diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index 086b8ebb..a267353c 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -724,120 +724,6 @@ fakepw(void) return (&fake); } -/* - * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not - * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is - * called. - * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some - * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. - * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? - * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) - */ - -static char * -remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) -{ - struct sockaddr_storage from; - socklen_t fromlen; - struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; - char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; - const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - - /* Get IP address of client. */ - fromlen = sizeof(from); - memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); - if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), - (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { - debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); - if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) - fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); - - debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); - /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ - if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), - NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { - /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - /* - * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, - * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: - * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ - hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { - logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", - name, ntop); - freeaddrinfo(ai); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ - lowercase(name); - - /* - * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given - * address actually is an address of this host. This is - * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can - * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from - * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be - * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of - * the domain). - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { - logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " - "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ - for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, - sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && - (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) - break; - } - freeaddrinfo(aitop); - /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ - if (ai == NULL) { - /* Address not found for the host name. */ - logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " - "map back to the address.", ntop, name); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - return xstrdup(name); -} - -/* - * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current - * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this - * several times. - */ - -const char * -auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) -{ - static char *dnsname; - - if (!use_dns) - return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - else if (dnsname != NULL) - return dnsname; - else { - dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); - return dnsname; - } -} - /* * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644 --- a/canohost.c +++ b/canohost.c @@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 1); } + +/* + * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not + * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is + * called. + * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some + * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. + * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? + * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) + */ + +static char * +remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; + const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) + fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + + debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); + /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), + NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { + /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* + * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, + * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: + * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { + logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", + name, ntop); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ + lowercase(name); + + /* + * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given + * address actually is an address of this host. This is + * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can + * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from + * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be + * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of + * the domain). + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { + logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " + "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); + return strdup(ntop); + } + /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, + sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && + (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ + if (ai == NULL) { + /* Address not found for the host name. */ + logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " + "map back to the address.", ntop, name); + return strdup(ntop); + } + return strdup(name); +} + +/* + * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current + * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this + * several times. + */ + +const char * +auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) +{ + static char *dnsname; + + if (!use_dns) + return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + else if (dnsname != NULL) + return dnsname; + else { + dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); + return dnsname; + } +} diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index f3cac6b3..adfd7a4e 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, + oGssTrustDns, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, @@ -205,9 +206,11 @@ static struct { #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, # else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, @@ -1033,6 +1036,10 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; + case oGssTrustDns: + intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; + goto parse_flag; + case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; @@ -1912,6 +1919,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; + options->gss_trust_dns = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; @@ -2061,6 +2069,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; + if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) + options->gss_trust_dns = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h index feedb3d2..c7139c1b 100644 --- a/readconf.h +++ b/readconf.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ typedef struct { /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ + int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 06a32d31..6871ff36 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -770,6 +770,16 @@ The default is Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Cm no . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. +.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns +Set to +.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize +the name of the host being connected to. If +.Dq no, the hostname entered on the +command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. +The default is +.Dq no . +This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index af00fb30..652463c5 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -716,6 +716,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) OM_uint32 min; int r, ok = 0; gss_OID mech = NULL; + const char *gss_host; + + if (options.gss_trust_dns) { + extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns); + gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1); + } else + gss_host = authctxt->host; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ @@ -730,7 +737,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, - mech, authctxt->host)) { + mech, gss_host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { authctxt->mech_tried++;