diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys-apps')
-rw-r--r-- | sys-apps/Manifest.gz | bin | 48509 -> 48509 bytes | |||
-rw-r--r-- | sys-apps/shadow/Manifest | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.5-CVE-2018-7169.patch | 180 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys-apps/shadow/shadow-4.5-r1.ebuild | 212 |
4 files changed, 394 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys-apps/Manifest.gz b/sys-apps/Manifest.gz Binary files differindex dd00f66970d2..35bb6758a36f 100644 --- a/sys-apps/Manifest.gz +++ b/sys-apps/Manifest.gz diff --git a/sys-apps/shadow/Manifest b/sys-apps/shadow/Manifest index e14f4f8e6344..2837d7d44ba3 100644 --- a/sys-apps/shadow/Manifest +++ b/sys-apps/shadow/Manifest @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ AUX shadow-4.4-CVE-2017-2616.patch 2159 BLAKE2B e51b0c81392207d8e07dd6d4b8b16410 AUX shadow-4.4-load_defaults.patch 1027 BLAKE2B 632c18631d1218bed95a043e89a2599f008f8af87c230703c759acaab20768920cdfc21233ebd6a065553a92577a6e5a81f2a0d6d7cdecb9c16cacad4df4f22b SHA512 c821149fdcb71b0c1c7b0de72126a3ec625bd54f2edaff1666ccd30abe3f3d516db329dbe873ae020a6670f93caaf7d235283666113d5b02936043d6dd976d36 AUX shadow-4.4-prototypes.patch 1232 BLAKE2B 757a6db113b6873994dcacfd6867a14e7d35def2d4ba6749b887f28cf7278117722bda2c8b981e23694dafcc25d6f2d7cd9531aeb3d3eb597c9b822729678dc2 SHA512 970f79efaf77e91baa22049230f2a97e6a045f2f03ef846f4c35dc4f5702941e61db5b6544c24d112faafd6d516fc5054725039f28fe81e17926a5e8ef6f0432 AUX shadow-4.4-su-snprintf.patch 849 BLAKE2B 62cb1498bd79991373b1bc8241a07dfcd731ebba7a39406958b30bd0287c8acab65a9a22bcee8ba95073e36c7a8d0b1931b988b4b5963041f61db9ef4c5dbdeb SHA512 2aaa1c847ec34002c6e63af66fb36664e0fc5dc0b719ab38959043f990e84191f5e2f85c2dc44e324abcfe67691c9a9b8181da49077031e2eaaf979dde95b2d9 +AUX shadow-4.5-CVE-2018-7169.patch 5778 BLAKE2B 59e06cda2d3b48d77548c22073f9c4ce018c16bdd128089ce6ae6d8eebe1ad9b73438530fb32b628bc5e72201852b7c452264a13707bcbfa826777b778a7b90b SHA512 fef082516e47ee4e3d9627916c47ffb8e1987580586639374d461b7b9d041370abe5b80dbbfacd4fd256a1bc2f9d23e0e71497298dd60ccd96d795811a13cd58 DIST shadow-4.4.tar.gz 3706812 BLAKE2B b4dc056643ea507af975df68a1775193c942227aef4ff0d19fcc70392e5410da076d3cc9ad1c58082ec992f2aaa35037dd7de9e6563f783aaed96b2007055ab1 SHA512 c1e0f65a4fbd0f9d8de38e488b4a374cac5c476180e233269fc666988d9201c0dcc694605c5e54d54f81039c2e30c95b14c12f10adef749a45cc31f0b4b5d5a6 DIST shadow-4.5.tar.gz 3804933 BLAKE2B c4714b7fe9a1af5a5751d4274e70e7fb31994cc40058b44c401bbbdf83c238fcf48e6e6e663d8a61f614b6291ea524862d9d2425d7d839340a10f8fb7c8eaa85 SHA512 02d6482a1159689e404dd49a68b4e2db85e9ffdcdfbacc8efcbd9043f14a1ec3fc4d749700df915d375df67d589219b6b0f57a6cfd9fb5b197012888a608913b EBUILD shadow-4.4-r2.ebuild 5484 BLAKE2B 988704357c01c35a2808b48c921c6de6ac6eb06429e6a35945263fba094caf8bddb0d4fed6ef236845f7983671dbee109d95a01f84703e7b4fc59a7fe26ce569 SHA512 8584c5805f4729a4ab42ccac22a558b0899258f9408cae4a9c5570f6b4ea7f9a969da92393ce456f1d5e2a5199bacbb5317f3433a7d41afb5b52e280493b0f56 +EBUILD shadow-4.5-r1.ebuild 5405 BLAKE2B 7518b3700adf543a619413066415f64959a50efbbe669b28622e8d2d4cd749705b256c62e3ba73a88e6f3c0d6c195c87c377e7541e165ccbf4328ec5f4b1b0df SHA512 a50352c9b189d5265e921e977acff5c96dedef2634b046f66b376e6d6e2fdab40b629e453695a3153dd1edb13740e94d6d205daed544b3bba885fd35dbb7251e EBUILD shadow-4.5.ebuild 5325 BLAKE2B c2849ceaf174e3ea0a660c7da8912f60d4c1446119759c1d98131ee493074340c1bc149e3c542552f56a802cb5b56d2d0db60b36860afe858c84a00122bbfeb1 SHA512 1f1a6dc525673045fee660b661bf772aea028718b172f386560999b884807f1b3e0dd6a9a6ef6a9c89ebe79d9a0ff14526c62dd77d7c9ca96ebc55f1243a870a MISC metadata.xml 565 BLAKE2B bdd91116c16f590eabb6f18f05a4f72b55651383431c78fb07c27b23e7152b25816895e2ae3e2afd1ecd6e2b9fa9dd0005d198f2ab7ee2061583b586e4c44b01 SHA512 be29faf2eb981bdb0d643ca691d48b10ee702c3a32ca7fca1d00365aa1c4beb5b1b4bec8104be4352fed32f3fabc3108061b8eb8f0054e612c268b5c6f4b1469 diff --git a/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.5-CVE-2018-7169.patch b/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.5-CVE-2018-7169.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..30ad9e614067 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.5-CVE-2018-7169.patch @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group + +This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a +user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was +created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege +escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from +certain paths. + +This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes +it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which +only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use +that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This +workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set +an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow +administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1). + +We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the +default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they +technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if +the setgroups policy is already "deny". + +Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 +Fixes: CVE-2018-7169 +Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> +--- + src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c +index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644 +--- a/src/newgidmap.c ++++ b/src/newgidmap.c +@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@ + */ + const char *Prog; + +-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range) ++ ++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + /* An empty range is invalid */ + if (range->count == 0) + return false; + +- /* Test /etc/subgid */ +- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) ++ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */ ++ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) { ++ *allow_setgroups = true; + return true; ++ } + +- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */ +- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) ++ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */ ++ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) { ++ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */ + return true; ++ } + + return false; + } + + static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges, +- struct map_range *mappings) ++ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + struct map_range *mapping; + int idx; + + mapping = mappings; + for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) { +- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) { ++ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) { + fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"), + Prog, + mapping->upper, +@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void) + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + ++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups) ++{ ++ int setgroups_fd; ++ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096]; ++ ++ /* ++ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't ++ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing ++ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow" ++ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop. ++ */ ++ policy = "deny\n"; ++ if (allow_setgroups) ++ return; ++ ++ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (setgroups_fd < 0) { ++ /* ++ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups ++ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this. ++ */ ++ if (ENOENT == errno) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups ++ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will ++ * fail. ++ */ ++ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Write the policy. */ ++ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ policy, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++out: ++ close(setgroups_fd); ++} ++ + /* + * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process + */ +@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw; + int written; ++ bool allow_setgroups = false; + + Prog = Basename (argv[0]); + +@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + (unsigned long) getuid ())); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } +- ++ + /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */ + if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"), +@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + if (!mappings) + usage(); + +- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings); ++ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups); + ++ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups); + write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map"); + sub_gid_close(); + diff --git a/sys-apps/shadow/shadow-4.5-r1.ebuild b/sys-apps/shadow/shadow-4.5-r1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e3d98f2593e --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-apps/shadow/shadow-4.5-r1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=6 + +inherit libtool pam multilib + +DESCRIPTION="Utilities to deal with user accounts" +HOMEPAGE="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/" +SRC_URI="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/${PV}/${P}.tar.gz" + +LICENSE="BSD GPL-2" +SLOT="0" +KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86" +IUSE="acl audit +cracklib nls pam selinux skey xattr" +# Taken from the man/Makefile.am file. +LANGS=( cs da de es fi fr hu id it ja ko pl pt_BR ru sv tr zh_CN zh_TW ) + +RDEPEND="acl? ( sys-apps/acl:0= ) + audit? ( >=sys-process/audit-2.6:0= ) + cracklib? ( >=sys-libs/cracklib-2.7-r3:0= ) + pam? ( virtual/pam:0= ) + skey? ( sys-auth/skey:0= ) + selinux? ( + >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28:0= + sys-libs/libsemanage:0= + ) + nls? ( virtual/libintl ) + xattr? ( sys-apps/attr:0= )" +DEPEND="${RDEPEND} + app-arch/xz-utils + nls? ( sys-devel/gettext )" +RDEPEND="${RDEPEND} + pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20150213 )" + +PATCHES=( + "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-4.1.3-dots-in-usernames.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/${P}-CVE-2018-7169.patch" #647790 +) + +src_prepare() { + default + #eautoreconf + elibtoolize +} + +src_configure() { + local myeconfargs=( + --without-group-name-max-length + --without-tcb + --enable-shared=no + --enable-static=yes + $(use_with acl) + $(use_with audit) + $(use_with cracklib libcrack) + $(use_with pam libpam) + $(use_with skey) + $(use_with selinux) + $(use_enable nls) + $(use_with elibc_glibc nscd) + $(use_with xattr attr) + ) + econf "${myeconfargs[@]}" + + has_version 'sys-libs/uclibc[-rpc]' && sed -i '/RLOGIN/d' config.h #425052 + + if use nls ; then + local l langs="po" # These are the pot files. + for l in ${LANGS[*]} ; do + has ${l} ${LINGUAS-${l}} && langs+=" ${l}" + done + sed -i "/^SUBDIRS = /s:=.*:= ${langs}:" man/Makefile || die + fi +} + +set_login_opt() { + local comment="" opt=$1 val=$2 + if [[ -z ${val} ]]; then + comment="#" + sed -i \ + -e "/^${opt}\>/s:^:#:" \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/login.defs || die + else + sed -i -r \ + -e "/^#?${opt}\>/s:.*:${opt} ${val}:" \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/login.defs + fi + local res=$(grep "^${comment}${opt}\>" "${ED%/}"/etc/login.defs) + einfo "${res:-Unable to find ${opt} in /etc/login.defs}" +} + +src_install() { + emake DESTDIR="${D}" suidperms=4711 install + + # Remove libshadow and libmisc; see bug 37725 and the following + # comment from shadow's README.linux: + # Currently, libshadow.a is for internal use only, so if you see + # -lshadow in a Makefile of some other package, it is safe to + # remove it. + rm -f "${ED%/}"/{,usr/}$(get_libdir)/lib{misc,shadow}.{a,la} + + insinto /etc + if ! use pam ; then + insopts -m0600 + doins etc/login.access etc/limits + fi + + # needed for 'useradd -D' + insinto /etc/default + insopts -m0600 + doins "${FILESDIR}"/default/useradd + + # move passwd to / to help recover broke systems #64441 + mv "${ED%/}"/usr/bin/passwd "${ED%/}"/bin/ || die + dosym /bin/passwd /usr/bin/passwd + + cd "${S}" || die + insinto /etc + insopts -m0644 + newins etc/login.defs login.defs + + set_login_opt CREATE_HOME yes + if ! use pam ; then + set_login_opt MAIL_CHECK_ENAB no + set_login_opt SU_WHEEL_ONLY yes + set_login_opt CRACKLIB_DICTPATH /usr/$(get_libdir)/cracklib_dict + set_login_opt LOGIN_RETRIES 3 + set_login_opt ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512 + set_login_opt CONSOLE + else + dopamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/shadow + + for x in chpasswd chgpasswd newusers; do + newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/passwd ${x} + done + + for x in chage chsh chfn \ + user{add,del,mod} group{add,del,mod} ; do + newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/shadow ${x} + done + + # comment out login.defs options that pam hates + local opt sed_args=() + for opt in \ + CHFN_AUTH \ + CONSOLE \ + CRACKLIB_DICTPATH \ + ENV_HZ \ + ENVIRON_FILE \ + FAILLOG_ENAB \ + FTMP_FILE \ + LASTLOG_ENAB \ + MAIL_CHECK_ENAB \ + MOTD_FILE \ + NOLOGINS_FILE \ + OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB \ + PASS_ALWAYS_WARN \ + PASS_CHANGE_TRIES \ + PASS_MIN_LEN \ + PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB \ + QUOTAS_ENAB \ + SU_WHEEL_ONLY + do + set_login_opt ${opt} + sed_args+=( -e "/^#${opt}\>/b pamnote" ) + done + sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" \ + -e 'b exit' \ + -e ': pamnote; i# NOTE: This setting should be configured via /etc/pam.d/ and not in this file.' \ + -e ': exit' \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/login.defs || die + + # remove manpages that pam will install for us + # and/or don't apply when using pam + find "${ED%/}"/usr/share/man \ + '(' -name 'limits.5*' -o -name 'suauth.5*' ')' \ + -delete + + # Remove pam.d files provided by pambase. + rm "${ED%/}"/etc/pam.d/{login,passwd,su} || die + fi + + # Remove manpages that are handled by other packages + find "${ED%/}"/usr/share/man \ + '(' -name id.1 -o -name passwd.5 -o -name getspnam.3 ')' \ + -delete + + cd "${S}" || die + dodoc ChangeLog NEWS TODO + newdoc README README.download + cd doc || die + dodoc HOWTO README* WISHLIST *.txt +} + +pkg_preinst() { + rm -f "${EROOT}"/etc/pam.d/system-auth.new \ + "${EROOT}/etc/login.defs.new" +} + +pkg_postinst() { + # Enable shadow groups. + if [ ! -f "${EROOT}"/etc/gshadow ] ; then + if grpck -r -R "${EROOT}" 2>/dev/null ; then + grpconv -R "${EROOT}" + else + ewarn "Running 'grpck' returned errors. Please run it by hand, and then" + ewarn "run 'grpconv' afterwards!" + fi + fi + + einfo "The 'adduser' symlink to 'useradd' has been dropped." +} |