +3400,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, + return -ENOENT; + } + ++ /* ++ * Only check if O_CREAT is specified, all other checks need to go ++ * into may_open(). ++ */ ++ if (fifo_restricted(path.dentry, path.mnt, dir, open_flag, acc_mode)) { ++ path_to_nameidata(&path, nd); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + /* + * create/update audit record if it already exists. + */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644 +index ac3e06367cb6..06a2e4cf4cc1 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig @@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG @@ -785,6 +1172,76 @@ index f8e6fb2c3657..240c1432e18f 100644 generic_fillattr(inode, stat); return 0; +diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c +index feeae8081c22..a507113bbd3b 100644 +--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c ++++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c +@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ + + DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sysfs_symlink_target_lock); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++extern int sysfs_restricted; ++#endif ++ + void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name) + { + char *buf; +@@ -40,11 +44,19 @@ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name) + int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns) + { + struct kernfs_node *parent, *kn; ++ const char* name; ++ umode_t mode; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ const char *parent_name; ++#endif ++ + BUG_ON(!kobj); + ++ name = kobject_name(kobj); ++ + if (kobj->parent) + parent = kobj->parent->sd; + else +@@ -55,12 +67,30 @@ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns) + + kobject_get_ownership(kobj, &uid, &gid); + +- kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, kobject_name(kobj), +- S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, uid, gid, +- kobj, ns); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ if (sysfs_restricted) { ++ parent_name = parent->name; ++ mode = S_IRWXU; ++ ++ if ((!strcmp(parent_name, "") && (!strcmp(name, "devices") || ++ !strcmp(name, "fs"))) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "devices") && !strcmp(name, "system")) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "fs") && (!strcmp(name, "selinux") || ++ !strcmp(name, "fuse") || !strcmp(name, "ecryptfs"))) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "system") && !strcmp(name, "cpu"))) ++ mode |= S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++ } ++ else ++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++#else ++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++#endif ++ ++ kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, name, mode, uid, gid, kobj, ns); ++ + if (IS_ERR(kn)) { + if (PTR_ERR(kn) == -EEXIST) +- sysfs_warn_dup(parent, kobject_name(kobj)); ++ sysfs_warn_dup(parent, name); + return PTR_ERR(kn); + } + diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644 --- a/include/linux/cache.h @@ -822,10 +1279,10 @@ index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644 { return true; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h -index d4e1b43a53c3..c925cbdd1d95 100644 +index 92420009b9bc..9238f04686ce 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h -@@ -3466,4 +3466,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); +@@ -3468,4 +3468,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); extern int vfs_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice); @@ -866,10 +1323,10 @@ index fd1ce10553bf..1905d2476d32 100644 mask |= FS_ISDIR; diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h -index 24bcc5eec6b4..b1cdfc350596 100644 +index f78d1e89593f..ff139ff8d3d2 100644 --- a/include/linux/gfp.h +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h -@@ -530,9 +530,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, +@@ -553,9 +553,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask); @@ -935,7 +1392,7 @@ index 069aa2ebef90..cb9e3637a620 100644 const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent); const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj); diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h -index bdec425c8e14..58409dee149a 100644 +index 45f10f5896b7..7f251a536293 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) @@ -972,10 +1429,10 @@ index 70b7123f38c7..09f3019489b2 100644 extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr); diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h -index 42fc852bf512..a6c5cacee3b5 100644 +index d8b4d31acd18..205c79491de3 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h -@@ -1184,6 +1184,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, +@@ -1194,6 +1194,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); @@ -1137,7 +1594,7 @@ index f58e1ef76572..516caa40676e 100644 return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h -index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 +index 248a137112e8..02a63bec41ca 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty.h +++ b/include/linux/tty.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ @@ -1148,7 +1605,7 @@ index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 /* -@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ struct tty_struct { +@@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ struct tty_struct { /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */ struct work_struct SAK_work; struct tty_port *port; @@ -1156,7 +1613,7 @@ index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 } __randomize_layout; /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */ -@@ -345,6 +347,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { +@@ -347,6 +349,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { struct list_head list; }; @@ -1199,8 +1656,24 @@ index 398e9c95cd61..baab7195306a 100644 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags); static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node, +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h +index e42d13b55cf3..3228bcfe7599 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h +@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ + + #define IPVERSION 4 + #define MAXTTL 255 ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++#define IPDEFTTL 128 ++#else + #define IPDEFTTL 64 ++#endif + + #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0 + #define IPOPT_OLEN 1 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 +index 47035b5a46f6..efbd3ac00d92 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ config USELIB @@ -1211,7 +1684,30 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for -@@ -1091,6 +1092,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE +@@ -957,6 +958,22 @@ config USER_NS + + If unsure, say N. + ++config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED ++ bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces" ++ depends on USER_NS ++ default n ++ help ++ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create ++ new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces ++ has been part of several recent local privilege escalation ++ exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are ++ paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this. ++ ++ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the ++ kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl. ++ ++ If unsure, say N. ++ + config PID_NS + bool "PID Namespaces" + default y +@@ -1091,6 +1108,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE endchoice @@ -1224,7 +1720,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 config HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION bool help -@@ -1377,8 +1384,7 @@ config SHMEM +@@ -1377,8 +1400,7 @@ config SHMEM which may be appropriate on small systems without swap. config AIO @@ -1234,7 +1730,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling -@@ -1595,7 +1601,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS +@@ -1595,7 +1617,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS config SLUB_DEBUG default y @@ -1243,7 +1739,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 depends on SLUB && SYSFS help SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can -@@ -1619,7 +1625,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON +@@ -1619,7 +1641,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON config COMPAT_BRK bool "Disable heap randomization" @@ -1251,7 +1747,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). -@@ -1666,7 +1671,6 @@ endchoice +@@ -1666,7 +1687,6 @@ endchoice config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT bool "Allow slab caches to be merged" @@ -1259,7 +1755,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. -@@ -1679,9 +1683,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT +@@ -1679,9 +1699,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT command line. config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM @@ -1270,7 +1766,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab -@@ -1690,12 +1694,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM +@@ -1690,12 +1710,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED bool "Harden slab freelist metadata" depends on SLUB @@ -1328,10 +1824,10 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 default y depends on SLUB && SMP diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c -index 2a8058764aa6..14e7a763db43 100644 +index 1f08c38e604a..2c4f577a4317 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c -@@ -1628,6 +1628,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) +@@ -1630,6 +1630,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF) audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED; @@ -1342,20 +1838,20 @@ index 2a8058764aa6..14e7a763db43 100644 pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c -index bad9985b8a08..453be8764a8c 100644 +index 36be400c3e65..50fa38718408 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c -@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp) - +@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp) + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */ int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON); -int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly; +int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2; int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly; - int bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly = BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; + long bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -index ede82382dd32..98591574df41 100644 +index 596959288eb9..fb76f46d61ce 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock); @@ -1368,10 +1864,10 @@ index ede82382dd32..98591574df41 100644 static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c -index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 +index 7718d7dcadc7..8a4ce459da0a 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c -@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) +@@ -432,6 +432,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); @@ -1385,7 +1881,7 @@ index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 /** diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c -index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 +index 8c70ee23fbe9..7c45b1e38bc0 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask; @@ -1402,7 +1898,7 @@ index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ -@@ -10462,6 +10467,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, +@@ -10529,6 +10534,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL) return -EINVAL; @@ -1413,7 +1909,7 @@ index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 if (err) return err; diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c -index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 +index 1a2d18e98bf9..f3a8e3df2e12 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ @@ -1428,7 +1924,7 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 /* * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel -@@ -1674,6 +1679,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( +@@ -1679,6 +1684,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -1439,7 +1935,7 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 /* * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads * can only be started up within the thread group. -@@ -2503,6 +2512,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) +@@ -2508,6 +2517,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; @@ -1452,11 +1948,29 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); if (err) goto bad_unshare_out; +diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c +index bc6addd9152b..008be43f6cdd 100644 +--- a/kernel/kmod.c ++++ b/kernel/kmod.c +@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) + if (ret) + return ret; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD ++ if (uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) { ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "denied attempt to auto-load module %.64s\n", module_name); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&kmod_concurrent_max) < 0) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("request_module: kmod_concurrent_max (%u) close to 0 (max_modprobes: %u), for module %s, throttling...", + atomic_read(&kmod_concurrent_max), diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 +index f2635fc751d9..a4c445bf7f24 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) void clear_free_pages(void) { @@ -1465,7 +1979,7 @@ index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map; unsigned long pfn; -@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) +@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) } memory_bm_position_reset(bm); pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n"); @@ -1501,10 +2015,10 @@ index f7e89c989df7..527c170810fc 100644 struct rcu_state *rsp; diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c -index 4a433608ba74..41d9b1656818 100644 +index 86ccaaf0c1bf..f3103b3f1bb4 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c -@@ -9627,7 +9627,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf) +@@ -9719,7 +9719,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf) * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick. * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set). */ @@ -1574,7 +2088,7 @@ index 6f584861d329..1943fe60f3b9 100644 void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t, diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c -index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 +index 4c4fd4339d33..10f5b0ecf5a4 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ @@ -1585,7 +2099,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h> -@@ -99,12 +100,19 @@ +@@ -99,12 +100,25 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) /* External variables not in a header file. */ @@ -1593,6 +2107,12 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 +int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb); +#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++int __read_mostly sysfs_restricted = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++int __read_mostly fifo_restrictions = 1; ++#endif extern int suid_dumpable; #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP extern int core_uses_pid; @@ -1605,7 +2125,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 extern int pid_max; extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; -@@ -116,35 +124,35 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; +@@ -116,35 +130,35 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR @@ -1657,7 +2177,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; /* -@@ -152,9 +160,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; +@@ -152,9 +166,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; * and hung_task_check_interval_secs */ #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK @@ -1671,7 +2191,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER #include <linux/inotify.h> #endif -@@ -298,19 +309,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { +@@ -298,19 +315,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG @@ -1699,7 +2219,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #endif static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { -@@ -516,6 +527,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { +@@ -516,6 +533,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, #endif @@ -1715,7 +2235,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .procname = "tainted", -@@ -864,6 +884,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { +@@ -864,6 +890,59 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &two, }, @@ -1750,14 +2270,36 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ { ++ .procname = "sysfs_restricted", ++ .data = &sysfs_restricted, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++ { ++ .procname = "fifo_restrictions", ++ .data = &fifo_restrictions, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, #endif { .procname = "ngroups_max", diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -index e1a549c9e399..c560063e3a8c 100644 +index 7362554416fd..fb8902236deb 100644 --- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c +++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -@@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, +@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, } } @@ -1767,10 +2309,10 @@ index e1a549c9e399..c560063e3a8c 100644 struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases); unsigned long flags; diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c -index fa49cd753dea..a16f8613282e 100644 +index ae64cb819a9a..52f5a5dcd09d 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timer.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c -@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) +@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) /* * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context. */ @@ -1780,21 +2322,25 @@ index fa49cd753dea..a16f8613282e 100644 struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]); diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index 923414a246e9..6b9dbc257e34 100644 +index 923414a246e9..107b17f0d528 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ +@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/sort.h> +/* sysctl */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED ++int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1; ++#else +int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#endif + static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug -index 3dea52f7be9c..9074878fe25b 100644 +index 46a910acce3f..5b60c663ac69 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs" @@ -1894,7 +2440,7 @@ index 812e59e13fe6..2c2104884c81 100644 static noinline_for_stack char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig -index de64ea658716..8bff017856eb 100644 +index b457e94ae618..ec2440e66c72 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ config KSM @@ -1908,10 +2454,10 @@ index de64ea658716..8bff017856eb 100644 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c -index 1480880ff814..0145114c44b4 100644 +index a98f09b83019..d1695e475b37 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c -@@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) +@@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk); oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk); @@ -1926,7 +2472,7 @@ index 1480880ff814..0145114c44b4 100644 goto set_brk; diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c -index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 +index e5c610d711f3..12f96ff5ef0e 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ @@ -1989,7 +2535,7 @@ index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages; set_page_refcounted(page); __free_pages(page, order); -@@ -1876,8 +1908,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) +@@ -1884,8 +1916,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) { @@ -2000,7 +2546,7 @@ index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM -@@ -1934,6 +1966,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags +@@ -1942,6 +1974,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); @@ -2066,7 +2612,7 @@ index 9632772e14be..802ff9ee8172 100644 /* * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c -index 4d3c2e76d1ba..7e943cb1eccd 100644 +index 39e382acb0b8..a87a9a2fdf4e 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ @@ -2092,7 +2638,7 @@ index 4d3c2e76d1ba..7e943cb1eccd 100644 static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str) { diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c -index 09c0e24a06d8..26e8c45a889a 100644 +index 9c3937c5ce38..6b063a76c419 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s) @@ -2371,7 +2917,7 @@ index 09c0e24a06d8..26e8c45a889a 100644 static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str) { diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c -index a3fc028e338e..4a1a899e430c 100644 +index 45fdbfb6b2a6..55ec851eb819 100644 --- a/mm/swap.c +++ b/mm/swap.c @@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page) @@ -2389,10 +2935,10 @@ index a3fc028e338e..4a1a899e430c 100644 } diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c -index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 +index c1a3baf16957..a6b3bba36e8a 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c -@@ -4533,7 +4533,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) +@@ -4536,7 +4536,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni); @@ -2401,7 +2947,7 @@ index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 { struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); -@@ -6318,7 +6318,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) +@@ -6304,7 +6304,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) return work; } @@ -2410,6 +2956,39 @@ index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 { struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + +diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +index 6cec08cd0bb9..ffc74355a94d 100644 +--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c ++++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */ + int sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net __read_mostly = 0; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++int sysctl_stealth_blackhole __read_mostly = 1; ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_RPS + static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +@@ -505,6 +509,17 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { + .proc_handler = set_default_qdisc + }, + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ { ++ .procname = "ip_blackhole", ++ .data = &sysctl_stealth_blackhole, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_NET */ + { + .procname = "netdev_budget", diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig @@ -2422,6 +3001,389 @@ index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644 ---help--- Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote +diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +index 4efa5e33513e..ae82ff1ea5e7 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ struct icmp_control { + short error; /* This ICMP is classed as an error message */ + }; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static const struct icmp_control icmp_pointers[NR_ICMP_TYPES+1]; + + /* +@@ -934,6 +938,11 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + struct net *net; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++ return true; ++#endif ++ + net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); + if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) { + struct icmp_bxm icmp_param; +@@ -960,6 +969,12 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb) + static bool icmp_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + struct icmp_bxm icmp_param; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++ return true; ++#endif ++ + /* + * Too short. + */ +diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c +index 523d26f5e22e..10070b040661 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c +@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ + ((in_dev)->mr_v2_seen && \ + time_before(jiffies, (in_dev)->mr_v2_seen))) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static int unsolicited_report_interval(struct in_device *in_dev) + { + int interval_ms, interval_jiffies; +@@ -737,6 +741,11 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc, + __be32 dst; + int hlen, tlen; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++ return -1; ++#endif ++ + if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT) + return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc); + +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +index 38b6d8f90a44..9c67d386df71 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +@@ -307,11 +307,13 @@ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK; + } + ++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT + static void tcp_ecn_rcv_syn(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + { + if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || !th->cwr)) + tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK; + } ++#endif + + static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + { +@@ -5921,6 +5923,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0)) + goto discard_and_undo; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT + if (th->syn) { + /* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of + * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs. +@@ -5972,6 +5975,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + goto discard; + #endif + } ++#endif + /* "fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then + * drop the segment and return." + */ +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +index 6da393016c11..e6171d1ea7c9 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, + struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb) + { + return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, +@@ -1561,6 +1565,9 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + return 0; + + reset: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++#endif + tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb); + discard: + kfree_skb(skb); +@@ -1709,6 +1716,27 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4)) + goto discard_it; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && ++ ( ++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG ++ ) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN ++ ) ++ ) ++ ) ++ goto discard_it; ++#endif ++ + /* An explanation is required here, I think. + * Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction, + * provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated. +@@ -1722,12 +1750,22 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + lookup: + sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source, + th->dest, sdif, &refcounted); +- if (!sk) ++ if (!sk) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 1; ++#endif ++ + goto no_tcp_socket; ++ } + + process: +- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) ++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 2; ++#endif ++ + goto do_time_wait; ++ } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); +@@ -1841,6 +1879,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + bad_packet: + __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); + } else { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 && ++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb); + } + +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +index 7ba8a90772b0..8c359b649bcd 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ + #include <net/xfrm.h> + #include <net/busy_poll.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win) + { + if (seq == s_win) +@@ -809,6 +813,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at + * resetting legit local connections. + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif ++ + req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb); + } else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */ + reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true); +diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c +index 0ef04cda1b27..6cb1efa826dc 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c +@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated); + #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536 + #define PORTS_PER_CHAIN (MAX_UDP_PORTS / UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MIN) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + /* IPCB reference means this can not be used from early demux */ + static bool udp_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) + { +@@ -2262,6 +2266,9 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable, + goto csum_error; + + __UDP_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++#endif + icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0); + + /* +diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c +index 6d14cbe443f8..4eeebbdc452e 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c +@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + /* + * The ICMP socket(s). This is the most convenient way to flow control + * our ICMP output as well as maintain a clean interface throughout +@@ -848,6 +852,9 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + + switch (type) { + case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif + if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all) + icmpv6_echo_reply(skb); + break; +diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +index c5f4e89b6ff3..86375c9966ef 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ + + #include <trace/events/tcp.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req); +@@ -1356,6 +1360,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + return 0; + + reset: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb); + discard: + if (opt_skb) +@@ -1453,6 +1461,27 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4)) + goto discard_it; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && ++ ( ++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG ++ ) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN ++ ) ++ ) ++ ) ++ goto discard_it; ++#endif ++ + if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo)) + goto csum_error; + +@@ -1463,12 +1492,22 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), + th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), sdif, + &refcounted); +- if (!sk) ++ if (!sk) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 1; ++#endif ++ + goto no_tcp_socket; ++ } + + process: +- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) ++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 2; ++#endif ++ + goto do_time_wait; ++ } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); +@@ -1576,6 +1615,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + bad_packet: + __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); + } else { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 && ++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb); + } + +diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c +index 1979922bcf67..6a8a3666648f 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c +@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ + #include <trace/events/skb.h> + #include "udp_impl.h" + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static bool udp6_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) + { + #if defined(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV) +@@ -863,6 +867,9 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable, + goto csum_error; + + __UDP6_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif + icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0); + + kfree_skb(skb); diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig @@ -2439,7 +3401,7 @@ index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644 secure! diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 +index 91a80036c05d..41692ca62c98 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1; @@ -2471,7 +3433,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 } }; -@@ -1255,10 +1263,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, +@@ -1267,10 +1275,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, continue; if (!is_valid_name(elf, sym)) continue; @@ -2484,7 +3446,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 if (d < 0) d = addr - sym->st_value; if (d < distance) { -@@ -1393,7 +1401,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, +@@ -1405,7 +1413,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, char *prl_from; char *prl_to; @@ -2497,7 +3459,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) return; -@@ -1517,6 +1529,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, +@@ -1529,6 +1541,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, " "we should never get here."); break; @@ -2512,7 +3474,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } -@@ -2528,6 +2548,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) +@@ -2540,6 +2560,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) } } free(buf.p); @@ -2528,7 +3490,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 return err; } diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index d9aa521b5206..a921713b76ec 100644 +index d9aa521b5206..438acc17532e 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig @@ -2636,6 +3598,135 @@ index d9aa521b5206..a921713b76ec 100644 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" help +@@ -278,3 +329,128 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY + + endmenu + ++menu "Hardened Enhancements" ++ ++config HARDENED_RANDOM ++ bool "Enhance the random number generator" ++ default n ++ help ++ Enabling this option enhances the Linux kernel random number generator. ++ This is done by: ++ - Increasing the pool size from 4096 bits to 262144 bits. ( 512B -> 32KB ) ++ - Increasing the diffusion via the linear feedback shift register. ++ - Defines newer 64-bit polynomial fields for the input and output pools. ++ ++ Overall, this enhances the total entropy available to the system and further ++ enhances the random number generator. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ bool "Enable stealth networking [GRSECURITY]" ++ default n ++ depends on NET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP ++ destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets ++ sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. ++ This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the ++ loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature ++ makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network ++ visibility against scanners. ++ ++ The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD ++ blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not ++ just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no ++ problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain ++ connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote ++ end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this ++ side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this ++ feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. ++ The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket ++ can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not ++ all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider ++ disabling this feature on the haproxy host. ++ ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with names ++ "ip_blackhole" will be created. ++ This sysctl, "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero ++ on/off toggle to enable or disable this feature. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT ++ bool "Disable simultaneous TCP connections [GRSECURITY]" ++ default n ++ depends on NET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, a feature by Willy Tarreau will be enabled that ++ removes a weakness in Linux's strict implementation of TCP that ++ allows two clients to connect to each other without either entering ++ a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker to easily prevent ++ a client from connecting to a known server provided the source port ++ for the connection is guessed correctly. ++ ++ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from ++ fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, ++ it should be eliminated by enabling this option. Though Linux is ++ one of few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it ++ has no legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ bool "Restrict SysFS & DebugFS [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ depends on SYSFS ++ help ++ If you say Y here, sysfs (the pseudo-filesystem mounted at /sys) and ++ any filesystem normally mounted under it (e.g. debugfs) will be ++ mostly accessible only by root. These filesystems generally provide access ++ to hardware and debug information that isn't appropriate for unprivileged ++ users of the system. Sysfs and debugfs have also become a large source ++ of new vulnerabilities, ranging from infoleaks to local compromise. ++ There has been very little oversight with an eye toward security involved ++ in adding new exporters of information to these filesystems, so their ++ use is discouraged. ++ To enable or disable this feature at runtime, use the sysctl ++ kernel.sysfs_restricted. ++ For reasons of compatibility, a few directories have been whitelisted ++ for access by non-root users: ++ /sys/fs/selinux ++ /sys/fs/fuse ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_FIFO ++ bool "Restrict FIFO [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ help ++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't ++ own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of ++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is ++ created. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD ++ bool "Harden module auto-loading [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ depends on MODULES ++ help ++ If you say Y here, module auto-loading in response to use of some ++ feature implemented by an unloaded module will be restricted to ++ root users. Enabling this option helps defend against attacks ++ by unprivileged users who abuse the auto-loading behavior to ++ cause a vulnerable module to load that is then exploited. ++ ++ If this option prevents a legitimate use of auto-loading for a ++ non-root user, the administrator can execute modprobe manually ++ with the exact name of the module mentioned in the alert log. ++ Alternatively, the administrator can add the module to the list ++ of modules loaded at boot by modifying init scripts. ++ ++ Modification of init scripts will most likely be needed on ++ Ubuntu servers with encrypted home directory support enabled, ++ as the first non-root user logging in will cause the ecb(aes), ++ ecb(aes)-all, cbc(aes), and cbc(aes)-all modules to be loaded. ++ ++ ++endmenu diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -2674,7 +3765,7 @@ index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c -index 70bad15ed7a0..a157a3d57cdd 100644 +index c574285966f9..667cca9fcd78 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -135,18 +135,7 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); @@ -2734,3 +3825,18 @@ index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644 help This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 4e499b78569b..55bba37f9517 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd) + struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data; + struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ + if (!debugfs_initialized()) + return 0; + diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild index f7975ac8..f7975ac8 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-image-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest index e9c22b9a..2847081b 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/Manifest @@ -1 +1 @@ -DIST linux-4.19.104.tar.xz 103438092 BLAKE2B 10324dae2d3e29048f4ae9474eb3b9dc6c210e7d0fad017b07620ca600cf76bf144b026a47ef7ff11e1dbb9ed7e60bba7d51e8ef6b278b32cae2205ac478a48c SHA512 08bd31c37e413a5f1f785a0fd53d7f044255fc30bf6af15876c15a88ad533c1895d905f8708d93c7fa769b4f6b13af46b442ff213b8ac8a936fee433c8fcd012 +DIST linux-4.19.108.tar.xz 103408396 BLAKE2B d8130982ef7b1bbcdc6b1e4099b6bf5bd707f722b74b2e8cf8bcd45e510f3e39c8418851c923013a6919c4c45c43c65fae8f39ba92563f4645c1c3a3fcfd2937 SHA512 c39099f314fe22e902f561f0dd17fad021a9b8d4ad3c154709a7680e710980a44bcadf46092da7f1a0a9c6910a9b2a8116cc874f8991e197ff05fafe4312da2d diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config index 274f6f27..7dbc8f7a 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-amd64.config @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86 4.19.95-redcore-lts Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86 4.19.108-redcore-lts-legacy Kernel Configuration # # @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y CONFIG_UTS_NS=y CONFIG_IPC_NS=y CONFIG_USER_NS=y +# CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED is not set CONFIG_PID_NS=y CONFIG_NET_NS=y # CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is not set @@ -8743,6 +8744,16 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y # CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor" + +# +# Hardened Enhancements +# +CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT=y +CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO=y +# CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD is not set CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS=m CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE=m CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch index 3cba43ca..2f477148 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -index a29301d6e6c6..d3a259e762fa 100644 +index 8bf0c0532046..c81c652ecf44 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ index a29301d6e6c6..d3a259e762fa 100644 cio_ignore= [S390] See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. clk_ignore_unused -@@ -3165,6 +3155,11 @@ +@@ -3207,6 +3197,11 @@ the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if your oopses keep scrolling off the screen. @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ index 37a679501ddc..59b747920f4d 100644 The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index f7e7e365e2ff..7c69091b65a0 100644 +index 313f0c8dd66f..8e66fca67fd0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile -@@ -693,6 +693,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong +@@ -696,6 +696,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y) ifeq ($(cc-name),clang) @@ -115,10 +115,10 @@ index a336548487e6..bbe821420e7a 100644 Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -index 8790a29d0af4..265c6edd859f 100644 +index 51fe21f5d078..f345755446d9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -@@ -1031,6 +1031,7 @@ endif +@@ -1033,6 +1033,7 @@ endif config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching" @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ index 8790a29d0af4..265c6edd859f 100644 help Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved -@@ -1206,6 +1207,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE +@@ -1208,6 +1209,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES select RELOCATABLE @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ index 69c9170bdd24..a786227db0e3 100644 Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -index db8d364f8476..67441db36c07 100644 +index 1a4f8b67bbe8..85273063eb56 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ @@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ index 433b9554c6a1..1f4b06317c9f 100644 #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -index 7f1628effe6d..38bd2f95a961 100644 +index d6a49bb07a5f..16e4214c2305 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) +@@ -517,9 +517,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (is_compat_task()) @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ index 7f1628effe6d..38bd2f95a961 100644 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 +index af35f5caadbe..34e88af114bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1189,8 +1189,7 @@ config VM86 @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL ---help--- This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit -@@ -2274,7 +2273,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO +@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO choice prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" depends on X86_64 @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 help Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in -@@ -2355,8 +2354,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE +@@ -2400,8 +2399,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE be set to 'N' under normal conditions. config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ index e76d16ac2776..07dcedbb271e 100644 Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -index 7d68f0c7cfb1..85f04bbeadd8 100644 +index 687cd1a213d5..29075c2bc51f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP @@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ index 79ec7add5f98..2950448e00ac 100644 native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE); /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -index 1073118b9bf0..2e34aede5c36 100644 +index a6458ab499c2..0be5291ec42e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1748,7 +1748,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) +@@ -1790,7 +1790,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); barrier(); @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ index 6a78d4b36a79..715009f7a96c 100644 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 +index 79b95910fd9f..fcda13aa03d0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c @@ -560,9 +560,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void) @@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); -@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) - #endif +@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ void arch_remove_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, + } #endif -int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly; @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { -@@ -925,12 +925,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) +@@ -922,12 +922,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start; @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", start, start+size); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 +index 81e85a8dd300..f0403d1ba1b0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); -@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) +@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) mem_init_print_info(NULL); } @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { -@@ -1250,9 +1250,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) +@@ -1239,9 +1239,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n", (end - start) >> 10); @@ -567,10 +567,10 @@ index 15c1f5e12eb8..ff72cccec5b8 100644 struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list; diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -index adf28788cab5..cd4b3501eda9 100644 +index 75d582ca917f..38ba030b8e27 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -@@ -5158,7 +5158,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) +@@ -5161,7 +5161,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) struct ata_port *ap; unsigned int tag; @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ index adf28788cab5..cd4b3501eda9 100644 ap = qc->ap; qc->flags = 0; -@@ -5175,7 +5175,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) +@@ -5178,7 +5178,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) struct ata_port *ap; struct ata_link *link; @@ -608,6 +608,306 @@ index 1df9cb8e659e..eb71148a4a69 100644 help Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports. +diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c +index 53e822793d46..c97b295338ce 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/random.c ++++ b/drivers/char/random.c +@@ -281,11 +281,20 @@ + /* + * Configuration information + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 18 ++#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 16 ++#else + #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 +-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) + #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 ++#endif ++#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) + #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 32768 ++#else + #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512 ++#endif + #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 + + +@@ -294,9 +303,6 @@ + /* + * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is + * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. +- * +- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in +- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. + */ + #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 + #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +@@ -361,15 +367,27 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; + */ + static struct poolinfo { + int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; +-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) +- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; +-} poolinfo_table[] = { ++#define S(x) \ ++ .poolbitshift = ilog2(x)+5, \ ++ .poolwords = (x), \ ++ .poolbytes = (x)*4, \ ++ .poolbits = (x)*32, \ ++ .poolfracbits = (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) ++ int tap[5]; ++} __randomize_layout poolinfo_table[] = { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++ /* x^8192 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ ++ { S(8192), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } }, ++ /* x^2048 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ ++ { S(2048), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } } ++#else + /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ + /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ +- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, ++ { S(128), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } }, + /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ + /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ +- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, ++ { S(32), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } }, ++#endif + #if 0 + /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ + { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, +@@ -413,7 +431,7 @@ struct crng_state { + __u32 state[16]; + unsigned long init_time; + spinlock_t lock; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + struct crng_state primary_crng = { + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), +@@ -475,7 +493,7 @@ struct entropy_store { + unsigned int initialized:1; + unsigned int last_data_init:1; + __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, + size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); +@@ -486,6 +504,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); + static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); + static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; + static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; ++/* this actually doesn't need latent entropy */ ++static __u32 secondary_xfer_buffer[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; + + static struct entropy_store input_pool = { + .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], +@@ -504,9 +524,78 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { + push_to_pool), + }; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++static __u32 const twist_table[64][4] = { ++ { 0x6a09e668, 0xbb67ae86, 0x3c6ef373, 0xa54ff53a }, ++ { 0x510e5280, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ac, 0x5be0cd19 }, ++ { 0xcbbb9d5e, 0x629a292a, 0x9159015a, 0x152fecd9 }, ++ { 0x67332668, 0x8eb44a87, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x47b5481e }, ++ { 0xae5f9157, 0xcf6c85d4, 0x2f73477d, 0x6d1826cb }, ++ { 0x8b43d457, 0xe360b597, 0x1c456003, 0x6f196331 }, ++ { 0xd94ebeb2, 0x0cc4a612, 0x261dc1f3, 0x5815a7be }, ++ { 0x70b7ed68, 0xa1513c69, 0x44f93636, 0x720dcdfe }, ++ { 0xb467369e, 0xca320b76, 0x34e0d42e, 0x49c7d9be }, ++ { 0x87abb9f2, 0xc463a2fc, 0xec3fc3f4, 0x27277f6d }, ++ { 0x610bebf3, 0x7420b49f, 0xd1fd8a34, 0xe4773594 }, ++ { 0x092197f6, 0x1b530c96, 0x869d6343, 0xeee52e50 }, ++ { 0x1107668a, 0x21fba37c, 0x43ab9fb6, 0x75a9f91d }, ++ { 0x8630501a, 0xd7cd8174, 0x007fe010, 0x0379f514 }, ++ { 0x066b651b, 0x0764ab84, 0x0a4b06be, 0x0c3578c1 }, ++ { 0x0d2962a5, 0x11e039f4, 0x1857b7bf, 0x1a29bf2e }, ++ { 0x1b11a32f, 0x1cdf34e8, 0x23183042, 0x25b89093 }, ++ { 0x2a0c06a1, 0x2ae79843, 0x2c9cda69, 0x2f281f24 }, ++ { 0x32841259, 0x3502e64e, 0x377c9c21, 0x39204cda }, ++ { 0x3b91bf66, 0x3ecc38ca, 0x40665609, 0x43947938 }, ++ { 0x47830769, 0x484ae4b8, 0x4c2b2b75, 0x4cf03d21 }, ++ { 0x4f3cbb11, 0x50c2d3b5, 0x5308af16, 0x560a7a9a }, ++ { 0x5788d981, 0x584769b4, 0x59c34f06, 0x5e2d564c }, ++ { 0x6116d760, 0x62894c10, 0x6569b58c, 0x66d7b394 }, ++ { 0x68f9f8dc, 0x6d34f03d, 0x6de8372f, 0x742687a4 }, ++ { 0x76356021, 0x799d1235, 0x7ba455f4, 0x7da8d73b }, ++ { 0x7e546743, 0x80554bdc, 0x83a63a3c, 0x85a01e39 }, ++ { 0x879774ac, 0x883eac9f, 0x8a32aae0, 0x8c243210 }, ++ { 0x8d6e8781, 0x8e134b6f, 0x91ea5892, 0x95166fe4 }, ++ { 0x95b817e6, 0x96faa747, 0x98dca135, 0x9abc6593 }, ++ { 0x9b5bd55a, 0x9f136df7, 0xa04ebd79, 0xa225f6ed }, ++ { 0xa4970e49, 0xa79f5a6b, 0xaa0869af, 0xad06dcbd }, ++ { 0xaf68312e, 0xb12efe0b, 0xb2f3ef5b, 0xb420e03a }, ++ { 0xb6785656, 0xb837d738, 0xb9613115, 0xbbb18efb }, ++ { 0xbcd89621, 0xc0db3814, 0xc3b2f2a3, 0xc71638d9 }, ++ { 0xc7a6240f, 0xca73166e, 0xcb01f3ba, 0xcc1f293d }, ++ { 0xccad81c8, 0xcf72acaf, 0xd34c7258, 0xd4649b7a }, ++ { 0xd4f07147, 0xd607a013, 0xd9d3b47b, 0xdae803b5 }, ++ { 0xdb71ef1a, 0xdc854e24, 0xe1dcf0ea, 0xe2eca719 }, ++ { 0xe50a4ad8, 0xe7ac0990, 0xe9c46d3a, 0xeacfc33c }, ++ { 0xec5fb417, 0xedee611c, 0xf18bc533, 0xf292ef77 }, ++ { 0xf41cab36, 0xf5a531ec, 0xf7aeb45d, 0xf93474e9 }, ++ { 0xfc3c7559, 0xfd3e1962, 0xfebf9bc1, 0xff3fdbf2 }, ++ { 0x01bf3cab, 0x023ebd6b, 0x03bc8288, 0x06365a0f }, ++ { 0x06b4c1d2, 0x092afcc1, 0x09a8ad2c, 0x0b21093c }, ++ { 0x0f83d25e, 0x107c1074, 0x10f803d0, 0x11ef938d }, ++ { 0x136212e8, 0x14d390a4, 0x16beab25, 0x182dd7d5 }, ++ { 0x199c09bf, 0x1ed27f46, 0x1f4b2d3e, 0x21a502bc }, ++ { 0x23849e06, 0x25d9d3da, 0x273ef0ca, 0x28a326f6 }, ++ { 0x2a7cb5e4, 0x2d4019ba, 0x2e2b1e73, 0x2f8aec73 }, ++ { 0x30e9ddcc, 0x315ea828, 0x32bc75cf, 0x357587f0 }, ++ { 0x37b7de93, 0x3bc31ec6, 0x3c35b24a, 0x3d1a949b }, ++ { 0x3e713d15, 0x3ee347da, 0x4038e0bf, 0x411c2bae }, ++ { 0x418daf9a, 0x4270749e, 0x4516b0b0, 0x45876dcb }, ++ { 0x46d92246, 0x4e448a56, 0x4f9141c0, 0x50dd3e71 }, ++ { 0x5296c45b, 0x56738aac, 0x58961d02, 0x5b9010c1 }, ++ { 0x5c6913ae, 0x5cd577f2, 0x5dae0649, 0x5ef24aeb }, ++ { 0x60a199af, 0x6178ce9b, 0x61e44c97, 0x6326551c }, ++ { 0x65a86b29, 0x67bd7e12, 0x6827e41c, 0x68fc7925 }, ++ { 0x6966a836, 0x6a3acfa3, 0x6b78828a, 0x6df2017d }, ++ { 0x7068fdbb, 0x720c4495, 0x747f226b, 0x75b7a753 }, ++ { 0x7687a9e0, 0x77bf2d48, 0x795d98d4, 0x7a2c690b }, ++ { 0x7bc93fa8, 0x7c974690, 0x7f6653f3, 0x80333127 }, ++ { 0x81660244, 0x81cc2760, 0x829840e3, 0x83c9edd4 } ++}; ++#else + static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { + 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, + 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; ++#endif + + /* + * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not +@@ -521,17 +610,14 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { + static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, + int nbytes) + { +- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; ++ unsigned long i, n, t1, t2, tap[5]; + int input_rotate; + int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; + const char *bytes = in; + __u32 w; + +- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; +- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; +- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; +- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; +- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; ++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) ++ tap[n] = r->poolinfo->tap[n]; + + input_rotate = r->input_rotate; + i = r->add_ptr; +@@ -543,14 +629,17 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, + + /* XOR in the various taps */ + w ^= r->pool[i]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; +- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; ++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) ++ w ^= r->pool[(i + tap[n]) & wordmask]; + + /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM ++ t1 = rol32(w, 14) & 0x1FFF; // 0-63, 1111111111111 ++ t2 = rol32(w, t1) & 0x3; // 0-3, 11 ++ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[t1][t2]; ++#else + r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; ++#endif + + /* + * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. +@@ -588,7 +677,7 @@ struct fast_pool { + unsigned long last; + unsigned short reg_idx; + unsigned char count; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + /* + * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness +@@ -683,7 +772,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) + /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ + + do { +- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); ++ __u64 anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); + unsigned int add = + ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; + +@@ -1061,7 +1150,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) + + extract_crng(tmp); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); +- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } +@@ -1089,9 +1178,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) + struct timer_rand_state { + cycles_t last_time; + long last_delta, last_delta2; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + +-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; ++#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { .last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES }; + + /* + * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help +@@ -1334,20 +1423,18 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) + + static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) + { +- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; +- + int bytes = nbytes; + + /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ + bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); + /* but never more than the buffer size */ +- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); ++ bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(secondary_xfer_buffer)); + + trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, + ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); +- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, ++ bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes, + random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); +- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); ++ mix_pool_bytes(r, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes); + credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); + } + +@@ -1572,7 +1659,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, + + extract_buf(r, tmp); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); +- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } +@@ -2276,7 +2363,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { + }; + unsigned int position; + spinlock_t batch_lock; +-}; ++} __randomize_layout; + + /* + * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig index e0a04bfc873e..ec93f827c599 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig @@ -661,10 +961,10 @@ index ac8025cd4a1f..a89e48f53fba 100644 return tty; } diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 +index 27486b0a027a..82689c97b660 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ +@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY 40 /* ns */ #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX 65535 /* ns */ @@ -673,7 +973,7 @@ index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */ -@@ -4940,6 +4942,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, +@@ -4961,6 +4963,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, goto done; return; } @@ -686,8 +986,35 @@ index eb24ec0e160d..68c93697cae9 100644 if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) unit_load = 150; else +diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c +index e5126fad57c5..2a59499ba24d 100644 +--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c ++++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c +@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount; + static int debugfs_mount_count; + static bool debugfs_registered; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++extern int sysfs_restricted; ++#endif ++ + static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb) + { + struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb); +@@ -517,6 +521,11 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) + if (unlikely(!inode)) + return failed_creating(dentry); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ if (sysfs_restricted) ++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU; ++ else ++#endif + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; + inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c -index 433b1257694a..f86201f25a4c 100644 +index 561ea64829ec..5d40794103eb 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ @@ -708,10 +1035,21 @@ index 433b1257694a..f86201f25a4c 100644 err: up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index 914178cdbe94..7422b5ce077a 100644 +index 327844fedf3d..c1b2eafa3b30 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -885,10 +885,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) +@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ + + #define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX (PATH_MAX - offsetof(struct filename, iname)) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++extern int fifo_restrictions; ++#endif ++ + struct filename * + getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty) + { +@@ -885,10 +889,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) path_put(&last->link); } @@ -726,8 +1064,57 @@ index 914178cdbe94..7422b5ce077a 100644 /** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations +@@ -3252,6 +3256,32 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, + return error; + } + ++/* ++ * Handles possibly restricted FIFO operations ++ * if the user doesn't own this directory. ++ */ ++static int fifo_restricted(const struct dentry *dentry, ++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, ++ const struct dentry *dir, ++ const int flag, ++ const int acc_mode) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++ const struct cred *cred; ++ struct inode *inode, *dir_inode; ++ ++ cred = current_cred(); ++ inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); ++ dir_inode = d_backing_inode(dir); ++ ++ if (fifo_restrictions && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) && ++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && ++ !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_inode->i_uid) && ++ !uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid)) ++ return -EACCES; ++#endif ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* + * Handle the last step of open() + */ +@@ -3370,6 +3400,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, + return -ENOENT; + } + ++ /* ++ * Only check if O_CREAT is specified, all other checks need to go ++ * into may_open(). ++ */ ++ if (fifo_restricted(path.dentry, path.mnt, dir, open_flag, acc_mode)) { ++ path_to_nameidata(&path, nd); ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ + /* + * create/update audit record if it already exists. + */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644 +index ac3e06367cb6..06a2e4cf4cc1 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig @@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG @@ -785,6 +1172,76 @@ index f8e6fb2c3657..240c1432e18f 100644 generic_fillattr(inode, stat); return 0; +diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c +index feeae8081c22..a507113bbd3b 100644 +--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c ++++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c +@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ + + DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sysfs_symlink_target_lock); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++extern int sysfs_restricted; ++#endif ++ + void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name) + { + char *buf; +@@ -40,11 +44,19 @@ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name) + int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns) + { + struct kernfs_node *parent, *kn; ++ const char* name; ++ umode_t mode; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ const char *parent_name; ++#endif ++ + BUG_ON(!kobj); + ++ name = kobject_name(kobj); ++ + if (kobj->parent) + parent = kobj->parent->sd; + else +@@ -55,12 +67,30 @@ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns) + + kobject_get_ownership(kobj, &uid, &gid); + +- kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, kobject_name(kobj), +- S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, uid, gid, +- kobj, ns); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ if (sysfs_restricted) { ++ parent_name = parent->name; ++ mode = S_IRWXU; ++ ++ if ((!strcmp(parent_name, "") && (!strcmp(name, "devices") || ++ !strcmp(name, "fs"))) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "devices") && !strcmp(name, "system")) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "fs") && (!strcmp(name, "selinux") || ++ !strcmp(name, "fuse") || !strcmp(name, "ecryptfs"))) || ++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "system") && !strcmp(name, "cpu"))) ++ mode |= S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++ } ++ else ++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++#else ++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; ++#endif ++ ++ kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, name, mode, uid, gid, kobj, ns); ++ + if (IS_ERR(kn)) { + if (PTR_ERR(kn) == -EEXIST) +- sysfs_warn_dup(parent, kobject_name(kobj)); ++ sysfs_warn_dup(parent, name); + return PTR_ERR(kn); + } + diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644 --- a/include/linux/cache.h @@ -822,10 +1279,10 @@ index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644 { return true; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h -index d4e1b43a53c3..c925cbdd1d95 100644 +index 92420009b9bc..9238f04686ce 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h -@@ -3466,4 +3466,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); +@@ -3468,4 +3468,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); extern int vfs_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice); @@ -866,10 +1323,10 @@ index fd1ce10553bf..1905d2476d32 100644 mask |= FS_ISDIR; diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h -index 24bcc5eec6b4..b1cdfc350596 100644 +index f78d1e89593f..ff139ff8d3d2 100644 --- a/include/linux/gfp.h +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h -@@ -530,9 +530,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, +@@ -553,9 +553,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask); @@ -935,7 +1392,7 @@ index 069aa2ebef90..cb9e3637a620 100644 const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent); const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj); diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h -index bdec425c8e14..58409dee149a 100644 +index 45f10f5896b7..7f251a536293 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) @@ -972,10 +1429,10 @@ index 70b7123f38c7..09f3019489b2 100644 extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr); diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h -index 42fc852bf512..a6c5cacee3b5 100644 +index d8b4d31acd18..205c79491de3 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h -@@ -1184,6 +1184,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, +@@ -1194,6 +1194,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); @@ -1137,7 +1594,7 @@ index f58e1ef76572..516caa40676e 100644 return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h -index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 +index 248a137112e8..02a63bec41ca 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty.h +++ b/include/linux/tty.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ @@ -1148,7 +1605,7 @@ index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 /* -@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ struct tty_struct { +@@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ struct tty_struct { /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */ struct work_struct SAK_work; struct tty_port *port; @@ -1156,7 +1613,7 @@ index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 } __randomize_layout; /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */ -@@ -345,6 +347,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { +@@ -347,6 +349,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { struct list_head list; }; @@ -1199,8 +1656,24 @@ index 398e9c95cd61..baab7195306a 100644 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags); static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node, +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h +index e42d13b55cf3..3228bcfe7599 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h +@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ + + #define IPVERSION 4 + #define MAXTTL 255 ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++#define IPDEFTTL 128 ++#else + #define IPDEFTTL 64 ++#endif + + #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0 + #define IPOPT_OLEN 1 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 +index 47035b5a46f6..efbd3ac00d92 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ config USELIB @@ -1211,7 +1684,30 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for -@@ -1091,6 +1092,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE +@@ -957,6 +958,22 @@ config USER_NS + + If unsure, say N. + ++config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED ++ bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces" ++ depends on USER_NS ++ default n ++ help ++ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create ++ new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces ++ has been part of several recent local privilege escalation ++ exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are ++ paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this. ++ ++ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the ++ kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl. ++ ++ If unsure, say N. ++ + config PID_NS + bool "PID Namespaces" + default y +@@ -1091,6 +1108,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE endchoice @@ -1224,7 +1720,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 config HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION bool help -@@ -1377,8 +1384,7 @@ config SHMEM +@@ -1377,8 +1400,7 @@ config SHMEM which may be appropriate on small systems without swap. config AIO @@ -1234,7 +1730,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling -@@ -1595,7 +1601,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS +@@ -1595,7 +1617,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS config SLUB_DEBUG default y @@ -1243,7 +1739,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 depends on SLUB && SYSFS help SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can -@@ -1619,7 +1625,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON +@@ -1619,7 +1641,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON config COMPAT_BRK bool "Disable heap randomization" @@ -1251,7 +1747,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). -@@ -1666,7 +1671,6 @@ endchoice +@@ -1666,7 +1687,6 @@ endchoice config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT bool "Allow slab caches to be merged" @@ -1259,7 +1755,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. -@@ -1679,9 +1683,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT +@@ -1679,9 +1699,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT command line. config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM @@ -1270,7 +1766,7 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 help Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab -@@ -1690,12 +1694,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM +@@ -1690,12 +1710,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED bool "Harden slab freelist metadata" depends on SLUB @@ -1328,10 +1824,10 @@ index 47035b5a46f6..63b30636fdc0 100644 default y depends on SLUB && SMP diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c -index 2a8058764aa6..14e7a763db43 100644 +index 1f08c38e604a..2c4f577a4317 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c -@@ -1628,6 +1628,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) +@@ -1630,6 +1630,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF) audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED; @@ -1342,20 +1838,20 @@ index 2a8058764aa6..14e7a763db43 100644 pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c -index bad9985b8a08..453be8764a8c 100644 +index 36be400c3e65..50fa38718408 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c -@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp) - +@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp) + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */ int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON); -int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly; +int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2; int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly; - int bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly = BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; + long bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -index ede82382dd32..98591574df41 100644 +index 596959288eb9..fb76f46d61ce 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock); @@ -1368,10 +1864,10 @@ index ede82382dd32..98591574df41 100644 static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c -index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 +index 7718d7dcadc7..8a4ce459da0a 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c -@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) +@@ -432,6 +432,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); @@ -1385,7 +1881,7 @@ index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 /** diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c -index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 +index 8c70ee23fbe9..7c45b1e38bc0 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask; @@ -1402,7 +1898,7 @@ index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ -@@ -10462,6 +10467,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, +@@ -10529,6 +10534,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL) return -EINVAL; @@ -1413,7 +1909,7 @@ index 171b83ebed4a..c38d8bf68b6b 100644 if (err) return err; diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c -index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 +index 1a2d18e98bf9..f3a8e3df2e12 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ @@ -1428,7 +1924,7 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 /* * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel -@@ -1674,6 +1679,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( +@@ -1679,6 +1684,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -1439,7 +1935,7 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 /* * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads * can only be started up within the thread group. -@@ -2503,6 +2512,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) +@@ -2508,6 +2517,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; @@ -1452,11 +1948,29 @@ index 69874db3fba8..44f666f2b7b7 100644 err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); if (err) goto bad_unshare_out; +diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c +index bc6addd9152b..008be43f6cdd 100644 +--- a/kernel/kmod.c ++++ b/kernel/kmod.c +@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) + if (ret) + return ret; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD ++ if (uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) { ++ printk(KERN_ALERT "denied attempt to auto-load module %.64s\n", module_name); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&kmod_concurrent_max) < 0) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("request_module: kmod_concurrent_max (%u) close to 0 (max_modprobes: %u), for module %s, throttling...", + atomic_read(&kmod_concurrent_max), diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 +index f2635fc751d9..a4c445bf7f24 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) void clear_free_pages(void) { @@ -1465,7 +1979,7 @@ index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map; unsigned long pfn; -@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) +@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) } memory_bm_position_reset(bm); pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n"); @@ -1501,10 +2015,10 @@ index f7e89c989df7..527c170810fc 100644 struct rcu_state *rsp; diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c -index 4a433608ba74..41d9b1656818 100644 +index 86ccaaf0c1bf..f3103b3f1bb4 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c -@@ -9627,7 +9627,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf) +@@ -9719,7 +9719,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf) * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick. * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set). */ @@ -1574,7 +2088,7 @@ index 6f584861d329..1943fe60f3b9 100644 void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t, diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c -index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 +index 4c4fd4339d33..10f5b0ecf5a4 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ @@ -1585,7 +2099,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h> -@@ -99,12 +100,19 @@ +@@ -99,12 +100,25 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) /* External variables not in a header file. */ @@ -1593,6 +2107,12 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 +int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb); +#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++int __read_mostly sysfs_restricted = 1; ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++int __read_mostly fifo_restrictions = 1; ++#endif extern int suid_dumpable; #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP extern int core_uses_pid; @@ -1605,7 +2125,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 extern int pid_max; extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; -@@ -116,35 +124,35 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; +@@ -116,35 +130,35 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR @@ -1657,7 +2177,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; /* -@@ -152,9 +160,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; +@@ -152,9 +166,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; * and hung_task_check_interval_secs */ #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK @@ -1671,7 +2191,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER #include <linux/inotify.h> #endif -@@ -298,19 +309,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { +@@ -298,19 +315,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG @@ -1699,7 +2219,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #endif static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { -@@ -516,6 +527,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { +@@ -516,6 +533,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, #endif @@ -1715,7 +2235,7 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .procname = "tainted", -@@ -864,6 +884,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { +@@ -864,6 +890,59 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &two, }, @@ -1750,14 +2270,36 @@ index 9a85c7ae7362..20221265a603 100644 + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ { ++ .procname = "sysfs_restricted", ++ .data = &sysfs_restricted, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO ++ { ++ .procname = "fifo_restrictions", ++ .data = &fifo_restrictions, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, #endif { .procname = "ngroups_max", diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -index e1a549c9e399..c560063e3a8c 100644 +index 7362554416fd..fb8902236deb 100644 --- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c +++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -@@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, +@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, } } @@ -1767,10 +2309,10 @@ index e1a549c9e399..c560063e3a8c 100644 struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases); unsigned long flags; diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c -index fa49cd753dea..a16f8613282e 100644 +index ae64cb819a9a..52f5a5dcd09d 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timer.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c -@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) +@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) /* * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context. */ @@ -1780,21 +2322,25 @@ index fa49cd753dea..a16f8613282e 100644 struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]); diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index 923414a246e9..6b9dbc257e34 100644 +index 923414a246e9..107b17f0d528 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ +@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/sort.h> +/* sysctl */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED ++int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1; ++#else +int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#endif + static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug -index 3dea52f7be9c..9074878fe25b 100644 +index 46a910acce3f..5b60c663ac69 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs" @@ -1894,7 +2440,7 @@ index 812e59e13fe6..2c2104884c81 100644 static noinline_for_stack char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig -index de64ea658716..8bff017856eb 100644 +index b457e94ae618..ec2440e66c72 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ config KSM @@ -1908,10 +2454,10 @@ index de64ea658716..8bff017856eb 100644 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c -index 1480880ff814..0145114c44b4 100644 +index a98f09b83019..d1695e475b37 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c -@@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) +@@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk); oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk); @@ -1926,7 +2472,7 @@ index 1480880ff814..0145114c44b4 100644 goto set_brk; diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c -index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 +index e5c610d711f3..12f96ff5ef0e 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ @@ -1989,7 +2535,7 @@ index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages; set_page_refcounted(page); __free_pages(page, order); -@@ -1876,8 +1908,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) +@@ -1884,8 +1916,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) { @@ -2000,7 +2546,7 @@ index 8e6932a140b8..1f9c55809c56 100644 } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM -@@ -1934,6 +1966,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags +@@ -1942,6 +1974,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); @@ -2066,7 +2612,7 @@ index 9632772e14be..802ff9ee8172 100644 /* * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c -index 4d3c2e76d1ba..7e943cb1eccd 100644 +index 39e382acb0b8..a87a9a2fdf4e 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ @@ -2092,7 +2638,7 @@ index 4d3c2e76d1ba..7e943cb1eccd 100644 static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str) { diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c -index 09c0e24a06d8..26e8c45a889a 100644 +index 9c3937c5ce38..6b063a76c419 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s) @@ -2371,7 +2917,7 @@ index 09c0e24a06d8..26e8c45a889a 100644 static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str) { diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c -index a3fc028e338e..4a1a899e430c 100644 +index 45fdbfb6b2a6..55ec851eb819 100644 --- a/mm/swap.c +++ b/mm/swap.c @@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page) @@ -2389,10 +2935,10 @@ index a3fc028e338e..4a1a899e430c 100644 } diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c -index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 +index c1a3baf16957..a6b3bba36e8a 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c -@@ -4533,7 +4533,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) +@@ -4536,7 +4536,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni); @@ -2401,7 +2947,7 @@ index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 { struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); -@@ -6318,7 +6318,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) +@@ -6304,7 +6304,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) return work; } @@ -2410,6 +2956,39 @@ index 138951d28643..efc5c650c9d7 100644 { struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + +diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +index 6cec08cd0bb9..ffc74355a94d 100644 +--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c ++++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */ + int sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net __read_mostly = 0; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++int sysctl_stealth_blackhole __read_mostly = 1; ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_RPS + static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +@@ -505,6 +509,17 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { + .proc_handler = set_default_qdisc + }, + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ { ++ .procname = "ip_blackhole", ++ .data = &sysctl_stealth_blackhole, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_NET */ + { + .procname = "netdev_budget", diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig @@ -2422,6 +3001,389 @@ index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644 ---help--- Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote +diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +index 4efa5e33513e..ae82ff1ea5e7 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c +@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ struct icmp_control { + short error; /* This ICMP is classed as an error message */ + }; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static const struct icmp_control icmp_pointers[NR_ICMP_TYPES+1]; + + /* +@@ -934,6 +938,11 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + struct net *net; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++ return true; ++#endif ++ + net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); + if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) { + struct icmp_bxm icmp_param; +@@ -960,6 +969,12 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb) + static bool icmp_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb) + { + struct icmp_bxm icmp_param; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++ return true; ++#endif ++ + /* + * Too short. + */ +diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c +index 523d26f5e22e..10070b040661 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c +@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ + ((in_dev)->mr_v2_seen && \ + time_before(jiffies, (in_dev)->mr_v2_seen))) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static int unsolicited_report_interval(struct in_device *in_dev) + { + int interval_ms, interval_jiffies; +@@ -737,6 +741,11 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc, + __be32 dst; + int hlen, tlen; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++ return -1; ++#endif ++ + if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT) + return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc); + +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +index 38b6d8f90a44..9c67d386df71 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +@@ -307,11 +307,13 @@ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK; + } + ++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT + static void tcp_ecn_rcv_syn(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + { + if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || !th->cwr)) + tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK; + } ++#endif + + static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th) + { +@@ -5921,6 +5923,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0)) + goto discard_and_undo; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT + if (th->syn) { + /* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of + * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs. +@@ -5972,6 +5975,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + goto discard; + #endif + } ++#endif + /* "fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then + * drop the segment and return." + */ +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +index 6da393016c11..e6171d1ea7c9 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, + struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb) + { + return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, +@@ -1561,6 +1565,9 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + return 0; + + reset: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++#endif + tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb); + discard: + kfree_skb(skb); +@@ -1709,6 +1716,27 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4)) + goto discard_it; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && ++ ( ++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG ++ ) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN ++ ) ++ ) ++ ) ++ goto discard_it; ++#endif ++ + /* An explanation is required here, I think. + * Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction, + * provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated. +@@ -1722,12 +1750,22 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + lookup: + sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source, + th->dest, sdif, &refcounted); +- if (!sk) ++ if (!sk) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 1; ++#endif ++ + goto no_tcp_socket; ++ } + + process: +- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) ++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 2; ++#endif ++ + goto do_time_wait; ++ } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); +@@ -1841,6 +1879,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + bad_packet: + __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); + } else { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 && ++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb); + } + +diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +index 7ba8a90772b0..8c359b649bcd 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ + #include <net/xfrm.h> + #include <net/busy_poll.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win) + { + if (seq == s_win) +@@ -809,6 +813,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at + * resetting legit local connections. + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif ++ + req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb); + } else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */ + reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true); +diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c +index 0ef04cda1b27..6cb1efa826dc 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c +@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated); + #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536 + #define PORTS_PER_CHAIN (MAX_UDP_PORTS / UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MIN) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + /* IPCB reference means this can not be used from early demux */ + static bool udp_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) + { +@@ -2262,6 +2266,9 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable, + goto csum_error; + + __UDP_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) ++#endif + icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0); + + /* +diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c +index 6d14cbe443f8..4eeebbdc452e 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c +@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + /* + * The ICMP socket(s). This is the most convenient way to flow control + * our ICMP output as well as maintain a clean interface throughout +@@ -848,6 +852,9 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + + switch (type) { + case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif + if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all) + icmpv6_echo_reply(skb); + break; +diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +index c5f4e89b6ff3..86375c9966ef 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ + + #include <trace/events/tcp.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req); +@@ -1356,6 +1360,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + return 0; + + reset: ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole)) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb); + discard: + if (opt_skb) +@@ -1453,6 +1461,27 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4)) + goto discard_it; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && ++ ( ++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH || ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG ++ ) || ++ ( ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & ++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) && ++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN ++ ) ++ ) ++ ) ++ goto discard_it; ++#endif ++ + if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo)) + goto csum_error; + +@@ -1463,12 +1492,22 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), + th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), sdif, + &refcounted); +- if (!sk) ++ if (!sk) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 1; ++#endif ++ + goto no_tcp_socket; ++ } + + process: +- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) ++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ ret = 2; ++#endif ++ + goto do_time_wait; ++ } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); +@@ -1576,6 +1615,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) + bad_packet: + __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); + } else { ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 && ++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) ++#endif ++ + tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb); + } + +diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c +index 1979922bcf67..6a8a3666648f 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c +@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ + #include <trace/events/skb.h> + #include "udp_impl.h" + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole; ++#endif ++ + static bool udp6_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) + { + #if defined(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV) +@@ -863,6 +867,9 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable, + goto csum_error; + + __UDP6_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE); ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ++#endif + icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0); + + kfree_skb(skb); diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig @@ -2439,7 +3401,7 @@ index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644 secure! diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 +index 91a80036c05d..41692ca62c98 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1; @@ -2471,7 +3433,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 } }; -@@ -1255,10 +1263,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, +@@ -1267,10 +1275,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, continue; if (!is_valid_name(elf, sym)) continue; @@ -2484,7 +3446,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 if (d < 0) d = addr - sym->st_value; if (d < distance) { -@@ -1393,7 +1401,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, +@@ -1405,7 +1413,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, char *prl_from; char *prl_to; @@ -2497,7 +3459,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) return; -@@ -1517,6 +1529,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, +@@ -1529,6 +1541,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, " "we should never get here."); break; @@ -2512,7 +3474,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } -@@ -2528,6 +2548,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) +@@ -2540,6 +2560,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) } } free(buf.p); @@ -2528,7 +3490,7 @@ index 858cbe56b100..61ade07a967a 100644 return err; } diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index d9aa521b5206..a921713b76ec 100644 +index d9aa521b5206..438acc17532e 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig @@ -2636,6 +3598,135 @@ index d9aa521b5206..a921713b76ec 100644 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" help +@@ -278,3 +329,128 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY + + endmenu + ++menu "Hardened Enhancements" ++ ++config HARDENED_RANDOM ++ bool "Enhance the random number generator" ++ default n ++ help ++ Enabling this option enhances the Linux kernel random number generator. ++ This is done by: ++ - Increasing the pool size from 4096 bits to 262144 bits. ( 512B -> 32KB ) ++ - Increasing the diffusion via the linear feedback shift register. ++ - Defines newer 64-bit polynomial fields for the input and output pools. ++ ++ Overall, this enhances the total entropy available to the system and further ++ enhances the random number generator. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING ++ bool "Enable stealth networking [GRSECURITY]" ++ default n ++ depends on NET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP ++ destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets ++ sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists. ++ This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the ++ loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature ++ makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network ++ visibility against scanners. ++ ++ The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD ++ blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not ++ just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no ++ problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain ++ connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote ++ end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this ++ side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this ++ feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks. ++ The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket ++ can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not ++ all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider ++ disabling this feature on the haproxy host. ++ ++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with names ++ "ip_blackhole" will be created. ++ This sysctl, "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero ++ on/off toggle to enable or disable this feature. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT ++ bool "Disable simultaneous TCP connections [GRSECURITY]" ++ default n ++ depends on NET ++ help ++ If you say Y here, a feature by Willy Tarreau will be enabled that ++ removes a weakness in Linux's strict implementation of TCP that ++ allows two clients to connect to each other without either entering ++ a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker to easily prevent ++ a client from connecting to a known server provided the source port ++ for the connection is guessed correctly. ++ ++ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from ++ fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, ++ it should be eliminated by enabling this option. Though Linux is ++ one of few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it ++ has no legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ bool "Restrict SysFS & DebugFS [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ depends on SYSFS ++ help ++ If you say Y here, sysfs (the pseudo-filesystem mounted at /sys) and ++ any filesystem normally mounted under it (e.g. debugfs) will be ++ mostly accessible only by root. These filesystems generally provide access ++ to hardware and debug information that isn't appropriate for unprivileged ++ users of the system. Sysfs and debugfs have also become a large source ++ of new vulnerabilities, ranging from infoleaks to local compromise. ++ There has been very little oversight with an eye toward security involved ++ in adding new exporters of information to these filesystems, so their ++ use is discouraged. ++ To enable or disable this feature at runtime, use the sysctl ++ kernel.sysfs_restricted. ++ For reasons of compatibility, a few directories have been whitelisted ++ for access by non-root users: ++ /sys/fs/selinux ++ /sys/fs/fuse ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_FIFO ++ bool "Restrict FIFO [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ help ++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't ++ own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of ++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl ++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is ++ created. ++ ++ ++config HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD ++ bool "Harden module auto-loading [GRSECURITY]" ++ default y ++ depends on MODULES ++ help ++ If you say Y here, module auto-loading in response to use of some ++ feature implemented by an unloaded module will be restricted to ++ root users. Enabling this option helps defend against attacks ++ by unprivileged users who abuse the auto-loading behavior to ++ cause a vulnerable module to load that is then exploited. ++ ++ If this option prevents a legitimate use of auto-loading for a ++ non-root user, the administrator can execute modprobe manually ++ with the exact name of the module mentioned in the alert log. ++ Alternatively, the administrator can add the module to the list ++ of modules loaded at boot by modifying init scripts. ++ ++ Modification of init scripts will most likely be needed on ++ Ubuntu servers with encrypted home directory support enabled, ++ as the first non-root user logging in will cause the ecb(aes), ++ ecb(aes)-all, cbc(aes), and cbc(aes)-all modules to be loaded. ++ ++ ++endmenu diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -2674,7 +3765,7 @@ index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c -index 70bad15ed7a0..a157a3d57cdd 100644 +index c574285966f9..667cca9fcd78 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -135,18 +135,7 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); @@ -2734,3 +3825,18 @@ index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644 help This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 4e499b78569b..55bba37f9517 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd) + struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data; + struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ + if (!debugfs_initialized()) + return 0; + diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild index 2f7dc850..2f7dc850 100644 --- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.104.ebuild +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy-4.19.108.ebuild |