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From dd679ad1d855e7f69a887eb343bb53d49dc664e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jordy Zomer <zome8499@student.alfa-college.nl>
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 12:19:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix CVE-2018-19497.
An issue was discovered in The Sleuth Kit (TSK) through 4.6.4.
The "tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, &rec_buf[rec_off2])" call in hfs_dir_open_meta_cb in
tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c does not properly check boundaries. This results in
a crash (SEGV on unknown address
READ memory access)
when reading too much in the destination buffer.
---
tsk/fs/hfs.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tsk/fs/hfs.c b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
index 00f1720b1b..0dec507165 100644
--- a/tsk/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
@@ -956,7 +956,8 @@ hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
- if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
+
+ if (keylen > nodesize - rec_off) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
From fb2bc0ad693db852fac1dcc77a072aeabe106ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jordy Zomer <zome8499@student.alfa-college.nl>
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 12:37:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix length in printf of nodesize
Also fix the length in printf next to comit dd679ad1d855e7f69a887eb343bb53d49dc664e7
---
tsk/fs/hfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tsk/fs/hfs.c b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
index 0dec507165..4f7c0679a8 100644
--- a/tsk/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
- PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
+ PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize - rec_off);
free(node);
return 1;
}
From 8242588f4354339d9cb1ad82622e7c16c55391c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jordy Zomer <zome8499@student.alfa-college.nl>
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 12:47:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UPDATE on CVE-2018-19497.
make it >= because if keylen == nodesize - rec_off it's already past it's destination.
Also fix the sprintf
---
tsk/fs/hfs.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tsk/fs/hfs.c b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
index 4f7c0679a8..bb3819ada9 100644
--- a/tsk/fs/hfs.c
+++ b/tsk/fs/hfs.c
@@ -957,11 +957,11 @@ hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
- if (keylen > nodesize - rec_off) {
+ if (keylen >= nodesize - rec_off) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
- PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize - rec_off);
+ PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, (nodesize - rec_off));
free(node);
return 1;
}
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