gentoo resync : 11.07.2019

5 files changed, 638 insertions, 198 deletions

diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/241-wrapper-msan-unpoinson.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/241-wrapper-msan-unpoinson.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e337b4f4ca52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-apps/systemd/files/241-wrapper-msan-unpoinson.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From c322f379e6ca972f1c4d3409ac97828b1b838d5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:07:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add wrapper for __msan_unpoinson() to reduce #ifdeffery
+
+This isn't really necessary for the subsequent commit, but I expect that we'll
+need to unpoison more often once we turn on msan in CI, so I think think this
+change makes sense in the long run.
+---
+ src/basic/alloc-util.h  | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 11 ++---------
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/alloc-util.h b/src/basic/alloc-util.h
+index 893a1238ff..78ee34bb71 100644
+--- a/src/basic/alloc-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/alloc-util.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "macro.h"
+ 
++#if HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER
++#  include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
++#endif
++
+ typedef void (*free_func_t)(void *p);
+ 
+ /* If for some reason more than 4M are allocated on the stack, let's abort immediately. It's better than
+@@ -160,3 +164,9 @@ void* greedy_realloc0(void **p, size_t *allocated, size_t need, size_t size);
+                 (ptr) = NULL;                   \
+                 _ptr_;                          \
+         })
++
++#if HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER
++#  define msan_unpoison(r, s) __msan_unpoison(r, s)
++#else
++#  define msan_unpoison(r, s)
++#endif
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index f7decf60b6..ca25fd2420 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -23,16 +23,13 @@
+ #  include <linux/random.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include "alloc-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "io-util.h"
+ #include "missing.h"
+ #include "random-util.h"
+ #include "time-util.h"
+ 
+-#if HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER
+-#include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
+-#endif
+-
+ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+ 
+ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+@@ -58,11 +55,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+                      "setc %1"
+                      : "=r" (*ret),
+                        "=qm" (err));
+-
+-#if HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER
+-        __msan_unpoison(&err, sizeof(err));
+-#endif
+-
++        msan_unpoison(&err, sizeof(err));
+         if (!err)
+                 return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..166a8ee5b76f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From fe0e16db093a7da09fcb52a2bc7017197047443d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 May 2019 05:40:31 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] network: do not use ordered_set_printf() for DOMAINS= or
+ ROUTE_DOMAINS=
+
+This partially reverts 5e2a51d588dde4b52c6017ea80b75c16e6e23431.
+
+Fixes #12531.
+---
+ src/network/networkd-link.c | 17 +++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+index f8ee48802cb..1dc10c65a1b 100644
+--- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
++++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+@@ -3495,12 +3495,11 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
+                 admin_state, oper_state);
+ 
+         if (link->network) {
+-                bool space;
++                char **dhcp6_domains = NULL, **dhcp_domains = NULL;
++                const char *dhcp_domainname = NULL, *p;
+                 sd_dhcp6_lease *dhcp6_lease = NULL;
+-                const char *dhcp_domainname = NULL;
+-                char **dhcp6_domains = NULL;
+-                char **dhcp_domains = NULL;
+                 unsigned j;
++                bool space;
+ 
+                 fprintf(f, "REQUIRED_FOR_ONLINE=%s\n",
+                         yes_no(link->network->required_for_online));
+@@ -3617,7 +3616,10 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
+                                 (void) sd_dhcp6_lease_get_domains(dhcp6_lease, &dhcp6_domains);
+                 }
+ 
+-                ordered_set_print(f, "DOMAINS=", link->network->search_domains);
++                fputs("DOMAINS=", f);
++                space = false;
++                ORDERED_SET_FOREACH(p, link->network->search_domains, i)
++                        fputs_with_space(f, p, NULL, &space);
+ 
+                 if (link->network->dhcp_use_domains == DHCP_USE_DOMAINS_YES) {
+                         NDiscDNSSL *dd;
+@@ -3635,7 +3637,10 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
+ 
+                 fputc('\n', f);
+ 
+-                ordered_set_print(f, "ROUTE_DOMAINS=", link->network->route_domains);
++                fputs("ROUTE_DOMAINS=", f);
++                space = false;
++                ORDERED_SET_FOREACH(p, link->network->route_domains, i)
++                        fputs_with_space(f, p, NULL, &space);
+ 
+                 if (link->network->dhcp_use_domains == DHCP_USE_DOMAINS_ROUTE) {
+                         NDiscDNSSL *dd;
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87a85f6f6ab0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From 4eb086a38712ea98faf41e075b84555b11b54362 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Susant Sahani <ssahani@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 07:35:35 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] networkd: fix link_up() (#12505)
+
+Fillup IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE while we do link_up.
+
+Fixes the following error:
+```
+dummy-test: Could not bring up interface: Invalid argument
+```
+
+After reading the kernel code when we do a link up
+```
+net/core/rtnetlink.c
+IFLA_AF_SPEC
+ af_ops->set_link_af(dev, af);
+  inet6_set_link_af
+   if (tb[IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE])
+             Here it looks for IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE
+```
+Since link up we didn't filling up that it's failing.
+
+Closes #12504.
+---
+ src/network/networkd-link.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+index 3c8b5c5cb43..4db9f3f980f 100644
+--- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
++++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+@@ -2031,6 +2031,8 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
+         }
+ 
+         if (link_ipv6_enabled(link)) {
++                uint8_t ipv6ll_mode;
++
+                 r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, IFLA_AF_SPEC);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
+@@ -2046,6 +2048,19 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
+                                 return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_TOKEN: %m");
+                 }
+ 
++                if (!link_ipv6ll_enabled(link))
++                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE;
++                else if (sysctl_read_ip_property(AF_INET6, link->ifname, "stable_secret", NULL) < 0)
++                        /* The file may not exist. And event if it exists, when stable_secret is unset,
++                         * reading the file fails with EIO. */
++                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_EUI64;
++                else
++                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_STABLE_PRIVACY;
++
++                r = sd_netlink_message_append_u8(req, IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE, ipv6ll_mode);
++                if (r < 0)
++                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE: %m");
++
+                 r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
+                 if (r < 0)
+                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close AF_INET6 container: %m");
+From 9f6e82e6eb3b6e73d66d00d1d6eee60691fb702f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 14:39:46 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] network: do not send ipv6 token to kernel
+
+We disabled kernel RA support. Then, we should not send
+IFLA_INET6_TOKEN.
+Thus, we do not need to send IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE twice.
+
+Follow-up for 0e2fdb83bb5e22047e0c7cc058b415d0e93f02cf and
+4eb086a38712ea98faf41e075b84555b11b54362.
+---
+ src/network/networkd-link.c | 51 +++++--------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+index 2b6ff2b6c58..b6da4ea70b7 100644
+--- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
++++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
+@@ -1954,6 +1954,9 @@ static int link_configure_addrgen_mode(Link *link) {
+         assert(link->manager);
+         assert(link->manager->rtnl);
+ 
++        if (!socket_ipv6_is_supported())
++                return 0;
++
+         log_link_debug(link, "Setting address genmode for link");
+ 
+         r = sd_rtnl_message_new_link(link->manager->rtnl, &req, RTM_SETLINK, link->ifindex);
+@@ -2047,46 +2050,6 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
+                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not set MAC address: %m");
+         }
+ 
+-        if (link_ipv6_enabled(link)) {
+-                uint8_t ipv6ll_mode;
+-
+-                r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, IFLA_AF_SPEC);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
+-
+-                /* if the kernel lacks ipv6 support setting IFF_UP fails if any ipv6 options are passed */
+-                r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, AF_INET6);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open AF_INET6 container: %m");
+-
+-                if (!in_addr_is_null(AF_INET6, &link->network->ipv6_token)) {
+-                        r = sd_netlink_message_append_in6_addr(req, IFLA_INET6_TOKEN, &link->network->ipv6_token.in6);
+-                        if (r < 0)
+-                                return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_TOKEN: %m");
+-                }
+-
+-                if (!link_ipv6ll_enabled(link))
+-                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE;
+-                else if (sysctl_read_ip_property(AF_INET6, link->ifname, "stable_secret", NULL) < 0)
+-                        /* The file may not exist. And event if it exists, when stable_secret is unset,
+-                         * reading the file fails with EIO. */
+-                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_EUI64;
+-                else
+-                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_STABLE_PRIVACY;
+-
+-                r = sd_netlink_message_append_u8(req, IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE, ipv6ll_mode);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE: %m");
+-
+-                r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close AF_INET6 container: %m");
+-
+-                r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
+-        }
+-
+         r = netlink_call_async(link->manager->rtnl, NULL, req, link_up_handler,
+                                link_netlink_destroy_callback, link);
+         if (r < 0)
+@@ -3226,11 +3189,9 @@ static int link_configure(Link *link) {
+         if (r < 0)
+                 return r;
+ 
+-        if (socket_ipv6_is_supported()) {
+-                r = link_configure_addrgen_mode(link);
+-                if (r < 0)
+-                        return r;
+-        }
++        r = link_configure_addrgen_mode(link);
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
+ 
+         return link_configure_after_setting_mtu(link);
+ }
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec690c1b3f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+From d351699739471734666230ae3c6f9ba56ce5ce45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:18:13 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] =?UTF-8?q?random-util:=20rename=20RANDOM=5FDONT=5FDRA?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?IN=20=E2=86=92=20RANDOM=5FMAY=5FFAIL?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The old flag name was a bit of a misnomer, as /dev/urandom cannot be
+"drained". Once it's initialized it's initialized and then is good
+forever. (Only /dev/random has a concept of 'draining', but we never use
+that, as it's an obsolete interface).
+
+The flag is still useful though, since it allows us to suppress accesses
+to the random pool while it is not initialized, as that trips up the
+kernel and it logs about any such attempts, which we really don't want.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1a0ffa1e737e65312abac63dcf4b44e1ac0e1642)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ src/basic/random-util.h |  4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index ca25fd2420..de29e07549 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -71,21 +71,22 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
+         bool got_some = false;
+         int r;
+ 
+-        /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This call won't
+-         * block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, an error is returned if the random
+-         * pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the kernel, regardless of whether
+-         * the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
++        /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This
++         * call won't block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, an error is
++         * returned if the random pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the
++         * kernel, regardless of whether the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
+ 
+         if (n == 0)
+                 return 0;
+ 
+         if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND))
+-                /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is not
+-                 * required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of RDRAND here,
+-                 * even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10 invocations or so. That's
+-                 * because we don't really care about the quality here. We generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller
+-                 * allows us too, since this way we won't drain the kernel randomness pool if we don't need it, as the
+-                 * pool's entropy is scarce. */
++                /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is
++                 * not required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of
++                 * RDRAND here, even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10
++                 * invocations or so. That's because we don't really care about the quality here. We
++                 * generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller allows us to, since this way we won't upset
++                 * the kernel's random subsystem by accessing it before the pool is initialized (after all it
++                 * will kmsg log about every attempt to do so)..*/
+                 for (;;) {
+                         unsigned long u;
+                         size_t m;
+@@ -153,12 +154,13 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
+                                 break;
+ 
+                         } else if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+-                                /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall the next
+-                                 * time again though.
++                                /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall
++                                 * the next time again though.
+                                  *
+-                                 * If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can produce some
+-                                 * pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to /dev/urandom, which we know is empty,
+-                                 * but the kernel will produce some bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
++                                 * If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can
++                                 * produce some pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to
++                                 * /dev/urandom, which we know is empty, but the kernel will produce some
++                                 * bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
+                                 have_syscall = true;
+ 
+                                 if (got_some && FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) {
+@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
+                                         return 0;
+                                 }
+ 
+-                                if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN))
++                                if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_MAY_FAIL))
+                                         return -ENODATA;
+ 
+                                 /* Use /dev/urandom instead */
+@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
+ 
+ void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
+ 
+-        if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
++        if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_MAY_FAIL|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
+                 return;
+ 
+         /* If for some reason some user made /dev/urandom unavailable to us, or the kernel has no entropy, use a PRNG instead. */
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.h b/src/basic/random-util.h
+index 3e8c288d3d..148b6c7813 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.h
+@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
+ typedef enum RandomFlags {
+         RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO = 1 << 0, /* If we can't get enough genuine randomness, but some, fill up the rest with pseudo-randomness */
+         RANDOM_BLOCK              = 1 << 1, /* Rather block than return crap randomness (only if the kernel supports that) */
+-        RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN         = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -EAGAIN */
++        RANDOM_MAY_FAIL           = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -ENODATA */
+         RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND       = 1 << 3, /* Allow usage of the CPU RNG */
+ } RandomFlags;
+ 
+-int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled upwith pseudo random, if not enough is available */
++int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled up with pseudo random, if not enough is available */
+ void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n);                    /* returns only pseudo-randommess (but possibly seeded from something better) */
+ void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n);                           /* returns genuine randomness if cheaply available, and pseudo randomness if not. */
+ 
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
+
+From 1f492b9ecc31aa3782f9ce82058d8fb72a5c323f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:21:44 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] random-util: use gcc's bit_RDRND definition if it exists
+
+(cherry picked from commit cc28145d51f62711fdc4b4c229aecd5778806419)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index de29e07549..205d5501e5 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+                         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+                 }
+ 
+-                have_rdrand = !!(ecx & (1U << 30));
++/* Compat with old gcc where bit_RDRND didn't exist yet */
++#ifndef bit_RDRND
++#define bit_RDRND (1U << 30)
++#endif
++
++                have_rdrand = !!(ecx & bit_RDRND);
+         }
+ 
+         if (have_rdrand == 0)
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
+
+From 6460c540e6183dd19de89b7f0672b3b47c4d41cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 17:26:55 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] random-util: hash AT_RANDOM getauxval() value before
+ using it
+
+Let's be a bit paranoid and hash the 16 bytes we get from getauxval()
+before using them. AFter all they might be used by other stuff too (in
+particular ASLR), and we probably shouldn't end up leaking that seed
+though our crappy pseudo-random numbers.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 80eb560a5bd7439103036867d5e09a5e0393e5d3)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index 205d5501e5..40f1928936 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include "io-util.h"
+ #include "missing.h"
+ #include "random-util.h"
++#include "siphash24.h"
+ #include "time-util.h"
+ 
+ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+@@ -203,14 +204,19 @@ void initialize_srand(void) {
+                 return;
+ 
+ #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H
+-        /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's
+-         * try to make use of that to seed the pseudo-random generator. It's
+-         * better than nothing... */
++        /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's try to make use of that to seed
++         * the pseudo-random generator. It's better than nothing... But let's first hash it to make it harder
++         * to recover the original value by watching any pseudo-random bits we generate. After all the
++         * AT_RANDOM data might be used by other stuff too (in particular: ASLR), and we probably shouldn't
++         * leak the seed for that. */
+ 
+-        auxv = (const void*) getauxval(AT_RANDOM);
++        auxv = ULONG_TO_PTR(getauxval(AT_RANDOM));
+         if (auxv) {
+-                assert_cc(sizeof(x) <= 16);
+-                memcpy(&x, auxv, sizeof(x));
++                static const uint8_t auxval_hash_key[16] = {
++                        0x92, 0x6e, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x00, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x81, 0x0f
++                };
++
++                x = (unsigned) siphash24(auxv, 16, auxval_hash_key);
+         } else
+ #endif
+                 x = 0;
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
+
+From 17d52f6320b45d1728af6007b4df4aaccc6fdaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 18:51:26 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] random-util: rename "err" to "success"
+
+After all rdrand returns 1 on success, and 0 on failure, hence let's
+name this accordingly.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 328f850e36e86d14ab06d11fa8f2397e9575a7f9)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index 40f1928936..7c64857592 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+ 
+ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+         static int have_rdrand = -1;
+-        unsigned char err;
++        uint8_t success;
+ 
+         if (have_rdrand < 0) {
+                 uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+         asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
+                      "setc %1"
+                      : "=r" (*ret),
+-                       "=qm" (err));
+-        msan_unpoison(&err, sizeof(err));
+-        if (!err)
++                       "=qm" (success));
++        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
++        if (!success)
+                 return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+         return 0;
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
+
+From a6c72245ba5ba688cd6544650b9c6e313b39b53e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
+Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 15:50:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] util-lib: fix a typo in rdrand
+
+Otherwise, the fuzzers will fail to compile with MSan:
+```
+../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:64:40: error: use of undeclared identifier 'sucess'; did you mean 'success'?
+        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
+                                       ^~~~~~
+                                       success
+../../src/systemd/src/basic/alloc-util.h:169:50: note: expanded from macro 'msan_unpoison'
+                                                 ^
+../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:38:17: note: 'success' declared here
+        uint8_t success;
+                ^
+1 error generated.
+[80/545] Compiling C object 'src/basic/a6ba3eb@@basic@sta/process-util.c.o'.
+ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed.
+Fuzzers build failed
+```
+
+(cherry picked from commit 7f2cdceaed4d37c4e601e531c7d863fca1bd1460)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index 7c64857592..b8bbf2d418 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+                      "setc %1"
+                      : "=r" (*ret),
+                        "=qm" (success));
+-        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
++        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
+         if (!success)
+                 return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
+
+From 47eec0ae61c887cb8cc05ce8d49b8d151bc4ef25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 15:16:16 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] random-util: eat up bad RDRAND values seen on AMD CPUs
+
+An ugly, ugly work-around for #11810. And no, we shouldn't have to do
+this. This is something for AMD, the firmware or the kernel to
+fix/work-around, not us. But nonetheless, this should do it for now.
+
+Fixes: #11810
+(cherry picked from commit 1c53d4a070edbec8ad2d384ba0014d0eb6bae077)
+---
+ src/basic/random-util.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
+index b8bbf2d418..0561f0cb22 100644
+--- a/src/basic/random-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+ 
+ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+         static int have_rdrand = -1;
++        unsigned long v;
+         uint8_t success;
+ 
+         if (have_rdrand < 0) {
+@@ -59,12 +60,24 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
+ 
+         asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
+                      "setc %1"
+-                     : "=r" (*ret),
++                     : "=r" (v),
+                        "=qm" (success));
+         msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
+         if (!success)
+                 return -EAGAIN;
+ 
++        /* Apparently on some AMD CPUs RDRAND will sometimes (after a suspend/resume cycle?) report success
++         * via the carry flag but nonetheless return the same fixed value -1 in all cases. This appears to be
++         * a bad bug in the CPU or firmware. Let's deal with that and work-around this by explicitly checking
++         * for this special value (and also 0, just to be sure) and filtering it out. This is a work-around
++         * only however and something AMD really should fix properly. The Linux kernel should probably work
++         * around this issue by turning off RDRAND altogether on those CPUs. See:
++         * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11810 */
++        if (v == 0 || v == ULONG_MAX)
++                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
++                                       "RDRAND returned suspicious value %lx, assuming bad hardware RNG, not using value.", v);
++
++        *ret = v;
+         return 0;
+ #else
+         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+-- 
+2.22.0
+
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-6454.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-6454.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 97b7d635e7d6..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-6454.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
---- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
-+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
-@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
-         if (slash)
-                 return false;
-
--        return true;
-+        return (q - p) <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX;
- }
-
- char* object_path_startswith(const char *a, const char *b) {
---- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
-+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
-@@ -333,6 +333,10 @@
-
- #define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (128*1024*1024)
- #define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
-+/* Note that the D-Bus specification states that bus paths shall have no size limit. We enforce here one
-+ * anyway, since truly unbounded strings are a security problem. The limit we pick is relatively large however,
-+ * to not clash unnecessarily with real-life applications. */
-+#define BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
-
- #define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
-
---- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
-+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
-@@ -1134,7 +1134,8 @@
-                 const char *path,
-                 sd_bus_error *error) {
-
--        char *prefix;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-+        size_t pl;
-         int r;
-
-         assert(bus);
-@@ -1150,7 +1151,12 @@
-                 return 0;
-
-         /* Second, add fallback vtables registered for any of the prefixes */
--        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-+        pl = strlen(path);
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                 r = object_manager_serialize_path(bus, reply, prefix, path, true, error);
-                 if (r < 0)
-@@ -1346,6 +1352,7 @@
- }
-
- int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-         int r;
-         size_t pl;
-         bool found_object = false;
-@@ -1370,9 +1377,12 @@
-         assert(m->member);
-
-         pl = strlen(m->path);
--        do {
--                char prefix[pl+1];
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-
-+        do {
-                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
-
-                 r = object_find_and_run(bus, m, m->path, false, &found_object);
-@@ -1499,9 +1509,15 @@
-
-         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, path);
-         if (!n) {
--                char *prefix;
-+                _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-+                size_t pl;
-+
-+                pl = strlen(path);
-+                assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+                prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+                if (!prefix)
-+                        return -ENOMEM;
-
--                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, prefix);
-                         if (n)
-@@ -2091,8 +2107,9 @@
-                 char **names) {
-
-         BUS_DONT_DESTROY(bus);
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-         bool found_interface = false;
--        char *prefix;
-+        size_t pl;
-         int r;
-
-         assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
-@@ -2111,6 +2128,12 @@
-         if (names && names[0] == NULL)
-                 return 0;
-
-+        pl = strlen(path);
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-         do {
-                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
-
-@@ -2120,7 +2143,6 @@
-                 if (bus->nodes_modified)
-                         continue;
-
--                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                         r = emit_properties_changed_on_interface(bus, prefix, path, interface, true, &found_interface, names);
-                         if (r != 0)
-@@ -2252,7 +2274,8 @@
-
- static int object_added_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
-         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
--        char *prefix;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-+        size_t pl;
-         int r;
-
-         assert(bus);
-@@ -2297,7 +2320,12 @@
-         if (bus->nodes_modified)
-                 return 0;
-
--        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-+        pl = strlen(path);
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                 r = object_added_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
-                 if (r < 0)
-@@ -2436,7 +2464,8 @@
-
- static int object_removed_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
-         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
--        char *prefix;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-+        size_t pl;
-         int r;
-
-         assert(bus);
-@@ -2468,7 +2497,12 @@
-         if (bus->nodes_modified)
-                 return 0;
-
--        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-+        pl = strlen(path);
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                 r = object_removed_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
-                 if (r < 0)
-@@ -2618,7 +2652,8 @@
-                 const char *path,
-                 const char *interface) {
-
--        char *prefix;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
-+        size_t pl;
-         int r;
-
-         assert(bus);
-@@ -2632,7 +2667,12 @@
-         if (bus->nodes_modified)
-                 return 0;
-
--        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
-+        pl = strlen(path);
-+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
-+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
-+        if (!prefix)
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
-                 r = interfaces_added_append_one_prefix(bus, m, prefix, path, interface, true);
-                 if (r != 0)
-
-
-