From b57f481b8dd2bd320fd953df47bec7fc8657e3b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: V3n3RiX Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 13:33:55 +0000 Subject: net-misc/openssh : pull from gentoo --- .../openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch | 359 --------------------- 1 file changed, 359 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch (limited to 'net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch') diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d4db77b9..00000000 --- a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.2_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,359 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c -index 086b8ebb..a267353c 100644 ---- a/auth.c -+++ b/auth.c -@@ -724,120 +724,6 @@ fakepw(void) - return (&fake); - } - --/* -- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not -- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is -- * called. -- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some -- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. -- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? -- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) -- */ -- --static char * --remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) --{ -- struct sockaddr_storage from; -- socklen_t fromlen; -- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; -- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; -- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -- -- /* Get IP address of client. */ -- fromlen = sizeof(from); -- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); -- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), -- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { -- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -- return xstrdup(ntop); -- } -- -- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); -- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) -- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); -- -- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); -- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ -- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), -- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { -- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ -- return xstrdup(ntop); -- } -- -- /* -- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, -- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: -- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 -- */ -- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ -- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; -- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { -- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", -- name, ntop); -- freeaddrinfo(ai); -- return xstrdup(ntop); -- } -- -- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ -- lowercase(name); -- -- /* -- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given -- * address actually is an address of this host. This is -- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can -- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from -- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be -- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of -- * the domain). -- */ -- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; -- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; -- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { -- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " -- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); -- return xstrdup(ntop); -- } -- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ -- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { -- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, -- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && -- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) -- break; -- } -- freeaddrinfo(aitop); -- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ -- if (ai == NULL) { -- /* Address not found for the host name. */ -- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " -- "map back to the address.", ntop, name); -- return xstrdup(ntop); -- } -- return xstrdup(name); --} -- --/* -- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current -- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this -- * several times. -- */ -- --const char * --auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) --{ -- static char *dnsname; -- -- if (!use_dns) -- return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -- else if (dnsname != NULL) -- return dnsname; -- else { -- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); -- return dnsname; -- } --} -- - /* - * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. - * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. -diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c -index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644 ---- a/canohost.c -+++ b/canohost.c -@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock) - { - return get_sock_port(sock, 1); - } -+ -+/* -+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not -+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is -+ * called. -+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some -+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. -+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? -+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) -+ */ -+ -+static char * -+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct sockaddr_storage from; -+ socklen_t fromlen; -+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; -+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; -+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -+ -+ /* Get IP address of client. */ -+ fromlen = sizeof(from); -+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); -+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), -+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { -+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); -+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) -+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); -+ -+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); -+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ -+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), -+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { -+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, -+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: -+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 -+ */ -+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ -+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; -+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { -+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", -+ name, ntop); -+ freeaddrinfo(ai); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ -+ lowercase(name); -+ -+ /* -+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given -+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is -+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can -+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from -+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be -+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of -+ * the domain). -+ */ -+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; -+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; -+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { -+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " -+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ -+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { -+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, -+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && -+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) -+ break; -+ } -+ freeaddrinfo(aitop); -+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ -+ if (ai == NULL) { -+ /* Address not found for the host name. */ -+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " -+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ return strdup(name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current -+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this -+ * several times. -+ */ -+ -+const char * -+auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) -+{ -+ static char *dnsname; -+ -+ if (!use_dns) -+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -+ else if (dnsname != NULL) -+ return dnsname; -+ else { -+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); -+ return dnsname; -+ } -+} -diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c -index f3cac6b3..adfd7a4e 100644 ---- a/readconf.c -+++ b/readconf.c -@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -+ oGssTrustDns, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, - oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -205,9 +206,11 @@ static struct { - #if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, - # else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, - #endif - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, -@@ -1033,6 +1036,10 @@ parse_time: - intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssTrustDns: -+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1912,6 +1919,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; - options->gss_authentication = -1; - options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -2061,6 +2069,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->gss_authentication = 0; - if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; -+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h -index feedb3d2..c7139c1b 100644 ---- a/readconf.h -+++ b/readconf.h -@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ typedef struct { - /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ - int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ - int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ -+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 -index 06a32d31..6871ff36 100644 ---- a/ssh_config.5 -+++ b/ssh_config.5 -@@ -770,6 +770,16 @@ The default is - Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. - The default is - .Cm no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. -+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns -+Set to -+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+the name of the host being connected to. If -+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c -index af00fb30..652463c5 100644 ---- a/sshconnect2.c -+++ b/sshconnect2.c -@@ -716,6 +716,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) - OM_uint32 min; - int r, ok = 0; - gss_OID mech = NULL; -+ const char *gss_host; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) { -+ extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns); -+ gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1); -+ } else -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; - - /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at - * once. */ -@@ -730,7 +737,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) - elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; - /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, -- mech, authctxt->host)) { -+ mech, gss_host)) { - ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ - } else { - authctxt->mech_tried++; -- cgit v1.2.3