From f0441898622982ede21c3104ca8beb040489dadf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: V3n3RiX <venerix@koprulu.sector>
Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2024 12:27:10 +0000
Subject: sys-kernel/linux-{image,sources}-redcore : version bump (v6.7.x)

---
 ...ctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 131 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/6.7-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch

(limited to 'sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/6.7-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch')

diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/6.7-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/6.7-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..09d6a2c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore/files/6.7-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -Nur a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h	2024-02-23 08:51:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h	2024-02-24 11:24:37.945502209 +0000
+@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+ 
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++
+ static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
+ {
+ 	if (ns)
+@@ -189,6 +191,8 @@
+ struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
+ #else
+ 
++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
++
+ static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
+ {
+ 	return &init_user_ns;
+diff -Nur a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
+--- a/init/Kconfig	2024-02-23 08:51:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/init/Kconfig	2024-02-24 11:24:37.945502209 +0000
+@@ -1235,6 +1235,22 @@
+ 
+ 	  If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
++	bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
++	default y
++	depends on USER_NS
++	help
++	  When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
++	  new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
++	  has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
++	  exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
++	  paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
++
++	  This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
++	  kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
++
++	  If unsure, say Y.
++
+ config PID_NS
+ 	bool "PID Namespaces"
+ 	default y
+diff -Nur a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
+--- a/kernel/fork.c	2024-02-23 08:51:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/kernel/fork.c	2024-02-24 11:24:37.946502209 +0000
+@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@
+ #include <linux/user_events.h>
+ #include <linux/iommu.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -2265,6 +2269,10 @@
+ 	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
+ 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ 
++	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
+ 	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
+@@ -3411,6 +3419,12 @@
+ 	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
+ 		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
+ 
++	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			goto bad_unshare_out;
++	}
++
+ 	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff -Nur a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c	2024-02-23 08:51:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c	2024-02-24 11:24:37.946502209 +0000
+@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
+ #include <linux/rtmutex.h>
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ /* shared constants to be used in various sysctls */
+ const int sysctl_vals[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 100, 200, 1000, 3000, INT_MAX, 65535, -1 };
+@@ -1623,6 +1626,15 @@
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++	{
++		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
++		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "tainted",
+diff -Nur a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c	2024-02-23 08:51:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c	2024-02-24 11:40:48.120538387 +0000
+@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@
+ #include <linux/bsearch.h>
+ #include <linux/sort.h>
+ 
++/* sysctl */
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
++int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
++#else
++int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#endif
++
+ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __ro_after_init;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
+ 
-- 
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