diff options
| author | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2019-02-09 20:03:56 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2019-02-09 20:03:56 +0000 |
| commit | 42672d73de4fab730a2d6e91c92d19afebeb40bb (patch) | |
| tree | 75f994204990d5dc91f836f1312406ec4b560105 /sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch | |
| parent | c3bbcf0672c7f05a24ba5869129ab012396870b2 (diff) | |
sys-kernel/linux-{image,sources}-redcore-lts : version bump to v4.14.95 && v4.19.20
Diffstat (limited to 'sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch | 2732 |
1 files changed, 2732 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42ba2084 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-kernel/linux-image-redcore-lts/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2732 @@ +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +index f5acf35c712f..191e7eb6b9ce 100644 +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ + nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting. + nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting. + +- checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value. +- Format: { "0" | "1" } +- See security/selinux/Kconfig help text. +- 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes +- any implied execute protection). +- 1 -- check protection requested by application. +- Default value is set via a kernel config option. +- Value can be changed at runtime via +- /selinux/checkreqprot. +- + cio_ignore= [S390] + See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. + clk_ignore_unused +@@ -3105,6 +3095,11 @@ + the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if + your oopses keep scrolling off the screen. + ++ extra_latent_entropy ++ Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction ++ from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator ++ passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator. ++ + pcbit= [HW,ISDN] + + pcd. [PARIDE] +diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +index 37a679501ddc..59b747920f4d 100644 +--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt ++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: + - sysctl_writes_strict + - tainted + - threads-max ++- tiocsti_restrict + - unknown_nmi_panic + - watchdog + - watchdog_thresh +@@ -1041,6 +1042,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly. + + ============================================================== + ++tiocsti_restrict: ++ ++This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented ++from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into other processes ++which share a tty session. ++ ++When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept ++the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into ++one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must ++have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl. ++ ++When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability ++CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally ++opened the tty. ++ ++The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the ++default value of tiocsti_restrict. ++ ++============================================================== ++ + unknown_nmi_panic: + + The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index f1859811dca1..432040e2d299 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -698,6 +698,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y) + + ifeq ($(cc-name),clang) ++ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT ++KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fsanitize=local-init ++endif + KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,) + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier) + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu) +diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig +index 6801123932a5..d331769f18cd 100644 +--- a/arch/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/Kconfig +@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT + range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT +- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ++ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + help + This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to +@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT + range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT +- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ++ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + help + This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to +@@ -837,6 +837,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT + + config REFCOUNT_FULL + bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" ++ default y + help + Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast + unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked +diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +index 1b1a0e95c751..2397d505747f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +@@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ endif + + config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN + bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching" ++ default y + help + Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing + user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved +@@ -1188,6 +1189,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" + select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES + select RELOCATABLE ++ default y + help + Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is + loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts +diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug +index 69c9170bdd24..a786227db0e3 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug ++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET + config DEBUG_WX + bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" + select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE ++ default y + ---help--- + Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig +index db8d364f8476..67441db36c07 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig +@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ +-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y + CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y + CONFIG_AUDIT=y + CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +index 433b9554c6a1..1f4b06317c9f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ + + /* + * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On +- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address ++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address + * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. + */ +-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3) ++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x100000000UL + + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + /* 1GB of VA */ + #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + #define STACK_RND_MASK (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \ +- 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ +- 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) ++ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ ++ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) + #else +-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) ++#define STACK_RND_MASK (((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) + #endif + + #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +index 7f1628effe6d..38bd2f95a961 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) + unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) + { + if (is_compat_task()) +- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M); ++ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; + else +- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G); ++ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; + } + + /* +diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig +index 44c6a82b7ce5..62aba195aae8 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig +@@ -1189,8 +1189,7 @@ config VM86 + default X86_LEGACY_VM86 + + config X86_16BIT +- bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT +- default y ++ bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" + depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL + ---help--- + This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit +@@ -2280,7 +2279,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO + choice + prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" + depends on X86_64 +- default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE ++ default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE + help + Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects + to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in +@@ -2361,8 +2360,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE + be set to 'N' under normal conditions. + + config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL +- bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT +- default y ++ bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" + ---help--- + Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 + Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system +diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +index 7d68f0c7cfb1..85f04bbeadd8 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug ++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP + config DEBUG_WX + bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" + select X86_PTDUMP_CORE ++ default y + ---help--- + Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. + +diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig +index e32fc1f274d8..d08acc76502a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig +@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ + # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set +-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y + CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y + CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y + CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y +diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +index 5b8b556dbb12..a569f08b4478 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c ++++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +@@ -204,55 +204,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr) + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +-/* +- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized +- * offset. This way there is no hole in the middle of address space. +- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack +- * top. This doesn't give that many random bits. +- * +- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso +- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end. +- * +- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos. +- */ +-static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len) +-{ +- unsigned long addr, end; +- unsigned offset; +- +- /* +- * Round up the start address. It can start out unaligned as a result +- * of stack start randomization. +- */ +- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); +- +- /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */ +- end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK; +- if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) +- end = TASK_SIZE_MAX; +- end -= len; +- +- if (end > start) { +- offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1); +- addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT); +- } else { +- addr = start; +- } +- +- /* +- * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware +- * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons. +- */ +- addr = align_vdso_addr(addr); +- +- return addr; +-} +- + static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image) + { +- unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start); +- +- return map_vdso(image, addr); ++ return map_vdso(image, 0); + } + #endif + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +index 0d157d2a1e2a..770c8ae97f92 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ extern int force_personality32; + + /* + * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On +- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address ++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address + * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. + */ + #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \ +- (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2)) ++ 0x100000000UL) + + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what + instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, +@@ -313,8 +313,8 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); + + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + +-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff) +-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff) ++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) ++#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) + + #define ARCH_DLINFO ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 + +@@ -323,7 +323,11 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); + #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ + + /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */ +-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff) ++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT ++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) ++#else ++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) ++#endif + #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32()) + + #define ARCH_DLINFO \ +@@ -381,5 +385,4 @@ struct va_alignment { + } ____cacheline_aligned; + + extern struct va_alignment va_align; +-extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */ +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +index 79ec7add5f98..2950448e00ac 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits(unsigned long mask) + + local_irq_save(flags); + cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); ++ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); + if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4) + __cr4_set(cr4 | mask); + local_irq_restore(flags); +@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask) + + local_irq_save(flags); + cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); ++ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); + if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4) + __cr4_set(cr4 & ~mask); + local_irq_restore(flags); +@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@ static inline void cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(unsigned long mask) + unsigned long cr4; + + cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); ++ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); + __cr4_set(cr4 ^ mask); + } + +@@ -438,6 +441,7 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void) + raw_local_irq_save(flags); + + cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); ++ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); + /* toggle PGE */ + native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE); + /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */ +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +index 44c4ef3d989b..05943ca7b59a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1730,7 +1730,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) + wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); + barrier(); + +- x86_configure_nx(); + x2apic_setup(); + + /* +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +index 7d31192296a8..4f87550d814c 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ + #include <asm/desc.h> + #include <asm/prctl.h> + #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> ++#include <asm/elf.h> ++#include <linux/sizes.h> + + #include "process.h" + +@@ -779,7 +781,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) + + unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) + { +- return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000); ++ if (mmap_is_ia32()) ++ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; ++ else ++ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; + } + + /* +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c +index 6a78d4b36a79..715009f7a96c 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c +@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void) + return va_align.bits & get_align_mask(); + } + +-unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr) +-{ +- unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask(); +- addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask; +- return addr | get_align_bits(); +-} +- + static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str) + { + /* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */ +@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags, + } + + *begin = get_mmap_base(1); +- if (in_compat_syscall()) +- *end = task_size_32bit(); +- else +- *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW); ++ *end = get_mmap_base(0); + } + + unsigned long +@@ -210,7 +200,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0, + + info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; + info.length = len; +- info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; ++ info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1); + info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0); + + /* +diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +index 979e0a02cbe1..d6ab882a0091 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +@@ -560,9 +560,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void) + + #define DEFAULT_PTE_MASK ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL) + /* Bits supported by the hardware: */ +-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK; ++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK; + /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */ +-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK; ++pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK; + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); + /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ + EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); +@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) + #endif + #endif + +-int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly; ++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; + + void set_kernel_text_rw(void) + { +@@ -925,12 +925,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) + unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); + unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start; + ++ kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; + set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT); + printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n", + size >> 10); + +- kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; +- + #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG + printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", + start, start+size); +diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +index a3e9c6ee3cf2..40bbcd978b0a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ + */ + + /* Bits supported by the hardware: */ +-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0; ++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0; + /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */ +-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0; ++pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0; + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); + /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */ + EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask); +@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) + mem_init_print_info(NULL); + } + +-int kernel_set_to_readonly; ++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; + + void set_kernel_text_rw(void) + { +@@ -1250,9 +1250,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) + + printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n", + (end - start) >> 10); +- set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); +- + kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; ++ set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + /* + * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!) +diff --git a/block/blk-softirq.c b/block/blk-softirq.c +index 15c1f5e12eb8..ff72cccec5b8 100644 +--- a/block/blk-softirq.c ++++ b/block/blk-softirq.c +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blk_cpu_done); + * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them + * while passing them to the queue registered handler. + */ +-static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void) + { + struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list; + +diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c +index b8c3f9e6af89..bf65bc091cb6 100644 +--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c ++++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c +@@ -5157,7 +5157,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) + struct ata_port *ap; + unsigned int tag; + +- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ ++ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ + ap = qc->ap; + + qc->flags = 0; +@@ -5174,7 +5174,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) + struct ata_port *ap; + struct ata_link *link; + +- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ ++ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE)); + ap = qc->ap; + link = qc->dev->link; +diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig +index 40728491f37b..b4f3ccfa2993 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig ++++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig +@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ source "drivers/tty/Kconfig" + + config DEVMEM + bool "/dev/mem virtual device support" +- default y + help + Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device. + The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical +@@ -531,7 +530,6 @@ config TELCLOCK + config DEVPORT + bool "/dev/port character device" + depends on ISA || PCI +- default y + help + Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port + device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports. +diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig +index 0840d27381ea..ae292fcedaca 100644 +--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig ++++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig +@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS + + config LEGACY_PTYS + bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support" +- default y + ---help--- + A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two + halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to +diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c +index e7d192ebecd7..1c682abd31ca 100644 +--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c ++++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c +@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty) + put_device(tty->dev); + kfree(tty->write_buf); + tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD; ++ put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns); + kfree(tty); + } + +@@ -2175,11 +2176,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) + * FIXME: may race normal receive processing + */ + ++int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT); ++ + static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p) + { + char ch, mbz = 0; + struct tty_ldisc *ld; + ++ if (tiocsti_restrict && ++ !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { ++ dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev, ++ "Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n"); ++ return -EPERM; ++ } + if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + if (get_user(ch, p)) +@@ -2863,6 +2872,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx) + tty->index = idx; + tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name); + tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty); ++ tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns()); + + return tty; + } +diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +index cc62707c0251..21d78ae4b4ae 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ + #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY 40 /* ns */ + #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX 65535 /* ns */ + ++extern int deny_new_usb; ++ + /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members + * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can + * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */ +@@ -4933,6 +4935,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, + goto done; + return; + } ++ ++ if (deny_new_usb) { ++ dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1); ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) + unit_load = 150; + else +diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c +index 1ebf6e5a521d..73b8d839927c 100644 +--- a/fs/exec.c ++++ b/fs/exec.c +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ + #include <linux/oom.h> + #include <linux/compat.h> + #include <linux/vmalloc.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +@@ -320,6 +321,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) + arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *); ++ if (randomize_va_space) ++ bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK; + return 0; + err: + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); +diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c +index 914178cdbe94..7422b5ce077a 100644 +--- a/fs/namei.c ++++ b/fs/namei.c +@@ -885,10 +885,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) + path_put(&last->link); + } + +-int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; +-int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; +-int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly; +-int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly; ++int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1; ++int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; ++int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly = 2; ++int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly = 2; + + /** + * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations +diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig +index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644 +--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig ++++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig +@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG + bool + depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG + select CRC32 +- default y +diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig +index 817c02b13b1d..b8cd62b5cbc3 100644 +--- a/fs/proc/Kconfig ++++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig +@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE + config PROC_VMCORE + bool "/proc/vmcore support" + depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP +- default y + help + Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. + +diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c +index f8e6fb2c3657..240c1432e18f 100644 +--- a/fs/stat.c ++++ b/fs/stat.c +@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat) + stat->gid = inode->i_gid; + stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev; + stat->size = i_size_read(inode); +- stat->atime = inode->i_atime; +- stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; ++ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { ++ stat->atime = inode->i_ctime; ++ stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime; ++ } else { ++ stat->atime = inode->i_atime; ++ stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; ++ } + stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime; + stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode); + stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks; +@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, + stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS; + request_mask &= STATX_ALL; + query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS; +- if (inode->i_op->getattr) +- return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, +- query_flags); ++ if (inode->i_op->getattr) { ++ int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); ++ if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { ++ stat->atime = stat->ctime; ++ stat->mtime = stat->ctime; ++ } ++ return retval; ++ } + + generic_fillattr(inode, stat); + return 0; +diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h +index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644 +--- a/include/linux/cache.h ++++ b/include/linux/cache.h +@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ + #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init"))) + #endif + ++#define __read_only __ro_after_init ++ + #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned + #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES))) + #endif +diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h +index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644 +--- a/include/linux/capability.h ++++ b/include/linux/capability.h +@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); + extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); + extern bool capable(int cap); ++extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap); + extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); + extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); + #else +@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) + { + return true; + } ++static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap) ++{ ++ return true; ++} + static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) + { + return true; +diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h +index 7b6084854bfe..cee4467da4a7 100644 +--- a/include/linux/fs.h ++++ b/include/linux/fs.h +@@ -3456,4 +3456,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); + extern int vfs_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, + int advice); + ++extern int device_sidechannel_restrict; ++ ++static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode) ++{ ++ umode_t mode; ++ if (!device_sidechannel_restrict) ++ return false; ++ mode = inode->i_mode; ++ return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH))); ++} ++ + #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ +diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h +index fd1ce10553bf..1905d2476d32 100644 +--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h ++++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h +@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file) + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + __u32 mask = FS_ACCESS; + ++ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) ++ return; ++ + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + mask |= FS_ISDIR; + +@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_modify(struct file *file) + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + __u32 mask = FS_MODIFY; + ++ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) ++ return; ++ + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + mask |= FS_ISDIR; + +diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h +index 24bcc5eec6b4..b1cdfc350596 100644 +--- a/include/linux/gfp.h ++++ b/include/linux/gfp.h +@@ -530,9 +530,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, + extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); + extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask); + +-void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); ++void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size); +-void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); ++void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(2))); + + #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \ + __get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0) +diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h +index 0690679832d4..b9394bc86fad 100644 +--- a/include/linux/highmem.h ++++ b/include/linux/highmem.h +@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page) + kunmap_atomic(kaddr); + } + ++static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page) ++{ ++ void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); ++ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE)); ++ kunmap_atomic(kaddr); ++} ++ + static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page, + unsigned start1, unsigned end1, + unsigned start2, unsigned end2) +diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h +index eeceac3376fc..78ad558bce5f 100644 +--- a/include/linux/interrupt.h ++++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h +@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS]; + + struct softirq_action + { +- void (*action)(struct softirq_action *); ++ void (*action)(void); + }; + + asmlinkage void do_softirq(void); +@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static inline void do_softirq_own_stack(void) + } + #endif + +-extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)); ++extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)); + extern void softirq_init(void); + extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr); + +diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h +index 069aa2ebef90..cb9e3637a620 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h ++++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h +@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations { + void (*drop_ns)(void *); + }; + +-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); ++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); + int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type); + const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent); + const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj); +diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h +index e899460f1bc5..bca0cbed3269 100644 +--- a/include/linux/mm.h ++++ b/include/linux/mm.h +@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) + } + #endif + +-extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node); ++extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) + { + return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE); +diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h +index 70b7123f38c7..09f3019489b2 100644 +--- a/include/linux/percpu.h ++++ b/include/linux/percpu.h +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size, + pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn); + #endif + +-extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); ++extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr); + extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); + +@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); + extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void); + #endif + +-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp); +-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); ++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata); + extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr); + +diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h +index 53c500f0ca79..15c236b8aba3 100644 +--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h ++++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h +@@ -1179,6 +1179,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); + ++static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void) ++{ ++ return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2; ++} ++ + static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void) + { + return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; +diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h +index ed9cbddeb4a6..e76e18c7165f 100644 +--- a/include/linux/slab.h ++++ b/include/linux/slab.h +@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ void memcg_destroy_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *); + /* + * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators + */ +-void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); +-void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); ++void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2))); ++void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2))); + void kfree(const void *); + void kzfree(const void *); + size_t ksize(const void *); +@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_index(size_t size) + } + #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */ + +-void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; ++void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; + void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *); + +@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p) + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA +-void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; ++void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; + #else + static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags) + * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of + * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h. + */ +-static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) ++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) + { + if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { + if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) +@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_size(unsigned int n) + return 0; + } + +-static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) ++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) + { + #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && +diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h +index 3a1a1dbc6f49..ff38fec9eb76 100644 +--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h ++++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h +@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ struct kmem_cache { + unsigned long random; + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY ++ unsigned long random_active; ++ unsigned long random_inactive; ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + /* + * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. +diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h +index 4a5a0eb7df51..be86cf21d0ce 100644 +--- a/include/linux/string.h ++++ b/include/linux/string.h +@@ -235,10 +235,16 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob + void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter"); + void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING ++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1) ++#else ++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0) ++#endif ++ + #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) + __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) + { +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __write_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) +@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) + + __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) + { +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strcat(p, q); + if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) +@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) + __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) + { + __kernel_size_t ret; +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); + + /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || +@@ -274,7 +280,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) + extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen); + __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen) + { +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); + __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); + if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) + fortify_panic(__func__); +@@ -286,8 +292,8 @@ extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy); + __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) + { + size_t ret; +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); +- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); ++ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size); + ret = strlen(q); +@@ -307,8 +313,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) + __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) + { + size_t p_len, copy_len; +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); +- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); ++ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); + p_len = strlen(p); +@@ -421,8 +427,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) + /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */ + __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) + { +- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); +- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); ++ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); ++ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); + memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); +diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h +index 808fbfe86f85..e4429b7d6e8e 100644 +--- a/include/linux/tty.h ++++ b/include/linux/tty.h +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + #include <uapi/linux/tty.h> + #include <linux/rwsem.h> + #include <linux/llist.h> ++#include <linux/user_namespace.h> + + + /* +@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ struct tty_struct { + /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */ + struct work_struct SAK_work; + struct tty_port *port; ++ struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns; + } __randomize_layout; + + /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */ +@@ -345,6 +347,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { + struct list_head list; + }; + ++extern int tiocsti_restrict; ++ + /* tty magic number */ + #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401 + +diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h +index 398e9c95cd61..baab7195306a 100644 +--- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h ++++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h +@@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void) + } + #endif + +-extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size); +-extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size); +-extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size); +-extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); +-extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); +-extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size); +-extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size); +-extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size); +-extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot); ++extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); ++extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask, + pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node, +- const void *caller); ++ const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); + #ifndef CONFIG_MMU + extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags); + static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node, +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index 864af10bb1b9..643bb9448bb9 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ config USELIB + config AUDIT + bool "Auditing support" + depends on NET ++ default y + help + Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another + kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for +@@ -1088,6 +1089,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE + + endchoice + ++config LOCAL_INIT ++ bool "Zero uninitialized locals" ++ help ++ Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length ++ arrays. Requires compiler support. ++ + config HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION + bool + help +@@ -1374,8 +1381,7 @@ config SHMEM + which may be appropriate on small systems without swap. + + config AIO +- bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT +- default y ++ bool "Enable AIO support" + help + This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used + by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling +@@ -1592,7 +1598,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS + + config SLUB_DEBUG + default y +- bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT ++ bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" + depends on SLUB && SYSFS + help + SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can +@@ -1616,7 +1622,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON + + config COMPAT_BRK + bool "Disable heap randomization" +- default y + help + Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it + also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). +@@ -1663,7 +1668,6 @@ endchoice + + config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT + bool "Allow slab caches to be merged" +- default y + help + For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be + merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. +@@ -1676,9 +1680,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT + command line. + + config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM +- default n + depends on SLAB || SLUB + bool "SLAB freelist randomization" ++ default y + help + Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This + security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab +@@ -1687,12 +1691,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM + config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED + bool "Harden slab freelist metadata" + depends on SLUB ++ default y + help + Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and + other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance + sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common + freelist exploit methods. + ++config SLAB_HARDENED ++ default y ++ depends on SLUB ++ bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure" ++ help ++ Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab ++ allocator. ++ ++config SLAB_CANARY ++ depends on SLUB ++ depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT ++ bool "SLAB canaries" ++ default y ++ help ++ Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing ++ some performance and memory usage for security. ++ ++ Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations ++ are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides ++ basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY. ++ ++ Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate ++ non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero ++ byte and provide basic double-free detection. ++ ++config SLAB_SANITIZE ++ bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations" ++ depends on SLUB ++ default y ++ help ++ Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of ++ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. ++ ++ For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact. ++ ++config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY ++ depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE ++ default y ++ bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations" ++ help ++ Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect ++ write-after-free bugs. ++ + config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL + default y + depends on SLUB && SMP +diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c +index 2a8058764aa6..14e7a763db43 100644 +--- a/kernel/audit.c ++++ b/kernel/audit.c +@@ -1628,6 +1628,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) + + if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF) + audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED; ++ else if (!audit_ever_enabled) ++ audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED; ++ + if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default)) + pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", + audit_default); +diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c +index 474525e3a9db..644a87f6ad28 100644 +--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c ++++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c +@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp) + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT + /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */ + int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON); +-int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly; ++int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2; + int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly; + + static __always_inline void +diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +index 382c09dddf93..11f436e79170 100644 +--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c ++++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock); + static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr); + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock); + +-int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly; ++int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1; + + static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { + #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) +diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c +index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 +--- a/kernel/capability.c ++++ b/kernel/capability.c +@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) + return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); ++ ++bool capable_noaudit(int cap) ++{ ++ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit); + #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ + + /** +diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c +index 5a97f34bc14c..a4a4fc1e1586 100644 +--- a/kernel/events/core.c ++++ b/kernel/events/core.c +@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask; + * 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv + * 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv + * 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv ++ * 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use + */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT ++int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3; ++#else + int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2; ++#endif + + /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ + int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ +@@ -10410,6 +10415,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, + if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL) + return -EINVAL; + ++ if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ return -EACCES; ++ + err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr); + if (err) + return err; +diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c +index 64ef113e387e..42d257e43e04 100644 +--- a/kernel/fork.c ++++ b/kernel/fork.c +@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ + + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS + #include <trace/events/task.h> ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#else ++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 ++#endif + + /* + * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel +@@ -1649,6 +1654,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( + if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + ++ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); ++ + /* + * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads + * can only be started up within the thread group. +@@ -2476,6 +2485,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) + if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) + unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; + ++ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ goto bad_unshare_out; ++ } ++ + err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); + if (err) + goto bad_unshare_out; +diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c +index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 +--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c ++++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c +@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) + + void clear_free_pages(void) + { +-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO ++#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) + struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map; + unsigned long pfn; + +@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) + } + memory_bm_position_reset(bm); + pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n"); +-#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */ ++#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */ + } + + /** +diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c +index befc9321a89c..61e19256560c 100644 +--- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c ++++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c +@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static void __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_ctrlblk *rcp) + } + } + +-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) ++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) + { + __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk); + __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk); +diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c +index 15301ed19da6..2a799dea7016 100644 +--- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c ++++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c +@@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@ __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_state *rsp) + /* + * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU. + */ +-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) ++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) + { + struct rcu_state *rsp; + +diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c +index 7137bc343b4a..104e0855a018 100644 +--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c ++++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c +@@ -9593,7 +9593,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf) + * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick. + * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set). + */ +-static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void) + { + struct rq *this_rq = this_rq(); + enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ? +diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c +index 6f584861d329..1943fe60f3b9 100644 +--- a/kernel/softirq.c ++++ b/kernel/softirq.c +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(irq_cpustat_t, irq_stat); + EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(irq_stat); + #endif + +-static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp; ++static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + + DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd); + +@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) + kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr); + + trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr); +- h->action(h); ++ h->action(); + trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr); + if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) { + pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n", +@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr) + or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr); + } + +-void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)) ++void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)) + { + softirq_vec[nr].action = action; + } +@@ -497,8 +497,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule); + +-static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, +- struct tasklet_head *tl_head, ++static void tasklet_action_common(struct tasklet_head *tl_head, + unsigned int softirq_nr) + { + struct tasklet_struct *list; +@@ -535,14 +534,14 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, + } + } + +-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) ++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void) + { +- tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ); ++ tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ); + } + +-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a) ++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void) + { +- tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ); ++ tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ); + } + + void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t, +diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c +index cc02050fd0c4..cca161854186 100644 +--- a/kernel/sysctl.c ++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ + #include <linux/bpf.h> + #include <linux/mount.h> + #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> ++#include <linux/tty.h> + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/processor.h> +@@ -99,12 +100,19 @@ + #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) + + /* External variables not in a header file. */ ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) ++int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb); ++#endif + extern int suid_dumpable; + #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP + extern int core_uses_pid; + extern char core_pattern[]; + extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit; + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++#endif + extern int pid_max; + extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; + extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; +@@ -116,33 +124,33 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; + + /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ + #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR +-static int sixty = 60; ++static int sixty __read_only = 60; + #endif + +-static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1; ++static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1; + + static int zero; +-static int __maybe_unused one = 1; +-static int __maybe_unused two = 2; +-static int __maybe_unused four = 4; +-static unsigned long one_ul = 1; +-static int one_hundred = 100; +-static int one_thousand = 1000; ++static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1; ++static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2; ++static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4; ++static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1; ++static int one_hundred __read_only = 100; ++static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000; + #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK +-static int ten_thousand = 10000; ++static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000; + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS +-static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024; ++static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024; + #endif + + /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */ +-static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; ++static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + + /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */ +-static int maxolduid = 65535; +-static int minolduid; ++static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535; ++static int minolduid __read_only; + +-static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX; ++static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX; + static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; + + /* +@@ -150,9 +158,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; + * and hung_task_check_interval_secs + */ + #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK +-static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ); ++static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ); + #endif + ++int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict); ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER + #include <linux/inotify.h> + #endif +@@ -296,19 +307,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { + }; + + #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG +-static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ +-static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ +-static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns; /* 0 usecs */ +-static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ ++static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ ++static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ ++static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only; /* 0 usecs */ ++static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP +-static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; +-static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; ++static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; ++static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; + #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION +-static int min_extfrag_threshold; +-static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; ++static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only; ++static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000; + #endif + + static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { +@@ -514,6 +525,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++ { ++ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", ++ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL + { + .procname = "tainted", +@@ -862,6 +882,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &two, + }, ++#endif ++#if defined CONFIG_TTY ++ { ++ .procname = "tiocsti_restrict", ++ .data = &tiocsti_restrict, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#endif ++ { ++ .procname = "device_sidechannel_restrict", ++ .data = &device_sidechannel_restrict, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) ++ { ++ .procname = "deny_new_usb", ++ .data = &deny_new_usb, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &one, ++ }, + #endif + { + .procname = "ngroups_max", +diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c +index e1a549c9e399..c560063e3a8c 100644 +--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c ++++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c +@@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, + } + } + +-static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void) + { + struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases); + unsigned long flags; +diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c +index fa49cd753dea..a16f8613282e 100644 +--- a/kernel/time/timer.c ++++ b/kernel/time/timer.c +@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) + /* + * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context. + */ +-static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void) + { + struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]); + +diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c +index 923414a246e9..6b9dbc257e34 100644 +--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c ++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c +@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ + #include <linux/bsearch.h> + #include <linux/sort.h> + ++/* sysctl */ ++int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++ + static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; + static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); + +diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug +index 4966c4fbe7f7..7a685272c155 100644 +--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug ++++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug +@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs" + + config PANIC_ON_OOPS + bool "Panic on Oops" ++ default y + help + Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This + has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command +@@ -959,7 +960,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS + anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data + corruption or other issues. + +- Say N if unsure. ++ Say Y if unsure. + + config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE + int +@@ -1328,6 +1329,7 @@ config DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE + config DEBUG_LIST + bool "Debug linked list manipulation" + depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION ++ default y + help + Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list + walking routines. +@@ -1982,6 +1984,7 @@ config MEMTEST + config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION + bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected" + select DEBUG_LIST ++ default y + help + Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters + data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked +@@ -2021,6 +2024,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM + config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM + bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem" + depends on STRICT_DEVMEM ++ default y + ---help--- + If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all + io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that +diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c +index 86a709954f5a..6f15787fcb1b 100644 +--- a/lib/irq_poll.c ++++ b/lib/irq_poll.c +@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete); + +-static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) ++static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void) + { + struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll); + int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget; +diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c +index 97d86dc17c42..388257c2878b 100644 +--- a/lib/kobject.c ++++ b/lib/kobject.c +@@ -978,9 +978,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add); + + + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock); +-static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES]; ++static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init; + +-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) ++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) + { + enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type; + int error; +diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c +index e335bcafa9e4..f6334f882b1f 100644 +--- a/lib/nlattr.c ++++ b/lib/nlattr.c +@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count) + { + int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src)); + ++ BUG_ON(minlen < 0); ++ + memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen); + if (count > minlen) + memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen); +diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c +index 812e59e13fe6..2c2104884c81 100644 +--- a/lib/vsprintf.c ++++ b/lib/vsprintf.c +@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, + return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec); + } + +-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; ++int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2; + + static noinline_for_stack + char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, +diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig +index de64ea658716..8bff017856eb 100644 +--- a/mm/Kconfig ++++ b/mm/Kconfig +@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ config KSM + config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR + int "Low address space to protect from user allocation" + depends on MMU +- default 4096 ++ default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) ++ default 65536 + help + This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected + from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages +diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c +index f7cd9cb966c0..fda49841f4f2 100644 +--- a/mm/mmap.c ++++ b/mm/mmap.c +@@ -229,6 +229,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) + + newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk); + oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk); ++ /* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */ ++ if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) { ++ if (brk == min_brk) ++ newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; ++ if (mm->brk == min_brk) ++ oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; ++ } + if (oldbrk == newbrk) + goto set_brk; + +diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c +index 9e45553cabd6..f5ec01e1498c 100644 +--- a/mm/page_alloc.c ++++ b/mm/page_alloc.c +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ + #include <linux/ftrace.h> + #include <linux/lockdep.h> + #include <linux/nmi.h> ++#include <linux/random.h> + + #include <asm/sections.h> + #include <asm/tlbflush.h> +@@ -99,6 +100,15 @@ int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES]; + DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex); + DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain); + ++bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy; ++ ++static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str) ++{ ++ extra_latent_entropy = true; ++ return 0; ++} ++early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy); ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY + volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy); +@@ -1027,6 +1037,13 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, + debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page), + PAGE_SIZE << order); + } ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) { ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) ++ clear_highpage(page + i); ++ } ++ + arch_free_page(page, order); + kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); + kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); +@@ -1267,6 +1284,21 @@ static void __init __free_pages_boot_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order) + __ClearPageReserved(p); + set_page_count(p, 0); + ++ if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) { ++ unsigned long hash = 0; ++ size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash; ++ const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page); ++ ++ for (index = 0; index < end; index++) ++ hash ^= hash + data[index]; ++#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY ++ latent_entropy ^= hash; ++ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); ++#else ++ add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash)); ++#endif ++ } ++ + page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages; + set_page_refcounted(page); + __free_pages(page, order); +@@ -1855,8 +1887,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) + + static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) + { +- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && +- page_poisoning_enabled(); ++ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) || ++ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled()); + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM +@@ -1913,6 +1945,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags + + post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); + ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) { ++ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) ++ verify_zero_highpage(page + i); ++ } ++ + if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)) + for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) + clear_highpage(page + i); +diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h +index 58c6c1c2a78e..86d7a6e7ad25 100644 +--- a/mm/slab.h ++++ b/mm/slab.h +@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ static inline bool is_root_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) + static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s, + struct kmem_cache *p) + { ++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED ++ return p == s; ++#else + return true; ++#endif + } + + static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s) +@@ -365,18 +369,26 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x) + * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root + * will also be a constant. + */ +- if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() && ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) && ++ !memcg_kmem_enabled() && + !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS)) + return s; + + page = virt_to_head_page(x); ++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED ++ BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page)); ++#endif + cachep = page->slab_cache; + if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s)) + return cachep; + + pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n", + __func__, s->name, cachep->name); ++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION ++ BUG_ON(1); ++#else + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); ++#endif + return s; + } + +@@ -401,7 +413,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s) + * back there or track user information then we can + * only use the space before that information. + */ +- if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) ++ if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) + return s->inuse; + /* + * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation +diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c +index 3a7ac4f15194..a567cc1807ae 100644 +--- a/mm/slab_common.c ++++ b/mm/slab_common.c +@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ + + #include "slab.h" + +-enum slab_state slab_state; ++enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init; + LIST_HEAD(slab_caches); + DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex); +-struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache; ++struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init; + + #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init = +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work, + /* + * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur. + */ +-static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); ++static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); + + static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str) + { +diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c +index 8da34a8af53d..f05bc9ca8489 100644 +--- a/mm/slub.c ++++ b/mm/slub.c +@@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s) + #endif + } + ++static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s) ++{ ++ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)); ++} ++ ++static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s) ++{ ++ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s); ++} ++ + void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) + { + if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) +@@ -297,6 +307,35 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) + *(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY ++static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) ++{ ++ if (s->offset) ++ return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *); ++ return object + s->inuse; ++} ++ ++static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value) ++{ ++ return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK; ++} ++ ++static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) ++{ ++ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); ++ *canary = get_canary_value(canary, value); ++} ++ ++static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) ++{ ++ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); ++ BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value)); ++} ++#else ++#define set_canary(s, object, value) ++#define check_canary(s, object, value) ++#endif ++ + /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ + #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \ + for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \ +@@ -469,13 +508,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) + * Debug settings: + */ + #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON) +-static slab_flags_t slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; ++static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; + #else +-static slab_flags_t slub_debug; ++static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init; + #endif + +-static char *slub_debug_slabs; +-static int disable_higher_order_debug; ++static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init; ++static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init; + + /* + * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata. This memory lies +@@ -535,6 +574,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, + else + p = object + s->inuse; + ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) ++ p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *); ++ + return p + alloc; + } + +@@ -674,6 +716,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) + else + off = s->inuse; + ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) ++ off += sizeof(void *); ++ + if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) + off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); + +@@ -803,6 +848,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) + /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */ + off += sizeof(void *); + ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) ++ off += sizeof(void *); ++ + if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) + /* We also have user information there */ + off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); +@@ -1417,8 +1465,9 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, + void *object) + { + setup_object_debug(s, page, object); ++ set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); + kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object); +- if (unlikely(s->ctor)) { ++ if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) { + kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object); + s->ctor(object); + kasan_poison_object_data(s, object); +@@ -2700,9 +2749,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, + stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); + } + +- if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) ++ if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) { ++ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); ++ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); ++ if (s->ctor) ++ s->ctor(object); ++ if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) ++ memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *)); ++ } else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) + memset(object, 0, s->object_size); + ++ if (object) { ++ check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); ++ set_canary(s, object, s->random_active); ++ } ++ + slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object); + + return object; +@@ -2909,6 +2970,27 @@ static __always_inline void do_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, + void *tail_obj = tail ? : head; + struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; + unsigned long tid; ++ bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) { ++ __maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); ++ void *x = head; ++ ++ while (1) { ++ check_canary(s, x, s->random_active); ++ set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive); ++ ++ if (sanitize) { ++ memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset); ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor) ++ s->ctor(x); ++ } ++ if (x == tail_obj) ++ break; ++ x = get_freepointer(s, x); ++ } ++ } ++ + redo: + /* + * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab. +@@ -3085,7 +3167,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, + void **p) + { + struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; +- int i; ++ int i, k; + + /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ + s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags); +@@ -3122,13 +3204,29 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, + local_irq_enable(); + + /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */ +- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { ++ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) { ++ int j; ++ ++ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { ++ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); ++ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); ++ if (s->ctor) ++ s->ctor(p[j]); ++ if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) ++ memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *)); ++ } ++ } else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size); + } + ++ for (k = 0; k < i; k++) { ++ check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive); ++ set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active); ++ } ++ + /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ + slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p); + return i; +@@ -3160,9 +3258,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk); + * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to + * take the list_lock. + */ +-static unsigned int slub_min_order; +-static unsigned int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; +-static unsigned int slub_min_objects; ++static unsigned int slub_min_order __ro_after_init; ++static unsigned int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; ++static unsigned int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init; + + /* + * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size. +@@ -3334,6 +3432,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node) + init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE); + init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n); + #endif ++ set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active); + kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), + GFP_KERNEL); + init_kmem_cache_node(n); +@@ -3490,6 +3589,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order) + size += sizeof(void *); + } + ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) ++ size += sizeof(void *); ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG + if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) + /* +@@ -3559,6 +3661,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags) + #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED + s->random = get_random_long(); + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY ++ s->random_active = get_random_long(); ++ s->random_inactive = get_random_long(); ++#endif + + if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1)) + goto error; +@@ -3835,6 +3941,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, + offset -= s->red_left_pad; + } + ++ check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active); ++ + /* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */ + if (offset >= s->useroffset && + offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize && +@@ -3868,7 +3976,11 @@ static size_t __ksize(const void *object) + page = virt_to_head_page(object); + + if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) { ++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION ++ BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page)); ++#else + WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page)); ++#endif + return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page); + } + +@@ -4728,7 +4840,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type { + #define SO_TOTAL (1 << SL_TOTAL) + + #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG +-static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); ++static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); + + static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str) + { +diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c +index 26fc9b5f1b6c..7c9312ca8982 100644 +--- a/mm/swap.c ++++ b/mm/swap.c +@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page) + if (!PageHuge(page)) + __page_cache_release(page); + dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page); ++ if (!PageHuge(page)) ++ BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page ++#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE ++ && dtor != free_transhuge_page ++#endif ++ ); ++ + (*dtor)(page); + } + +diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c +index af097ca9cb4f..fda1753e5b65 100644 +--- a/net/core/dev.c ++++ b/net/core/dev.c +@@ -4519,7 +4519,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni); + +-static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void) + { + struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); + +@@ -6302,7 +6302,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) + return work; + } + +-static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h) ++static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void) + { + struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); + unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + +diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig +index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644 +--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig ++++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig +@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2 + + config SYN_COOKIES + bool "IP: TCP syncookie support" ++ default y + ---help--- + Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN + flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote +diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig +index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644 +--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig ++++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig +@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY + is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and + irq processing. + ++ When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line, ++ entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the ++ runtime memory allocator is being initialized. This costs even more ++ slowdown of the boot process. ++ + Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically + secure! + +diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c +index 5a5b3780456f..01eac2c6e7eb 100644 +--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c ++++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1; + static int warn_unresolved = 0; + /* How a symbol is exported */ + static int sec_mismatch_count = 0; ++static int writable_fptr_count = 0; + static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1; + static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0; + /* ignore missing files */ +@@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ enum mismatch { + ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT, + EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT, + EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, ++ DATA_TO_TEXT + }; + + /** +@@ -1080,6 +1082,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = { + .good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL}, + .mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, + .handler = extable_mismatch_handler, ++}, ++/* Do not reference code from writable data */ ++{ ++ .fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL }, ++ .bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL }, ++ .mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT + } + }; + +@@ -1229,10 +1237,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, + continue; + if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION) + continue; +- if (sym->st_value == addr) +- return sym; + /* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */ + d = sym->st_value - addr; ++ if (d == 0) ++ return sym; + if (d < 0) + d = addr - sym->st_value; + if (d < distance) { +@@ -1391,7 +1399,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, + char *prl_from; + char *prl_to; + +- sec_mismatch_count++; ++ if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT) ++ writable_fptr_count++; ++ else ++ sec_mismatch_count++; ++ + if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) + return; + +@@ -1515,6 +1527,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, + fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, " + "we should never get here."); + break; ++ case DATA_TO_TEXT: ++#if 0 ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "The %s %s:%s references\n" ++ "the %s %s:%s%s\n", ++ from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p); ++#endif ++ break; + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +@@ -2526,6 +2546,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + } + } + free(buf.p); ++ if (writable_fptr_count) { ++ if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) { ++ warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n" ++ "To see full details build your kernel with:\n" ++ "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n", ++ writable_fptr_count); ++ } ++ } + + return err; + } +diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig +index d9aa521b5206..a921713b76ec 100644 +--- a/security/Kconfig ++++ b/security/Kconfig +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig + + config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT + bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" +- default n ++ default y + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel + syslog via dmesg(8). +@@ -18,10 +18,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + ++config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT ++ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" ++ depends on PERF_EVENTS ++ default y ++ help ++ If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl ++ will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the ++ perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is ++ changed. ++ ++config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT ++ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection" ++ default y ++ help ++ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands ++ into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI ++ ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. ++ ++ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced ++ unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). ++ ++ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. ++ + config SECURITY + bool "Enable different security models" + depends on SYSFS + depends on MULTIUSER ++ default y + help + This allows you to choose different security modules to be + configured into your kernel. +@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS + config SECURITY_NETWORK + bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" + depends on SECURITY ++ default y + help + This enables the socket and networking security hooks. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to +@@ -154,6 +179,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" + depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + imply STRICT_DEVMEM ++ default y + help + This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when + copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and +@@ -166,7 +192,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY + config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK + bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size" + depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY +- default y + help + This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists + to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of +@@ -191,10 +216,36 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN + config FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" + depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE ++ default y + help + Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions + where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. + ++config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING ++ bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows" ++ depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE ++ depends on EXPERT ++ help ++ Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects ++ for common C string functions rather than only between objects. ++ ++ This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding. ++ ++config PAGE_SANITIZE ++ bool "Sanitize pages" ++ default y ++ help ++ Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of ++ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. ++ ++config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY ++ bool "Verify sanitized pages" ++ depends on PAGE_SANITIZE ++ default y ++ help ++ Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect ++ write-after-free bugs. ++ + config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER + bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" + help +diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig +index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 +--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig ++++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX + bool "NSA SELinux Support" + depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET + select NETWORK_SECMARK +- default n ++ default y + help + This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). + You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem. +@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS + This option collects access vector cache statistics to + /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via + tools such as avcstat. +- +-config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE +- int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value" +- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX +- range 0 1 +- default 0 +- help +- This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag +- that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested +- by the application or the protection that will be applied by the +- kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for +- mmap and mprotect calls. If this option is set to 0 (zero), +- SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied +- by the kernel. If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will +- default to checking the protection requested by the application. +- The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the +- 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime +- via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. +- +- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. +diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c +index 3c3878f0d2fa..553e52f19f28 100644 +--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c ++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c +@@ -135,18 +135,7 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); + int selinux_enabled = 1; + #endif + +-static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = +- CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; +- +-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) +-{ +- unsigned long checkreqprot; +- +- if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) +- selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; +- return 1; +-} +-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); ++static const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot; + + static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; + static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache; +diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +index f3a5a138a096..d95f3c5fe6f0 100644 +--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c ++++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +@@ -640,7 +640,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, + static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) + { +- struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info; + char *page; + ssize_t length; + unsigned int new_value; +@@ -664,10 +663,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + return PTR_ERR(page); + + length = -EINVAL; +- if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) ++ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value) + goto out; + +- fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; + length = count; + out: + kfree(page); +diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig +index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644 +--- a/security/yama/Kconfig ++++ b/security/yama/Kconfig +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + config SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama support" + depends on SECURITY +- default n ++ default y + help + This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional + system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary |