diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.9-CVE-2023-3446.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.9-CVE-2023-3446.patch | 120 |
1 files changed, 120 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.9-CVE-2023-3446.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.9-CVE-2023-3446.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a1be6a8af51 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.9-CVE-2023-3446.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8a62fd996cb1c22383ec75b4155d54dec4a1b0ee + +From 1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus + +The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters +that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus +value even if it is excessively large. + +There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which +OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still +perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a +new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail. + +An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters +obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of +Service attack. + +The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL +functions. An application calling any of those other functions may +similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are +DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check(). + +CVE-2023-3446 + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> +Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451) + +(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d) +--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c ++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) + if (nid != NID_undef) + return 1; + ++ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */ ++ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { ++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret)) + return 0; + +--- a/include/openssl/dh.h ++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h +@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm); + # include <openssl/dherr.h> + + # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS +-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 ++# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 ++# endif ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS ++# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768 + # endif + + # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024 + +From 8a62fd996cb1c22383ec75b4155d54dec4a1b0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446 + +Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an +excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not +be performing time consuming checks using that modulus. + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> +Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451) + +(cherry picked from commit ede782b4c8868d1f09c9cd237f82b6f35b7dba8b) +--- a/test/dhtest.c ++++ b/test/dhtest.c +@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) + goto err1; + + /* check fails, because p is way too small */ +- if (!DH_check(dh, &i)) ++ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i))) + goto err2; + i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL; + if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) +@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void) + /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */ + ERR_clear_error(); + ++ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */ ++ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1)) ++ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS))) ++ goto err3; ++ ++ /* ++ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus ++ */ ++ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i))) ++ goto err3; ++ + /* + * II) key generation + */ +@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) + goto err3; + + /* ... and check whether it is valid */ +- if (!DH_check(a, &i)) ++ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i))) + goto err3; + if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) + || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) |