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authorV3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org>2020-03-07 17:15:14 +0000
committerV3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org>2020-03-07 17:15:14 +0000
commit4aea7c138416af7293bf8f36ace192ff23f520a0 (patch)
tree10d806f43508f209437a1bb45693cb954f7eae38
parent4f008d2dd74609c1bb2fceab6fb638a556d52e36 (diff)
sys-kernel/linux-{image,redcore}-sources-lts : version bump, increase hardening (v5.4.24)
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/Manifest2
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config16
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch1149
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild (renamed from sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild)0
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/Manifest2
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config16
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch1149
-rw-r--r--sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild (renamed from sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild)0
8 files changed, 2242 insertions, 92 deletions
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/Manifest b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/Manifest
index 5abd3eb9..d0eb1794 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/Manifest
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/Manifest
@@ -1 +1 @@
-DIST linux-5.4.20.tar.xz 109485940 BLAKE2B 57f09bf197864cae4245ac7df11a4f42c48205efef7423b70b241f8d17906f26326189b68ce95463dabdbded8d14e440f22ee6c1d80be75434f71c27f145966f SHA512 4bb38382eecf41a3e70adeb722c52e0475da27c80c4e07cdba806c5371ceb4bcf621229a991e19fab7e58cbc854052013e5ccdb2c8a1fff08978c002359d0166
+DIST linux-5.4.24.tar.xz 109481252 BLAKE2B 8124547a1be476b61612d22f856627ed0a70e3bb4ff3898a93eaaa6921870baf3bfcf3901a0f85772c995da5c2214d0a3ff440143438a479808e229d2ba9fb5d SHA512 1d30040ee4992156cc0436e1782fee1c1b2fbb50462ac29429be141eac5f6c7e0a124db335fcd42c5d73f03b564a5903c3de73afd867e0c923a9f1cb88273200
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
index 6efd5b6e..b8912970 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#
# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 5.4.11-redcore Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 5.4.24-redcore-lts Kernel Configuration
#
#
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y
#
CONFIG_INIT_ENV_ARG_LIMIT=32
# CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is not set
-# CONFIG_HEADER_TEST is not set
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION=""
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO=y
CONFIG_BUILD_SALT=""
@@ -6398,8 +6397,6 @@ CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_ATOM_HIFI_EP=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_COMMON=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BAYTRAIL_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BAYTRAIL=m
-CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BROADWELL_SUPPORT=y
-CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BROADWELL=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_MERRIFIELD_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_MERRIFIELD=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_APOLLOLAKE_SUPPORT=y
@@ -9275,6 +9272,17 @@ CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY=y
# end of Kernel hardening options
# end of Security options
+#
+# Hardened Enhancements
+#
+CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO=y
+# CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD is not set
+# end of Hardened Enhancements
+
CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
index 590651ed..1d52bc84 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
@@ -538,6 +538,308 @@ index df0fc997dc3e..bd8eed8de6c1 100644
help
Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 01b8868b9bed..13b8635519fe 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -350,11 +350,20 @@
+ /*
+ * Configuration information
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 18
++#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 16
++#else
+ #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
+-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+ #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
++#endif
++#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+ #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 32768
++#else
+ #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
++#endif
+ #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
+
+
+@@ -363,9 +372,6 @@
+ /*
+ * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
+ * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+- *
+- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
+- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ */
+ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+ #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+@@ -428,17 +434,28 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+ * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
+ * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ */
+-static const struct poolinfo {
++static struct poolinfo {
+ int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits;
+-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
+- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+-} poolinfo_table[] = {
++#define S(x) \
++ .poolbitshift = ilog2(x)+5, \
++ .poolwords = (x), \
++ .poolbytes = (x)*4, \
++ .poolfracbits = (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
++ int tap[5];
++} __randomize_layout poolinfo_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++ /* x^8192 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
++ { S(8192), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } },
++ /* x^2048 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
++ { S(2048), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } }
++#else
+ /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+ /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
++ { S(128), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } },
+ /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+ /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 },
++ { S(32), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } },
++#endif
+ #if 0
+ /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
+ { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
+@@ -482,7 +499,7 @@ struct crng_state {
+ __u32 state[16];
+ unsigned long init_time;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
+@@ -542,7 +559,7 @@ struct entropy_store {
+ unsigned int initialized:1;
+ unsigned int last_data_init:1;
+ __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
+@@ -553,6 +570,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
+ static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
+ static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+ static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
++/* this actually doesn't need latent entropy */
++static __u32 secondary_xfer_buffer[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+
+ static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
+ .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
+@@ -571,9 +590,78 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
+ push_to_pool),
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++static __u32 const twist_table[64][4] = {
++ { 0x6a09e668, 0xbb67ae86, 0x3c6ef373, 0xa54ff53a },
++ { 0x510e5280, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ac, 0x5be0cd19 },
++ { 0xcbbb9d5e, 0x629a292a, 0x9159015a, 0x152fecd9 },
++ { 0x67332668, 0x8eb44a87, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x47b5481e },
++ { 0xae5f9157, 0xcf6c85d4, 0x2f73477d, 0x6d1826cb },
++ { 0x8b43d457, 0xe360b597, 0x1c456003, 0x6f196331 },
++ { 0xd94ebeb2, 0x0cc4a612, 0x261dc1f3, 0x5815a7be },
++ { 0x70b7ed68, 0xa1513c69, 0x44f93636, 0x720dcdfe },
++ { 0xb467369e, 0xca320b76, 0x34e0d42e, 0x49c7d9be },
++ { 0x87abb9f2, 0xc463a2fc, 0xec3fc3f4, 0x27277f6d },
++ { 0x610bebf3, 0x7420b49f, 0xd1fd8a34, 0xe4773594 },
++ { 0x092197f6, 0x1b530c96, 0x869d6343, 0xeee52e50 },
++ { 0x1107668a, 0x21fba37c, 0x43ab9fb6, 0x75a9f91d },
++ { 0x8630501a, 0xd7cd8174, 0x007fe010, 0x0379f514 },
++ { 0x066b651b, 0x0764ab84, 0x0a4b06be, 0x0c3578c1 },
++ { 0x0d2962a5, 0x11e039f4, 0x1857b7bf, 0x1a29bf2e },
++ { 0x1b11a32f, 0x1cdf34e8, 0x23183042, 0x25b89093 },
++ { 0x2a0c06a1, 0x2ae79843, 0x2c9cda69, 0x2f281f24 },
++ { 0x32841259, 0x3502e64e, 0x377c9c21, 0x39204cda },
++ { 0x3b91bf66, 0x3ecc38ca, 0x40665609, 0x43947938 },
++ { 0x47830769, 0x484ae4b8, 0x4c2b2b75, 0x4cf03d21 },
++ { 0x4f3cbb11, 0x50c2d3b5, 0x5308af16, 0x560a7a9a },
++ { 0x5788d981, 0x584769b4, 0x59c34f06, 0x5e2d564c },
++ { 0x6116d760, 0x62894c10, 0x6569b58c, 0x66d7b394 },
++ { 0x68f9f8dc, 0x6d34f03d, 0x6de8372f, 0x742687a4 },
++ { 0x76356021, 0x799d1235, 0x7ba455f4, 0x7da8d73b },
++ { 0x7e546743, 0x80554bdc, 0x83a63a3c, 0x85a01e39 },
++ { 0x879774ac, 0x883eac9f, 0x8a32aae0, 0x8c243210 },
++ { 0x8d6e8781, 0x8e134b6f, 0x91ea5892, 0x95166fe4 },
++ { 0x95b817e6, 0x96faa747, 0x98dca135, 0x9abc6593 },
++ { 0x9b5bd55a, 0x9f136df7, 0xa04ebd79, 0xa225f6ed },
++ { 0xa4970e49, 0xa79f5a6b, 0xaa0869af, 0xad06dcbd },
++ { 0xaf68312e, 0xb12efe0b, 0xb2f3ef5b, 0xb420e03a },
++ { 0xb6785656, 0xb837d738, 0xb9613115, 0xbbb18efb },
++ { 0xbcd89621, 0xc0db3814, 0xc3b2f2a3, 0xc71638d9 },
++ { 0xc7a6240f, 0xca73166e, 0xcb01f3ba, 0xcc1f293d },
++ { 0xccad81c8, 0xcf72acaf, 0xd34c7258, 0xd4649b7a },
++ { 0xd4f07147, 0xd607a013, 0xd9d3b47b, 0xdae803b5 },
++ { 0xdb71ef1a, 0xdc854e24, 0xe1dcf0ea, 0xe2eca719 },
++ { 0xe50a4ad8, 0xe7ac0990, 0xe9c46d3a, 0xeacfc33c },
++ { 0xec5fb417, 0xedee611c, 0xf18bc533, 0xf292ef77 },
++ { 0xf41cab36, 0xf5a531ec, 0xf7aeb45d, 0xf93474e9 },
++ { 0xfc3c7559, 0xfd3e1962, 0xfebf9bc1, 0xff3fdbf2 },
++ { 0x01bf3cab, 0x023ebd6b, 0x03bc8288, 0x06365a0f },
++ { 0x06b4c1d2, 0x092afcc1, 0x09a8ad2c, 0x0b21093c },
++ { 0x0f83d25e, 0x107c1074, 0x10f803d0, 0x11ef938d },
++ { 0x136212e8, 0x14d390a4, 0x16beab25, 0x182dd7d5 },
++ { 0x199c09bf, 0x1ed27f46, 0x1f4b2d3e, 0x21a502bc },
++ { 0x23849e06, 0x25d9d3da, 0x273ef0ca, 0x28a326f6 },
++ { 0x2a7cb5e4, 0x2d4019ba, 0x2e2b1e73, 0x2f8aec73 },
++ { 0x30e9ddcc, 0x315ea828, 0x32bc75cf, 0x357587f0 },
++ { 0x37b7de93, 0x3bc31ec6, 0x3c35b24a, 0x3d1a949b },
++ { 0x3e713d15, 0x3ee347da, 0x4038e0bf, 0x411c2bae },
++ { 0x418daf9a, 0x4270749e, 0x4516b0b0, 0x45876dcb },
++ { 0x46d92246, 0x4e448a56, 0x4f9141c0, 0x50dd3e71 },
++ { 0x5296c45b, 0x56738aac, 0x58961d02, 0x5b9010c1 },
++ { 0x5c6913ae, 0x5cd577f2, 0x5dae0649, 0x5ef24aeb },
++ { 0x60a199af, 0x6178ce9b, 0x61e44c97, 0x6326551c },
++ { 0x65a86b29, 0x67bd7e12, 0x6827e41c, 0x68fc7925 },
++ { 0x6966a836, 0x6a3acfa3, 0x6b78828a, 0x6df2017d },
++ { 0x7068fdbb, 0x720c4495, 0x747f226b, 0x75b7a753 },
++ { 0x7687a9e0, 0x77bf2d48, 0x795d98d4, 0x7a2c690b },
++ { 0x7bc93fa8, 0x7c974690, 0x7f6653f3, 0x80333127 },
++ { 0x81660244, 0x81cc2760, 0x829840e3, 0x83c9edd4 }
++};
++#else
+ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+ 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+ 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
+@@ -588,17 +676,14 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+ int nbytes)
+ {
+- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
++ unsigned long i, n, t1, t2, tap[5];
+ int input_rotate;
+ int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
+ const char *bytes = in;
+ __u32 w;
+
+- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
+- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
+- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
+- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
+- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
++ tap[n] = r->poolinfo->tap[n];
+
+ input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+ i = r->add_ptr;
+@@ -610,14 +695,17 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+
+ /* XOR in the various taps */
+ w ^= r->pool[i];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
++ w ^= r->pool[(i + tap[n]) & wordmask];
+
+ /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++ t1 = rol32(w, 14) & 0x1FFF; // 0-63, 1111111111111
++ t2 = rol32(w, t1) & 0x3; // 0-3, 11
++ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[t1][t2];
++#else
+ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
+@@ -655,7 +743,7 @@ struct fast_pool {
+ unsigned long last;
+ unsigned short reg_idx;
+ unsigned char count;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+@@ -750,7 +838,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+ /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
+
+ do {
+- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
++ __u64 anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+ unsigned int add =
+ ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
+
+@@ -1134,7 +1222,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+
+ extract_crng(tmp);
+ i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -1162,9 +1250,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ struct timer_rand_state {
+ cycles_t last_time;
+ long last_delta, last_delta2;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
++#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { .last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+ /*
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+@@ -1407,20 +1495,18 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+
+ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+ {
+- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+-
+ int bytes = nbytes;
+
+ /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
+ bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
+ /* but never more than the buffer size */
+- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
++ bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(secondary_xfer_buffer));
+
+ trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
+ ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
+- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
++ bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes,
+ random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
++ mix_pool_bytes(r, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes);
+ credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
+ }
+
+@@ -1650,7 +1736,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
+
+ extract_buf(r, tmp);
+ i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -2353,7 +2439,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
+ };
+ unsigned int position;
+ spinlock_t batch_lock;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ /*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
index c7623f99ac0f..859c2782c8e2 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
@@ -616,6 +918,33 @@ index 4ac74b354801..7c2cb5b3a449 100644
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
unit_load = 150;
else
+diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+index 7b975dbb2bb4..43fdb33a1fc0 100644
+--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;
+ static int debugfs_mount_count;
+ static bool debugfs_registered;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++extern int sysfs_restricted;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down
+ * so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether
+@@ -559,6 +563,11 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
+ return failed_creating(dentry);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ if (sysfs_restricted)
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU;
++ else
++#endif
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
+ inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index c27231234764..4038334db213 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
@@ -638,10 +967,21 @@ index c27231234764..4038334db213 100644
err:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
-index bd1c0ca4151c..8f67ca391509 100644
+index e81521c87f98..8c933ad857e0 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -877,10 +877,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
+@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@
+
+ #define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX (PATH_MAX - offsetof(struct filename, iname))
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++extern int fifo_restrictions;
++#endif
++
+ struct filename *
+ getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty)
+ {
+@@ -877,10 +881,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
path_put(&last->link);
}
@@ -656,6 +996,55 @@ index bd1c0ca4151c..8f67ca391509 100644
/**
* may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
+@@ -3242,6 +3246,32 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
+ return error;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Handles possibly restricted FIFO operations
++ * if the user doesn't own this directory.
++ */
++static int fifo_restricted(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const struct dentry *dir,
++ const int flag,
++ const int acc_mode) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++ const struct cred *cred;
++ struct inode *inode, *dir_inode;
++
++ cred = current_cred();
++ inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
++ dir_inode = d_backing_inode(dir);
++
++ if (fifo_restrictions && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) &&
++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
++ !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_inode->i_uid) &&
++ !uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
++ return -EACCES;
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Handle the last step of open()
+ */
+@@ -3360,6 +3390,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd,
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Only check if O_CREAT is specified, all other checks need to go
++ * into may_open().
++ */
++ if (fifo_restricted(path.dentry, path.mnt, dir, open_flag, acc_mode)) {
++ path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * create/update audit record if it already exists.
+ */
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index 295a7a21b774..3aed361bc0f9 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -715,6 +1104,77 @@ index c38e4c2e1221..6135fbaf7298 100644
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
return 0;
+diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+index aa85f2874a9f..9b85cc73f70f 100644
+--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
++++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+
+ DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sysfs_symlink_target_lock);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++extern int sysfs_restricted;
++#endif
++
+ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
+ {
+ char *buf;
+@@ -40,12 +44,20 @@ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
+ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
+ {
+ struct kernfs_node *parent, *kn;
++ const char* name;
++ umode_t mode;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ const char *parent_name;
++#endif
++
+ if (WARN_ON(!kobj))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ name = kobject_name(kobj);
++
+ if (kobj->parent)
+ parent = kobj->parent->sd;
+ else
+@@ -56,12 +68,30 @@ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
+
+ kobject_get_ownership(kobj, &uid, &gid);
+
+- kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, kobject_name(kobj),
+- S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, uid, gid,
+- kobj, ns);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ if (sysfs_restricted) {
++ parent_name = parent->name;
++ mode = S_IRWXU;
++
++ if ((!strcmp(parent_name, "") && (!strcmp(name, "devices") ||
++ !strcmp(name, "fs"))) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "devices") && !strcmp(name, "system")) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "fs") && (!strcmp(name, "selinux") ||
++ !strcmp(name, "fuse") || !strcmp(name, "ecryptfs"))) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "system") && !strcmp(name, "cpu")))
++ mode |= S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++ }
++ else
++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++#else
++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++#endif
++
++ kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, name, mode, uid, gid, kobj, ns);
++
+ if (IS_ERR(kn)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(kn) == -EEXIST)
+- sysfs_warn_dup(parent, kobject_name(kobj));
++ sysfs_warn_dup(parent, name);
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+ }
+
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index d99d166fd892..7a4f2854feb8 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -1145,6 +1605,22 @@ index 4e7809408073..0b58a5176a25 100644
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
+diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
+index e42d13b55cf3..3228bcfe7599 100644
+--- a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
++++ b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
+@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@
+
+ #define IPVERSION 4
+ #define MAXTTL 255
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++#define IPDEFTTL 128
++#else
+ #define IPDEFTTL 64
++#endif
+
+ #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0
+ #define IPOPT_OLEN 1
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 0328b53d09ad..fde78a967939 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
@@ -1406,6 +1882,24 @@ index 755d8160e001..ed909f8050b2 100644
err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
+index bc6addd9152b..008be43f6cdd 100644
+--- a/kernel/kmod.c
++++ b/kernel/kmod.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
++ if (uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) {
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "denied attempt to auto-load module %.64s\n", module_name);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&kmod_concurrent_max) < 0) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("request_module: kmod_concurrent_max (%u) close to 0 (max_modprobes: %u), for module %s, throttling...",
+ atomic_read(&kmod_concurrent_max),
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index d65f2d5ab694..145e3c62c380 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1520,7 +2014,7 @@ index 0427a86743a4..5e6a9b4ccb41 100644
void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+index 70665934d53e..9b2fc21fb844 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
@@ -1531,7 +2025,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#include "../lib/kstrtox.h"
-@@ -104,12 +105,19 @@
+@@ -104,12 +105,25 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
/* External variables not in a header file. */
@@ -1539,6 +2033,12 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
+#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++int __read_mostly sysfs_restricted = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++int __read_mostly fifo_restrictions = 1;
++#endif
extern int suid_dumpable;
#ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
extern int core_uses_pid;
@@ -1551,7 +2051,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
extern int pid_max;
extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
-@@ -121,32 +129,32 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
+@@ -121,32 +135,32 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
/* Constants used for minimum and maximum */
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -1599,7 +2099,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
/*
-@@ -154,9 +162,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
+@@ -154,9 +168,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
* and hung_task_check_interval_secs
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
@@ -1613,7 +2113,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#endif
-@@ -301,19 +312,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
+@@ -301,19 +318,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
@@ -1641,7 +2141,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#endif
static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
-@@ -546,6 +557,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -546,6 +563,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
@@ -1657,7 +2157,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
{
.procname = "tainted",
-@@ -901,6 +921,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -901,6 +927,59 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
},
@@ -1692,6 +2192,28 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ {
++ .procname = "sysfs_restricted",
++ .data = &sysfs_restricted,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++ {
++ .procname = "fifo_restrictions",
++ .data = &fifo_restrictions,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
#endif
{
.procname = "ngroups_max",
@@ -2082,7 +2604,7 @@ index ade6c257d4b4..f8f9ebd51296 100644
static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
{
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
-index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
+index 20d72cb20515..3820def7e275 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
@@ -2205,25 +2727,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
if (!slab_free_hook(s, object)) {
/* Move object to the new freelist */
-@@ -1460,6 +1510,17 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
- *head = object;
- if (!*tail)
- *tail = object;
-+ } else if (slab_want_init_on_free(s) && s->ctor) {
-+ /* Objects that are put into quarantine by KASAN will
-+ * still undergo free_consistency_checks() and thus
-+ * need to show a valid freepointer to check_object().
-+ *
-+ * Note that doing this for all caches (not just ctor
-+ * ones, which have s->offset != NULL)) causes a GPF,
-+ * due to KASAN poisoning and the way set_freepointer()
-+ * eventually dereferences the freepointer.
-+ */
-+ set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
- }
- } while (object != old_tail);
-
-@@ -1473,8 +1534,9 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
+@@ -1473,8 +1523,9 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object)
{
setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
@@ -2234,7 +2738,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
s->ctor(object);
kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
-@@ -2752,8 +2814,28 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
+@@ -2752,8 +2803,28 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object);
@@ -2264,7 +2768,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
-@@ -3136,7 +3218,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+@@ -3136,7 +3207,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
void **p)
{
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
@@ -2273,12 +2777,13 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
-@@ -3176,11 +3258,35 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+@@ -3176,11 +3247,38 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
local_irq_enable();
/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
- if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
++ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
int j;
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
@@ -2287,10 +2792,12 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
+ * in the post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, p[j]);
-+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j], 0, s->object_size));
++ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
+ if (s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(p[j]);
+ kasan_poison_object_data(s, p[j]);
++ if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++ memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *));
+ }
+ } else if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
+ int j;
@@ -2311,7 +2818,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
}
/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
-@@ -3214,9 +3320,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
+@@ -3214,9 +3312,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
* and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
* take the list_lock.
*/
@@ -2324,7 +2831,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/*
* Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
-@@ -3384,6 +3490,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
+@@ -3384,6 +3482,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
#endif
@@ -2332,7 +2839,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
GFP_KERNEL);
page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
-@@ -3544,6 +3651,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
+@@ -3544,6 +3643,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
size += sizeof(void *);
}
@@ -2342,7 +2849,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/*
-@@ -3616,6 +3726,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
+@@ -3616,6 +3718,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
s->random = get_random_long();
#endif
@@ -2353,7 +2860,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
goto error;
-@@ -3891,6 +4005,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
+@@ -3891,6 +3997,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
offset -= s->red_left_pad;
}
@@ -2362,7 +2869,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
-@@ -3924,7 +4040,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
+@@ -3924,7 +4032,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
@@ -2374,7 +2881,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
return page_size(page);
}
-@@ -4769,7 +4889,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
+@@ -4769,7 +4881,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
#define SO_TOTAL (1 << SL_TOTAL)
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
@@ -2439,6 +2946,39 @@ index 82325d3d1371..240e3ae8e298 100644
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
+diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+index 9f9e00ba3ad7..962c6ca661e4 100644
+--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
++++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net);
+ int sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net __read_mostly;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++int sysctl_stealth_blackhole __read_mostly = 1;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
+ static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+@@ -512,6 +516,17 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
+ .proc_handler = set_default_qdisc
+ },
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ {
++ .procname = "ip_blackhole",
++ .data = &sysctl_stealth_blackhole,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
++#endif
+ #endif /* CONFIG_NET */
+ {
+ .procname = "netdev_budget",
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
index 03381f3e12ba..8ea409f37436 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
@@ -2451,6 +2991,389 @@ index 03381f3e12ba..8ea409f37436 100644
---help---
Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+index ac95ba78b903..249c6970e67c 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ struct icmp_control {
+ short error; /* This ICMP is classed as an error message */
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static const struct icmp_control icmp_pointers[NR_ICMP_TYPES+1];
+
+ /*
+@@ -929,6 +933,11 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct net *net;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++ return true;
++#endif
++
+ net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
+ if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) {
+ struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
+@@ -955,6 +964,12 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ static bool icmp_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++ return true;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Too short.
+ */
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+index 480d0b22db1a..b5f73fb34156 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@
+ ((in_dev)->mr_v2_seen && \
+ time_before(jiffies, (in_dev)->mr_v2_seen)))
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static int unsolicited_report_interval(struct in_device *in_dev)
+ {
+ int interval_ms, interval_jiffies;
+@@ -735,6 +739,11 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc,
+ __be32 dst;
+ int hlen, tlen;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++ return -1;
++#endif
++
+ if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT)
+ return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc);
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+index 6f7155d91313..e320249ecf67 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+@@ -313,11 +313,13 @@ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
+ }
+
++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
+ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_syn(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ {
+ if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || !th->cwr))
+ tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ {
+@@ -6026,6 +6028,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
+ goto discard_and_undo;
+
++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
+ if (th->syn) {
+ /* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of
+ * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs.
+@@ -6077,6 +6080,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ goto discard;
+ #endif
+ }
++#endif
+ /* "fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then
+ * drop the segment and return."
+ */
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+index eda64871f983..892c7e1a6f95 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
+ struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+@@ -1590,6 +1594,9 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return 0;
+
+ reset:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++#endif
+ tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb);
+ discard:
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+@@ -1832,6 +1839,27 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4))
+ goto discard_it;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
++ (
++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
++ ) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
++ )
++ )
++ )
++ goto discard_it;
++#endif
++
+ /* An explanation is required here, I think.
+ * Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction,
+ * provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated.
+@@ -1845,12 +1873,22 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ lookup:
+ sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
+ th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
+- if (!sk)
++ if (!sk) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 1;
++#endif
++
+ goto no_tcp_socket;
++ }
+
+ process:
+- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 2;
++#endif
++
+ goto do_time_wait;
++ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
+ struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
+@@ -1970,6 +2008,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ bad_packet:
+ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
+ } else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+index c802bc80c400..9efacbc3b3e6 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ #include <net/busy_poll.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win)
+ {
+ if (seq == s_win)
+@@ -790,6 +794,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at
+ * resetting legit local connections.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
++
+ req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
+ } else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */
+ reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true);
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+index 7ae7065758bd..802677524936 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated);
+ #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536
+ #define PORTS_PER_CHAIN (MAX_UDP_PORTS / UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MIN)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
+ const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
+ unsigned long *bitmap,
+@@ -2337,6 +2341,9 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
+ goto csum_error;
+
+ __UDP_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++#endif
+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+index 62c997201970..c43f64b7c7a5 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * The ICMP socket(s). This is the most convenient way to flow control
+ * our ICMP output as well as maintain a clean interface throughout
+@@ -867,6 +871,9 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
+ if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all)
+ icmpv6_echo_reply(skb);
+ break;
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index b42fa41cfceb..cd866ab245c7 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@
+
+ #include <trace/events/tcp.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req);
+@@ -1407,6 +1411,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return 0;
+
+ reset:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
+ discard:
+ if (opt_skb)
+@@ -1505,6 +1513,27 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4))
+ goto discard_it;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
++ (
++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
++ ) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
++ )
++ )
++ )
++ goto discard_it;
++#endif
++
+ if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo))
+ goto csum_error;
+
+@@ -1515,12 +1544,22 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th),
+ th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), sdif,
+ &refcounted);
+- if (!sk)
++ if (!sk) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 1;
++#endif
++
+ goto no_tcp_socket;
++ }
+
+ process:
+- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 2;
++#endif
++
+ goto do_time_wait;
++ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
+ struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
+@@ -1633,6 +1672,11 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ bad_packet:
+ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
+ } else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+index 9fec580c968e..aaba8b13ba66 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include <trace/events/skb.h>
+ #include "udp_impl.h"
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static u32 udp6_ehashfn(const struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr,
+ const u16 lport,
+@@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
+ goto csum_error;
+
+ __UDP6_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
+ icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+
+ kfree_skb(skb);
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modpost b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
index 952fff485546..59ffccdb1be4 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost
@@ -2586,7 +3509,7 @@ index d2a30a7b3f07..ff57a5fe8029 100644
return err;
}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
-index 2a1a2d396228..3b7a71410f88 100644
+index 2a1a2d396228..66eb3db67eb0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ source "security/keys/Kconfig"
@@ -2679,6 +3602,135 @@ index 2a1a2d396228..3b7a71410f88 100644
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
help
+@@ -293,3 +329,128 @@ source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+
+ endmenu
+
++menu "Hardened Enhancements"
++
++config HARDENED_RANDOM
++ bool "Enhance the random number generator"
++ default n
++ help
++ Enabling this option enhances the Linux kernel random number generator.
++ This is done by:
++ - Increasing the pool size from 4096 bits to 262144 bits. ( 512B -> 32KB )
++ - Increasing the diffusion via the linear feedback shift register.
++ - Defines newer 64-bit polynomial fields for the input and output pools.
++
++ Overall, this enhances the total entropy available to the system and further
++ enhances the random number generator.
++
++
++config HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ bool "Enable stealth networking [GRSECURITY]"
++ default n
++ depends on NET
++ help
++ If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
++ destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
++ sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
++ This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
++ loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
++ makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
++ visibility against scanners.
++
++ The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
++ blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
++ just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
++ problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
++ connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
++ end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
++ side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
++ feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
++ The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
++ can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
++ all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
++ disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
++
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with names
++ "ip_blackhole" will be created.
++ This sysctl, "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero
++ on/off toggle to enable or disable this feature.
++
++
++config HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
++ bool "Disable simultaneous TCP connections [GRSECURITY]"
++ default n
++ depends on NET
++ help
++ If you say Y here, a feature by Willy Tarreau will be enabled that
++ removes a weakness in Linux's strict implementation of TCP that
++ allows two clients to connect to each other without either entering
++ a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker to easily prevent
++ a client from connecting to a known server provided the source port
++ for the connection is guessed correctly.
++
++ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from
++ fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL,
++ it should be eliminated by enabling this option. Though Linux is
++ one of few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it
++ has no legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
++
++
++config HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ bool "Restrict SysFS & DebugFS [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ depends on SYSFS
++ help
++ If you say Y here, sysfs (the pseudo-filesystem mounted at /sys) and
++ any filesystem normally mounted under it (e.g. debugfs) will be
++ mostly accessible only by root. These filesystems generally provide access
++ to hardware and debug information that isn't appropriate for unprivileged
++ users of the system. Sysfs and debugfs have also become a large source
++ of new vulnerabilities, ranging from infoleaks to local compromise.
++ There has been very little oversight with an eye toward security involved
++ in adding new exporters of information to these filesystems, so their
++ use is discouraged.
++ To enable or disable this feature at runtime, use the sysctl
++ kernel.sysfs_restricted.
++ For reasons of compatibility, a few directories have been whitelisted
++ for access by non-root users:
++ /sys/fs/selinux
++ /sys/fs/fuse
++ /sys/devices/system/cpu
++
++
++config HARDENED_FIFO
++ bool "Restrict FIFO [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ help
++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
++ own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
++ created.
++
++
++config HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
++ bool "Harden module auto-loading [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ depends on MODULES
++ help
++ If you say Y here, module auto-loading in response to use of some
++ feature implemented by an unloaded module will be restricted to
++ root users. Enabling this option helps defend against attacks
++ by unprivileged users who abuse the auto-loading behavior to
++ cause a vulnerable module to load that is then exploited.
++
++ If this option prevents a legitimate use of auto-loading for a
++ non-root user, the administrator can execute modprobe manually
++ with the exact name of the module mentioned in the alert log.
++ Alternatively, the administrator can add the module to the list
++ of modules loaded at boot by modifying init scripts.
++
++ Modification of init scripts will most likely be needed on
++ Ubuntu servers with encrypted home directory support enabled,
++ as the first non-root user logging in will cause the ecb(aes),
++ ecb(aes)-all, cbc(aes), and cbc(aes)-all modules to be loaded.
++
++
++endmenu
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index af4c979b38ee..473e40bb8537 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -2818,3 +3870,18 @@ index a810304123ca..b809050b25d2 100644
help
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
+diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+index 13efc291b1c7..3c79201de266 100644
+--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd)
+ struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data;
+ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
+ if (!debugfs_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild
index e6f698c6..e6f698c6 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/linux-image-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/Manifest b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/Manifest
index 5abd3eb9..d0eb1794 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/Manifest
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/Manifest
@@ -1 +1 @@
-DIST linux-5.4.20.tar.xz 109485940 BLAKE2B 57f09bf197864cae4245ac7df11a4f42c48205efef7423b70b241f8d17906f26326189b68ce95463dabdbded8d14e440f22ee6c1d80be75434f71c27f145966f SHA512 4bb38382eecf41a3e70adeb722c52e0475da27c80c4e07cdba806c5371ceb4bcf621229a991e19fab7e58cbc854052013e5ccdb2c8a1fff08978c002359d0166
+DIST linux-5.4.24.tar.xz 109481252 BLAKE2B 8124547a1be476b61612d22f856627ed0a70e3bb4ff3898a93eaaa6921870baf3bfcf3901a0f85772c995da5c2214d0a3ff440143438a479808e229d2ba9fb5d SHA512 1d30040ee4992156cc0436e1782fee1c1b2fbb50462ac29429be141eac5f6c7e0a124db335fcd42c5d73f03b564a5903c3de73afd867e0c923a9f1cb88273200
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
index 6efd5b6e..b8912970 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-amd64.config
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#
# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 5.4.11-redcore Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 5.4.24-redcore-lts Kernel Configuration
#
#
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y
#
CONFIG_INIT_ENV_ARG_LIMIT=32
# CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is not set
-# CONFIG_HEADER_TEST is not set
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION=""
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO=y
CONFIG_BUILD_SALT=""
@@ -6398,8 +6397,6 @@ CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_ATOM_HIFI_EP=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_COMMON=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BAYTRAIL_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BAYTRAIL=m
-CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BROADWELL_SUPPORT=y
-CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_BROADWELL=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_MERRIFIELD_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_MERRIFIELD=m
CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_APOLLOLAKE_SUPPORT=y
@@ -9275,6 +9272,17 @@ CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY=y
# end of Kernel hardening options
# end of Security options
+#
+# Hardened Enhancements
+#
+CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO=y
+# CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD is not set
+# end of Hardened Enhancements
+
CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
index 590651ed..1d52bc84 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/files/5.4-linux-hardened.patch
@@ -538,6 +538,308 @@ index df0fc997dc3e..bd8eed8de6c1 100644
help
Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 01b8868b9bed..13b8635519fe 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -350,11 +350,20 @@
+ /*
+ * Configuration information
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 18
++#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 16
++#else
+ #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
+-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+ #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
++#endif
++#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+ #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 32768
++#else
+ #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
++#endif
+ #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
+
+
+@@ -363,9 +372,6 @@
+ /*
+ * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
+ * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+- *
+- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
+- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ */
+ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+ #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+@@ -428,17 +434,28 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+ * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
+ * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ */
+-static const struct poolinfo {
++static struct poolinfo {
+ int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits;
+-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
+- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+-} poolinfo_table[] = {
++#define S(x) \
++ .poolbitshift = ilog2(x)+5, \
++ .poolwords = (x), \
++ .poolbytes = (x)*4, \
++ .poolfracbits = (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
++ int tap[5];
++} __randomize_layout poolinfo_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++ /* x^8192 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
++ { S(8192), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } },
++ /* x^2048 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
++ { S(2048), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } }
++#else
+ /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+ /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
++ { S(128), .tap = { 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 } },
+ /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+ /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 },
++ { S(32), .tap = { 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 } },
++#endif
+ #if 0
+ /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
+ { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
+@@ -482,7 +499,7 @@ struct crng_state {
+ __u32 state[16];
+ unsigned long init_time;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
+@@ -542,7 +559,7 @@ struct entropy_store {
+ unsigned int initialized:1;
+ unsigned int last_data_init:1;
+ __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
+@@ -553,6 +570,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
+ static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
+ static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+ static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
++/* this actually doesn't need latent entropy */
++static __u32 secondary_xfer_buffer[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+
+ static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
+ .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
+@@ -571,9 +590,78 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
+ push_to_pool),
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++static __u32 const twist_table[64][4] = {
++ { 0x6a09e668, 0xbb67ae86, 0x3c6ef373, 0xa54ff53a },
++ { 0x510e5280, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ac, 0x5be0cd19 },
++ { 0xcbbb9d5e, 0x629a292a, 0x9159015a, 0x152fecd9 },
++ { 0x67332668, 0x8eb44a87, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x47b5481e },
++ { 0xae5f9157, 0xcf6c85d4, 0x2f73477d, 0x6d1826cb },
++ { 0x8b43d457, 0xe360b597, 0x1c456003, 0x6f196331 },
++ { 0xd94ebeb2, 0x0cc4a612, 0x261dc1f3, 0x5815a7be },
++ { 0x70b7ed68, 0xa1513c69, 0x44f93636, 0x720dcdfe },
++ { 0xb467369e, 0xca320b76, 0x34e0d42e, 0x49c7d9be },
++ { 0x87abb9f2, 0xc463a2fc, 0xec3fc3f4, 0x27277f6d },
++ { 0x610bebf3, 0x7420b49f, 0xd1fd8a34, 0xe4773594 },
++ { 0x092197f6, 0x1b530c96, 0x869d6343, 0xeee52e50 },
++ { 0x1107668a, 0x21fba37c, 0x43ab9fb6, 0x75a9f91d },
++ { 0x8630501a, 0xd7cd8174, 0x007fe010, 0x0379f514 },
++ { 0x066b651b, 0x0764ab84, 0x0a4b06be, 0x0c3578c1 },
++ { 0x0d2962a5, 0x11e039f4, 0x1857b7bf, 0x1a29bf2e },
++ { 0x1b11a32f, 0x1cdf34e8, 0x23183042, 0x25b89093 },
++ { 0x2a0c06a1, 0x2ae79843, 0x2c9cda69, 0x2f281f24 },
++ { 0x32841259, 0x3502e64e, 0x377c9c21, 0x39204cda },
++ { 0x3b91bf66, 0x3ecc38ca, 0x40665609, 0x43947938 },
++ { 0x47830769, 0x484ae4b8, 0x4c2b2b75, 0x4cf03d21 },
++ { 0x4f3cbb11, 0x50c2d3b5, 0x5308af16, 0x560a7a9a },
++ { 0x5788d981, 0x584769b4, 0x59c34f06, 0x5e2d564c },
++ { 0x6116d760, 0x62894c10, 0x6569b58c, 0x66d7b394 },
++ { 0x68f9f8dc, 0x6d34f03d, 0x6de8372f, 0x742687a4 },
++ { 0x76356021, 0x799d1235, 0x7ba455f4, 0x7da8d73b },
++ { 0x7e546743, 0x80554bdc, 0x83a63a3c, 0x85a01e39 },
++ { 0x879774ac, 0x883eac9f, 0x8a32aae0, 0x8c243210 },
++ { 0x8d6e8781, 0x8e134b6f, 0x91ea5892, 0x95166fe4 },
++ { 0x95b817e6, 0x96faa747, 0x98dca135, 0x9abc6593 },
++ { 0x9b5bd55a, 0x9f136df7, 0xa04ebd79, 0xa225f6ed },
++ { 0xa4970e49, 0xa79f5a6b, 0xaa0869af, 0xad06dcbd },
++ { 0xaf68312e, 0xb12efe0b, 0xb2f3ef5b, 0xb420e03a },
++ { 0xb6785656, 0xb837d738, 0xb9613115, 0xbbb18efb },
++ { 0xbcd89621, 0xc0db3814, 0xc3b2f2a3, 0xc71638d9 },
++ { 0xc7a6240f, 0xca73166e, 0xcb01f3ba, 0xcc1f293d },
++ { 0xccad81c8, 0xcf72acaf, 0xd34c7258, 0xd4649b7a },
++ { 0xd4f07147, 0xd607a013, 0xd9d3b47b, 0xdae803b5 },
++ { 0xdb71ef1a, 0xdc854e24, 0xe1dcf0ea, 0xe2eca719 },
++ { 0xe50a4ad8, 0xe7ac0990, 0xe9c46d3a, 0xeacfc33c },
++ { 0xec5fb417, 0xedee611c, 0xf18bc533, 0xf292ef77 },
++ { 0xf41cab36, 0xf5a531ec, 0xf7aeb45d, 0xf93474e9 },
++ { 0xfc3c7559, 0xfd3e1962, 0xfebf9bc1, 0xff3fdbf2 },
++ { 0x01bf3cab, 0x023ebd6b, 0x03bc8288, 0x06365a0f },
++ { 0x06b4c1d2, 0x092afcc1, 0x09a8ad2c, 0x0b21093c },
++ { 0x0f83d25e, 0x107c1074, 0x10f803d0, 0x11ef938d },
++ { 0x136212e8, 0x14d390a4, 0x16beab25, 0x182dd7d5 },
++ { 0x199c09bf, 0x1ed27f46, 0x1f4b2d3e, 0x21a502bc },
++ { 0x23849e06, 0x25d9d3da, 0x273ef0ca, 0x28a326f6 },
++ { 0x2a7cb5e4, 0x2d4019ba, 0x2e2b1e73, 0x2f8aec73 },
++ { 0x30e9ddcc, 0x315ea828, 0x32bc75cf, 0x357587f0 },
++ { 0x37b7de93, 0x3bc31ec6, 0x3c35b24a, 0x3d1a949b },
++ { 0x3e713d15, 0x3ee347da, 0x4038e0bf, 0x411c2bae },
++ { 0x418daf9a, 0x4270749e, 0x4516b0b0, 0x45876dcb },
++ { 0x46d92246, 0x4e448a56, 0x4f9141c0, 0x50dd3e71 },
++ { 0x5296c45b, 0x56738aac, 0x58961d02, 0x5b9010c1 },
++ { 0x5c6913ae, 0x5cd577f2, 0x5dae0649, 0x5ef24aeb },
++ { 0x60a199af, 0x6178ce9b, 0x61e44c97, 0x6326551c },
++ { 0x65a86b29, 0x67bd7e12, 0x6827e41c, 0x68fc7925 },
++ { 0x6966a836, 0x6a3acfa3, 0x6b78828a, 0x6df2017d },
++ { 0x7068fdbb, 0x720c4495, 0x747f226b, 0x75b7a753 },
++ { 0x7687a9e0, 0x77bf2d48, 0x795d98d4, 0x7a2c690b },
++ { 0x7bc93fa8, 0x7c974690, 0x7f6653f3, 0x80333127 },
++ { 0x81660244, 0x81cc2760, 0x829840e3, 0x83c9edd4 }
++};
++#else
+ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+ 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+ 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
+@@ -588,17 +676,14 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+ int nbytes)
+ {
+- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
++ unsigned long i, n, t1, t2, tap[5];
+ int input_rotate;
+ int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
+ const char *bytes = in;
+ __u32 w;
+
+- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
+- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
+- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
+- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
+- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
++ tap[n] = r->poolinfo->tap[n];
+
+ input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+ i = r->add_ptr;
+@@ -610,14 +695,17 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+
+ /* XOR in the various taps */
+ w ^= r->pool[i];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
++ for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
++ w ^= r->pool[(i + tap[n]) & wordmask];
+
+ /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
++ t1 = rol32(w, 14) & 0x1FFF; // 0-63, 1111111111111
++ t2 = rol32(w, t1) & 0x3; // 0-3, 11
++ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[t1][t2];
++#else
+ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
+@@ -655,7 +743,7 @@ struct fast_pool {
+ unsigned long last;
+ unsigned short reg_idx;
+ unsigned char count;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+@@ -750,7 +838,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+ /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
+
+ do {
+- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
++ __u64 anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+ unsigned int add =
+ ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
+
+@@ -1134,7 +1222,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+
+ extract_crng(tmp);
+ i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -1162,9 +1250,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ struct timer_rand_state {
+ cycles_t last_time;
+ long last_delta, last_delta2;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
++#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { .last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+ /*
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+@@ -1407,20 +1495,18 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+
+ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+ {
+- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+-
+ int bytes = nbytes;
+
+ /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
+ bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
+ /* but never more than the buffer size */
+- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
++ bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(secondary_xfer_buffer));
+
+ trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
+ ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
+- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
++ bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes,
+ random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
++ mix_pool_bytes(r, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes);
+ credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
+ }
+
+@@ -1650,7 +1736,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
+
+ extract_buf(r, tmp);
+ i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
++ if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -2353,7 +2439,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
+ };
+ unsigned int position;
+ spinlock_t batch_lock;
+-};
++} __randomize_layout;
+
+ /*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
index c7623f99ac0f..859c2782c8e2 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
@@ -616,6 +918,33 @@ index 4ac74b354801..7c2cb5b3a449 100644
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
unit_load = 150;
else
+diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+index 7b975dbb2bb4..43fdb33a1fc0 100644
+--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;
+ static int debugfs_mount_count;
+ static bool debugfs_registered;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++extern int sysfs_restricted;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down
+ * so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether
+@@ -559,6 +563,11 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
+ return failed_creating(dentry);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ if (sysfs_restricted)
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU;
++ else
++#endif
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
+ inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index c27231234764..4038334db213 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
@@ -638,10 +967,21 @@ index c27231234764..4038334db213 100644
err:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
-index bd1c0ca4151c..8f67ca391509 100644
+index e81521c87f98..8c933ad857e0 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -877,10 +877,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
+@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@
+
+ #define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX (PATH_MAX - offsetof(struct filename, iname))
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++extern int fifo_restrictions;
++#endif
++
+ struct filename *
+ getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty)
+ {
+@@ -877,10 +881,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
path_put(&last->link);
}
@@ -656,6 +996,55 @@ index bd1c0ca4151c..8f67ca391509 100644
/**
* may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
+@@ -3242,6 +3246,32 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
+ return error;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Handles possibly restricted FIFO operations
++ * if the user doesn't own this directory.
++ */
++static int fifo_restricted(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const struct dentry *dir,
++ const int flag,
++ const int acc_mode) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++ const struct cred *cred;
++ struct inode *inode, *dir_inode;
++
++ cred = current_cred();
++ inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
++ dir_inode = d_backing_inode(dir);
++
++ if (fifo_restrictions && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) &&
++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
++ !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_inode->i_uid) &&
++ !uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
++ return -EACCES;
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Handle the last step of open()
+ */
+@@ -3360,6 +3390,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd,
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Only check if O_CREAT is specified, all other checks need to go
++ * into may_open().
++ */
++ if (fifo_restricted(path.dentry, path.mnt, dir, open_flag, acc_mode)) {
++ path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * create/update audit record if it already exists.
+ */
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index 295a7a21b774..3aed361bc0f9 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -715,6 +1104,77 @@ index c38e4c2e1221..6135fbaf7298 100644
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
return 0;
+diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+index aa85f2874a9f..9b85cc73f70f 100644
+--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
++++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+
+ DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sysfs_symlink_target_lock);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++extern int sysfs_restricted;
++#endif
++
+ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
+ {
+ char *buf;
+@@ -40,12 +44,20 @@ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
+ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
+ {
+ struct kernfs_node *parent, *kn;
++ const char* name;
++ umode_t mode;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ const char *parent_name;
++#endif
++
+ if (WARN_ON(!kobj))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ name = kobject_name(kobj);
++
+ if (kobj->parent)
+ parent = kobj->parent->sd;
+ else
+@@ -56,12 +68,30 @@ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
+
+ kobject_get_ownership(kobj, &uid, &gid);
+
+- kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, kobject_name(kobj),
+- S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, uid, gid,
+- kobj, ns);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ if (sysfs_restricted) {
++ parent_name = parent->name;
++ mode = S_IRWXU;
++
++ if ((!strcmp(parent_name, "") && (!strcmp(name, "devices") ||
++ !strcmp(name, "fs"))) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "devices") && !strcmp(name, "system")) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "fs") && (!strcmp(name, "selinux") ||
++ !strcmp(name, "fuse") || !strcmp(name, "ecryptfs"))) ||
++ (!strcmp(parent_name, "system") && !strcmp(name, "cpu")))
++ mode |= S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++ }
++ else
++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++#else
++ mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
++#endif
++
++ kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, name, mode, uid, gid, kobj, ns);
++
+ if (IS_ERR(kn)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(kn) == -EEXIST)
+- sysfs_warn_dup(parent, kobject_name(kobj));
++ sysfs_warn_dup(parent, name);
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+ }
+
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index d99d166fd892..7a4f2854feb8 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -1145,6 +1605,22 @@ index 4e7809408073..0b58a5176a25 100644
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
+diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
+index e42d13b55cf3..3228bcfe7599 100644
+--- a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
++++ b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
+@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@
+
+ #define IPVERSION 4
+ #define MAXTTL 255
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++#define IPDEFTTL 128
++#else
+ #define IPDEFTTL 64
++#endif
+
+ #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0
+ #define IPOPT_OLEN 1
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 0328b53d09ad..fde78a967939 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
@@ -1406,6 +1882,24 @@ index 755d8160e001..ed909f8050b2 100644
err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
+index bc6addd9152b..008be43f6cdd 100644
+--- a/kernel/kmod.c
++++ b/kernel/kmod.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
++ if (uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) {
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "denied attempt to auto-load module %.64s\n", module_name);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&kmod_concurrent_max) < 0) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("request_module: kmod_concurrent_max (%u) close to 0 (max_modprobes: %u), for module %s, throttling...",
+ atomic_read(&kmod_concurrent_max),
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index d65f2d5ab694..145e3c62c380 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1520,7 +2014,7 @@ index 0427a86743a4..5e6a9b4ccb41 100644
void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+index 70665934d53e..9b2fc21fb844 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
@@ -1531,7 +2025,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#include "../lib/kstrtox.h"
-@@ -104,12 +105,19 @@
+@@ -104,12 +105,25 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
/* External variables not in a header file. */
@@ -1539,6 +2033,12 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
+#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++int __read_mostly sysfs_restricted = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++int __read_mostly fifo_restrictions = 1;
++#endif
extern int suid_dumpable;
#ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
extern int core_uses_pid;
@@ -1551,7 +2051,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
extern int pid_max;
extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
-@@ -121,32 +129,32 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
+@@ -121,32 +135,32 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
/* Constants used for minimum and maximum */
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -1599,7 +2099,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
/*
-@@ -154,9 +162,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
+@@ -154,9 +168,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
* and hung_task_check_interval_secs
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
@@ -1613,7 +2113,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#endif
-@@ -301,19 +312,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
+@@ -301,19 +318,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
@@ -1641,7 +2141,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#endif
static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
-@@ -546,6 +557,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -546,6 +563,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
@@ -1657,7 +2157,7 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
{
.procname = "tainted",
-@@ -901,6 +921,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -901,6 +927,59 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
},
@@ -1692,6 +2192,28 @@ index 70665934d53e..8ea67d08b926 100644
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ {
++ .procname = "sysfs_restricted",
++ .data = &sysfs_restricted,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
++ {
++ .procname = "fifo_restrictions",
++ .data = &fifo_restrictions,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
#endif
{
.procname = "ngroups_max",
@@ -2082,7 +2604,7 @@ index ade6c257d4b4..f8f9ebd51296 100644
static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
{
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
-index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
+index 20d72cb20515..3820def7e275 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
@@ -2205,25 +2727,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
if (!slab_free_hook(s, object)) {
/* Move object to the new freelist */
-@@ -1460,6 +1510,17 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
- *head = object;
- if (!*tail)
- *tail = object;
-+ } else if (slab_want_init_on_free(s) && s->ctor) {
-+ /* Objects that are put into quarantine by KASAN will
-+ * still undergo free_consistency_checks() and thus
-+ * need to show a valid freepointer to check_object().
-+ *
-+ * Note that doing this for all caches (not just ctor
-+ * ones, which have s->offset != NULL)) causes a GPF,
-+ * due to KASAN poisoning and the way set_freepointer()
-+ * eventually dereferences the freepointer.
-+ */
-+ set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
- }
- } while (object != old_tail);
-
-@@ -1473,8 +1534,9 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
+@@ -1473,8 +1523,9 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object)
{
setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
@@ -2234,7 +2738,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
s->ctor(object);
kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
-@@ -2752,8 +2814,28 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
+@@ -2752,8 +2803,28 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object);
@@ -2264,7 +2768,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
-@@ -3136,7 +3218,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+@@ -3136,7 +3207,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
void **p)
{
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
@@ -2273,12 +2777,13 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
-@@ -3176,11 +3258,35 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+@@ -3176,11 +3247,38 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
local_irq_enable();
/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
- if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
++ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
int j;
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
@@ -2287,10 +2792,12 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
+ * in the post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, p[j]);
-+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j], 0, s->object_size));
++ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
+ if (s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(p[j]);
+ kasan_poison_object_data(s, p[j]);
++ if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++ memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *));
+ }
+ } else if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
+ int j;
@@ -2311,7 +2818,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
}
/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
-@@ -3214,9 +3320,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
+@@ -3214,9 +3312,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
* and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
* take the list_lock.
*/
@@ -2324,7 +2831,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/*
* Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
-@@ -3384,6 +3490,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
+@@ -3384,6 +3482,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
#endif
@@ -2332,7 +2839,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
GFP_KERNEL);
page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
-@@ -3544,6 +3651,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
+@@ -3544,6 +3643,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
size += sizeof(void *);
}
@@ -2342,7 +2849,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/*
-@@ -3616,6 +3726,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
+@@ -3616,6 +3718,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
s->random = get_random_long();
#endif
@@ -2353,7 +2860,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
goto error;
-@@ -3891,6 +4005,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
+@@ -3891,6 +3997,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
offset -= s->red_left_pad;
}
@@ -2362,7 +2869,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
-@@ -3924,7 +4040,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
+@@ -3924,7 +4032,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
@@ -2374,7 +2881,7 @@ index 20d72cb20515..6690bce322a4 100644
return page_size(page);
}
-@@ -4769,7 +4889,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
+@@ -4769,7 +4881,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
#define SO_TOTAL (1 << SL_TOTAL)
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
@@ -2439,6 +2946,39 @@ index 82325d3d1371..240e3ae8e298 100644
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
+diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+index 9f9e00ba3ad7..962c6ca661e4 100644
+--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
++++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net);
+ int sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net __read_mostly;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++int sysctl_stealth_blackhole __read_mostly = 1;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
+ static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+@@ -512,6 +516,17 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
+ .proc_handler = set_default_qdisc
+ },
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ {
++ .procname = "ip_blackhole",
++ .data = &sysctl_stealth_blackhole,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
++ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ },
++#endif
+ #endif /* CONFIG_NET */
+ {
+ .procname = "netdev_budget",
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
index 03381f3e12ba..8ea409f37436 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
@@ -2451,6 +2991,389 @@ index 03381f3e12ba..8ea409f37436 100644
---help---
Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+index ac95ba78b903..249c6970e67c 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ struct icmp_control {
+ short error; /* This ICMP is classed as an error message */
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static const struct icmp_control icmp_pointers[NR_ICMP_TYPES+1];
+
+ /*
+@@ -929,6 +933,11 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct net *net;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++ return true;
++#endif
++
+ net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
+ if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) {
+ struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
+@@ -955,6 +964,12 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ static bool icmp_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++ return true;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Too short.
+ */
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+index 480d0b22db1a..b5f73fb34156 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@
+ ((in_dev)->mr_v2_seen && \
+ time_before(jiffies, (in_dev)->mr_v2_seen)))
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static int unsolicited_report_interval(struct in_device *in_dev)
+ {
+ int interval_ms, interval_jiffies;
+@@ -735,6 +739,11 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc,
+ __be32 dst;
+ int hlen, tlen;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++ return -1;
++#endif
++
+ if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT)
+ return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc);
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+index 6f7155d91313..e320249ecf67 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+@@ -313,11 +313,13 @@ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
+ }
+
++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
+ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_syn(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ {
+ if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || !th->cwr))
+ tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
+ {
+@@ -6026,6 +6028,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
+ goto discard_and_undo;
+
++#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
+ if (th->syn) {
+ /* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of
+ * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs.
+@@ -6077,6 +6080,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ goto discard;
+ #endif
+ }
++#endif
+ /* "fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then
+ * drop the segment and return."
+ */
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+index eda64871f983..892c7e1a6f95 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
+ struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+@@ -1590,6 +1594,9 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return 0;
+
+ reset:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++#endif
+ tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb);
+ discard:
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+@@ -1832,6 +1839,27 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4))
+ goto discard_it;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
++ (
++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
++ ) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
++ )
++ )
++ )
++ goto discard_it;
++#endif
++
+ /* An explanation is required here, I think.
+ * Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction,
+ * provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated.
+@@ -1845,12 +1873,22 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ lookup:
+ sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
+ th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
+- if (!sk)
++ if (!sk) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 1;
++#endif
++
+ goto no_tcp_socket;
++ }
+
+ process:
+- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 2;
++#endif
++
+ goto do_time_wait;
++ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
+ struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
+@@ -1970,6 +2008,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ bad_packet:
+ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
+ } else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+index c802bc80c400..9efacbc3b3e6 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ #include <net/busy_poll.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win)
+ {
+ if (seq == s_win)
+@@ -790,6 +794,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at
+ * resetting legit local connections.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
++
+ req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
+ } else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */
+ reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true);
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+index 7ae7065758bd..802677524936 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated);
+ #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536
+ #define PORTS_PER_CHAIN (MAX_UDP_PORTS / UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MIN)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
+ const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
+ unsigned long *bitmap,
+@@ -2337,6 +2341,9 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
+ goto csum_error;
+
+ __UDP_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
++#endif
+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+index 62c997201970..c43f64b7c7a5 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * The ICMP socket(s). This is the most convenient way to flow control
+ * our ICMP output as well as maintain a clean interface throughout
+@@ -867,6 +871,9 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
+ if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all)
+ icmpv6_echo_reply(skb);
+ break;
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index b42fa41cfceb..cd866ab245c7 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@
+
+ #include <trace/events/tcp.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req);
+@@ -1407,6 +1411,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return 0;
+
+ reset:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
+ discard:
+ if (opt_skb)
+@@ -1505,6 +1513,27 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4))
+ goto discard_it;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
++ (
++ th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
++ ) ||
++ (
++ tcp_flag_word(th) &
++ (TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
++ tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
++ )
++ )
++ )
++ goto discard_it;
++#endif
++
+ if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo))
+ goto csum_error;
+
+@@ -1515,12 +1544,22 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th),
+ th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), sdif,
+ &refcounted);
+- if (!sk)
++ if (!sk) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 1;
++#endif
++
+ goto no_tcp_socket;
++ }
+
+ process:
+- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ ret = 2;
++#endif
++
+ goto do_time_wait;
++ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
+ struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
+@@ -1633,6 +1672,11 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ bad_packet:
+ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
+ } else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
++ (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
++#endif
++
+ tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+index 9fec580c968e..aaba8b13ba66 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include <trace/events/skb.h>
+ #include "udp_impl.h"
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
++#endif
++
+ static u32 udp6_ehashfn(const struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr,
+ const u16 lport,
+@@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
+ goto csum_error;
+
+ __UDP6_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
++#endif
+ icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+
+ kfree_skb(skb);
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modpost b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
index 952fff485546..59ffccdb1be4 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost
@@ -2586,7 +3509,7 @@ index d2a30a7b3f07..ff57a5fe8029 100644
return err;
}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
-index 2a1a2d396228..3b7a71410f88 100644
+index 2a1a2d396228..66eb3db67eb0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ source "security/keys/Kconfig"
@@ -2679,6 +3602,135 @@ index 2a1a2d396228..3b7a71410f88 100644
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
help
+@@ -293,3 +329,128 @@ source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+
+ endmenu
+
++menu "Hardened Enhancements"
++
++config HARDENED_RANDOM
++ bool "Enhance the random number generator"
++ default n
++ help
++ Enabling this option enhances the Linux kernel random number generator.
++ This is done by:
++ - Increasing the pool size from 4096 bits to 262144 bits. ( 512B -> 32KB )
++ - Increasing the diffusion via the linear feedback shift register.
++ - Defines newer 64-bit polynomial fields for the input and output pools.
++
++ Overall, this enhances the total entropy available to the system and further
++ enhances the random number generator.
++
++
++config HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
++ bool "Enable stealth networking [GRSECURITY]"
++ default n
++ depends on NET
++ help
++ If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
++ destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
++ sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
++ This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
++ loopback interface from blackholing. Enabling this feature
++ makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
++ visibility against scanners.
++
++ The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
++ blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
++ just SYNs. Under most application behavior this causes no
++ problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
++ connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
++ end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state. Because of this
++ side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
++ feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
++ The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
++ can spend in LAST_ACK state. If you're using haproxy and not
++ all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
++ disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
++
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with names
++ "ip_blackhole" will be created.
++ This sysctl, "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero
++ on/off toggle to enable or disable this feature.
++
++
++config HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
++ bool "Disable simultaneous TCP connections [GRSECURITY]"
++ default n
++ depends on NET
++ help
++ If you say Y here, a feature by Willy Tarreau will be enabled that
++ removes a weakness in Linux's strict implementation of TCP that
++ allows two clients to connect to each other without either entering
++ a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker to easily prevent
++ a client from connecting to a known server provided the source port
++ for the connection is guessed correctly.
++
++ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from
++ fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL,
++ it should be eliminated by enabling this option. Though Linux is
++ one of few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it
++ has no legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
++
++
++config HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ bool "Restrict SysFS & DebugFS [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ depends on SYSFS
++ help
++ If you say Y here, sysfs (the pseudo-filesystem mounted at /sys) and
++ any filesystem normally mounted under it (e.g. debugfs) will be
++ mostly accessible only by root. These filesystems generally provide access
++ to hardware and debug information that isn't appropriate for unprivileged
++ users of the system. Sysfs and debugfs have also become a large source
++ of new vulnerabilities, ranging from infoleaks to local compromise.
++ There has been very little oversight with an eye toward security involved
++ in adding new exporters of information to these filesystems, so their
++ use is discouraged.
++ To enable or disable this feature at runtime, use the sysctl
++ kernel.sysfs_restricted.
++ For reasons of compatibility, a few directories have been whitelisted
++ for access by non-root users:
++ /sys/fs/selinux
++ /sys/fs/fuse
++ /sys/devices/system/cpu
++
++
++config HARDENED_FIFO
++ bool "Restrict FIFO [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ help
++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
++ own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
++ created.
++
++
++config HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
++ bool "Harden module auto-loading [GRSECURITY]"
++ default y
++ depends on MODULES
++ help
++ If you say Y here, module auto-loading in response to use of some
++ feature implemented by an unloaded module will be restricted to
++ root users. Enabling this option helps defend against attacks
++ by unprivileged users who abuse the auto-loading behavior to
++ cause a vulnerable module to load that is then exploited.
++
++ If this option prevents a legitimate use of auto-loading for a
++ non-root user, the administrator can execute modprobe manually
++ with the exact name of the module mentioned in the alert log.
++ Alternatively, the administrator can add the module to the list
++ of modules loaded at boot by modifying init scripts.
++
++ Modification of init scripts will most likely be needed on
++ Ubuntu servers with encrypted home directory support enabled,
++ as the first non-root user logging in will cause the ecb(aes),
++ ecb(aes)-all, cbc(aes), and cbc(aes)-all modules to be loaded.
++
++
++endmenu
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index af4c979b38ee..473e40bb8537 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -2818,3 +3870,18 @@ index a810304123ca..b809050b25d2 100644
help
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
+diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+index 13efc291b1c7..3c79201de266 100644
+--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd)
+ struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data;
+ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
+ if (!debugfs_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild
index 570f9335..570f9335 100644
--- a/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.20.ebuild
+++ b/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts/linux-sources-redcore-lts-5.4.24.ebuild