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authorV3n3RiX <venerix@koprulu.sector>2023-07-03 04:04:58 +0100
committerV3n3RiX <venerix@koprulu.sector>2023-07-03 04:04:58 +0100
commitc6872c361190d4f1a559d23458f6cdffb154b0b0 (patch)
tree98d2caa2e0d46d9968c7cc155946e785f96e6db3 /app-emulation/qemu/files
parenta55e5c074db9bb024358a8f0bd2c5e992b7cf6f6 (diff)
gentoo auto-resync : 03:07:2023 - 04:04:58
Diffstat (limited to 'app-emulation/qemu/files')
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-7.2.3-CVE-2023-2861.patch162
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-8.0.2-CVE-2023-2861.patch167
2 files changed, 329 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-7.2.3-CVE-2023-2861.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-7.2.3-CVE-2023-2861.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a9c11a41d66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-7.2.3-CVE-2023-2861.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/909542
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/10fad73a2bf1c76c8aa9d6322755e5f877d83ce5
+
+From 10fad73a2bf1c76c8aa9d6322755e5f877d83ce5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 18:29:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
+
+The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when
+client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does
+make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side
+in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to
+open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively
+on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape
+from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host
+side.
+
+With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:
+
+ - Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough'
+ security model.
+
+or
+
+ - Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as
+ root).
+
+These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before,
+however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-2861
+Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda)
+Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+(Mjt: drop adding qemu_fstat wrapper for 7.2 where wrappers aren't used)
+--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
++++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "qemu/xattr.h"
+ #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
++#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
+ #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
+
+ #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
+@@ -338,6 +339,28 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
++ * rejected.
++ *
++ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
++ */
++static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++ int fd;
++
++ fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
++ if (fd < 0) {
++ return fd;
++ }
++
++ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return fd;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * send response in two parts
+ * 1) ProxyHeader
+@@ -682,7 +705,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto unmarshal_err_out;
+ }
+- ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
++ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -errno;
+ }
+@@ -707,7 +730,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+- ret = open(path.data, flags);
++ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -errno;
+ }
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
+ #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+
++#include "qemu/error-report.h"
++
+ #ifdef O_PATH
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
+ #else
+@@ -112,6 +114,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+ errno = serrno;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
++ *
++ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
++ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
++ *
++ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
++ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
++ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
++ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
++ */
++static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
++{
++ struct stat stbuf;
++
++ if (fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
++ close_preserve_errno(fd);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
++ error_report_once(
++ "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
++ "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
++ );
++ close(fd);
++ errno = ENXIO;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
+ {
+ return openat(dirfd, name,
+@@ -146,6 +180,10 @@ again:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ serrno = errno;
+ /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+ * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
+--
+GitLab
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-8.0.2-CVE-2023-2861.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-8.0.2-CVE-2023-2861.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..75fa534b4f1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-8.0.2-CVE-2023-2861.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/909542
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b9d2887be4e616cdaeedd0b7456bfaa71ee798af
+
+From b9d2887be4e616cdaeedd0b7456bfaa71ee798af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 18:29:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
+
+The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when
+client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does
+make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side
+in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to
+open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively
+on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape
+from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host
+side.
+
+With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:
+
+ - Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough'
+ security model.
+
+or
+
+ - Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as
+ root).
+
+These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before,
+however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-2861
+Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda)
+Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
++++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "qemu/xattr.h"
+ #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
++#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
+ #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
+
+ #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
+@@ -338,6 +339,28 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
++ * rejected.
++ *
++ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
++ */
++static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++ int fd;
++
++ fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
++ if (fd < 0) {
++ return fd;
++ }
++
++ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return fd;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * send response in two parts
+ * 1) ProxyHeader
+@@ -682,7 +705,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto unmarshal_err_out;
+ }
+- ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
++ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -errno;
+ }
+@@ -707,7 +730,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+- ret = open(path.data, flags);
++ ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -errno;
+ }
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
+ #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+
++#include "qemu/error-report.h"
++
+ #ifdef O_PATH
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
+ #else
+@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ static inline int errno_to_dotl(int err) {
+ #endif
+
+ #define qemu_openat openat
++#define qemu_fstat fstat
+ #define qemu_fstatat fstatat
+ #define qemu_mkdirat mkdirat
+ #define qemu_renameat renameat
+@@ -108,6 +111,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+ errno = serrno;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
++ *
++ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
++ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
++ *
++ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
++ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
++ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
++ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
++ */
++static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
++{
++ struct stat stbuf;
++
++ if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
++ close_preserve_errno(fd);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
++ error_report_once(
++ "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
++ "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
++ );
++ close(fd);
++ errno = ENXIO;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
+ {
+ return qemu_openat(dirfd, name,
+@@ -142,6 +177,10 @@ again:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ serrno = errno;
+ /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+ * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()