summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/sys-kernel/linux-sources-redcore-lts-legacy/files/4.19-linux-hardened.patch
blob: 2f477148828141ee8882b2a1fbb28ca533997748 (plain)
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diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 8bf0c0532046..c81c652ecf44 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -496,16 +496,6 @@
 			nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting.
 			nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting.
 
-	checkreqprot	[SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value.
-			Format: { "0" | "1" }
-			See security/selinux/Kconfig help text.
-			0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes
-				any implied execute protection).
-			1 -- check protection requested by application.
-			Default value is set via a kernel config option.
-			Value can be changed at runtime via
-				/selinux/checkreqprot.
-
 	cio_ignore=	[S390]
 			See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
 	clk_ignore_unused
@@ -3207,6 +3197,11 @@
 			the specified number of seconds.  This is to be used if
 			your oopses keep scrolling off the screen.
 
+	extra_latent_entropy
+			Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction
+			from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator
+			passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator.
+
 	pcbit=		[HW,ISDN]
 
 	pcd.		[PARIDE]
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 37a679501ddc..59b747920f4d 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - sysctl_writes_strict
 - tainted
 - threads-max
+- tiocsti_restrict
 - unknown_nmi_panic
 - watchdog
 - watchdog_thresh
@@ -1041,6 +1042,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+tiocsti_restrict:
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
+from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into other processes
+which share a tty session.
+
+When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
+the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
+one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
+have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
+
+When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
+opened the tty.
+
+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
+default value of tiocsti_restrict.
+
+==============================================================
+
 unknown_nmi_panic:
 
 The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 313f0c8dd66f..8e66fca67fd0 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -696,6 +696,9 @@ stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG)      := -fstack-protector-strong
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y)
 
 ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
+ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT
+KBUILD_CFLAGS   += -fsanitize=local-init
+endif
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index a336548487e6..bbe821420e7a 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	help
 	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
 	help
 	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
 
 config REFCOUNT_FULL
 	bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
 	  unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 51fe21f5d078..f345755446d9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1033,6 +1033,7 @@ endif
 
 config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
 	bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
 	  user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
@@ -1208,6 +1209,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
 	bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
 	select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
 	select RELOCATABLE
+	default y
 	help
 	  Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
 	  loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
index 69c9170bdd24..a786227db0e3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
 config DEBUG_WX
 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
 	select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
+	default y
 	---help---
 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
index 1a4f8b67bbe8..85273063eb56 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
 CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
 CONFIG_AUDIT=y
 CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 433b9554c6a1..1f4b06317c9f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@
 
 /*
  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
  */
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x100000000UL
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 /* 1GB of VA */
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 #define STACK_RND_MASK			(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
-						0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
-						0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+						((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+						((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
 #else
-#define STACK_RND_MASK			(0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+#define STACK_RND_MASK			(((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
 #endif
 
 #ifdef __AARCH64EB__
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index d6a49bb07a5f..16e4214c2305 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -517,9 +517,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (is_compat_task())
-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
+		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
 	else
-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
+		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index af35f5caadbe..34e88af114bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1189,8 +1189,7 @@ config VM86
        default X86_LEGACY_VM86
 
 config X86_16BIT
-	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT
-	default y
+	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments"
 	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	---help---
 	  This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit
@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
 choice
 	prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
 	depends on X86_64
-	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
+	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
 	help
 	  Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
 	  to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
@@ -2400,8 +2399,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
 	  be set to 'N' under normal conditions.
 
 config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
-	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT
-	default y
+	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)"
 	---help---
 	  Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
 	  Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 687cd1a213d5..29075c2bc51f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP
 config DEBUG_WX
 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
 	select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
+	default y
 	---help---
 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
index e32fc1f274d8..d08acc76502a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set
-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
 CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
 CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y
 CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
index 5b8b556dbb12..a569f08b4478 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
@@ -204,55 +204,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/*
- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized
- * offset.  This way there is no hole in the middle of address space.
- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack
- * top.  This doesn't give that many random bits.
- *
- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso
- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end.
- *
- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos.
- */
-static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len)
-{
-	unsigned long addr, end;
-	unsigned offset;
-
-	/*
-	 * Round up the start address.  It can start out unaligned as a result
-	 * of stack start randomization.
-	 */
-	start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
-
-	/* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */
-	end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK;
-	if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
-		end = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
-	end -= len;
-
-	if (end > start) {
-		offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
-		addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT);
-	} else {
-		addr = start;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware
-	 * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons.
-	 */
-	addr = align_vdso_addr(addr);
-
-	return addr;
-}
-
 static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image)
 {
-	unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start);
-
-	return map_vdso(image, addr);
+	return map_vdso(image, 0);
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 0d157d2a1e2a..770c8ae97f92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ extern int force_personality32;
 
 /*
  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
  */
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
-						  (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2))
+						  0x100000000UL)
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
@@ -313,8 +313,8 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 
-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff)
-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff)
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
 
 #define ARCH_DLINFO		ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
 
@@ -323,7 +323,11 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
 /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */
-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff)
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#else
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#endif
 #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32())
 
 #define ARCH_DLINFO							\
@@ -381,5 +385,4 @@ struct va_alignment {
 } ____cacheline_aligned;
 
 extern struct va_alignment va_align;
-extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 79ec7add5f98..2950448e00ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits(unsigned long mask)
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
 	if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4)
 		__cr4_set(cr4 | mask);
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask)
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
 	if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4)
 		__cr4_set(cr4 & ~mask);
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@ static inline void cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(unsigned long mask)
 	unsigned long cr4;
 
 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+        BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
 	__cr4_set(cr4 ^ mask);
 }
 
@@ -438,6 +441,7 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void)
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 
 	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
 	/* toggle PGE */
 	native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
 	/* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a6458ab499c2..0be5291ec42e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1790,7 +1790,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
 	barrier();
 
-	x86_configure_nx();
 	x2apic_setup();
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index b8b08e61ac73..42f763e0adf3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/prctl.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -783,7 +785,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 
 unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-	return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
+	if (mmap_is_ia32())
+		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
+	else
+		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
index 6a78d4b36a79..715009f7a96c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void)
 	return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
 }
 
-unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
-{
-	unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
-	addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
-	return addr | get_align_bits();
-}
-
 static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
 {
 	/* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
 	}
 
 	*begin	= get_mmap_base(1);
-	if (in_compat_syscall())
-		*end = task_size_32bit();
-	else
-		*end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
+	*end	= get_mmap_base(0);
 }
 
 unsigned long
@@ -210,7 +200,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
 
 	info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
 	info.length = len;
-	info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
+	info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
 	info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index 79b95910fd9f..fcda13aa03d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -560,9 +560,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)
 
 #define DEFAULT_PTE_MASK ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL)
 /* Bits supported by the hardware: */
-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
 /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
 /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ void arch_remove_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
 }
 #endif
 
-int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly;
+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
 
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
 {
@@ -922,12 +922,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
 	unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start;
 
+	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
 	set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n",
 		size >> 10);
 
-	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n",
 		start, start+size);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 81e85a8dd300..f0403d1ba1b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
  */
 
 /* Bits supported by the hardware: */
-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
 /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
 /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
 	mem_init_print_info(NULL);
 }
 
-int kernel_set_to_readonly;
+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
 
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
 {
@@ -1239,9 +1239,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n",
 	       (end - start) >> 10);
-	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
-
 	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
+	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	/*
 	 * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!)
diff --git a/block/blk-softirq.c b/block/blk-softirq.c
index 15c1f5e12eb8..ff72cccec5b8 100644
--- a/block/blk-softirq.c
+++ b/block/blk-softirq.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blk_cpu_done);
  * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them
  * while passing them to the queue registered handler.
  */
-static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void)
 {
 	struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list;
 
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
index 75d582ca917f..38ba030b8e27 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
@@ -5161,7 +5161,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 	struct ata_port *ap;
 	unsigned int tag;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
 	ap = qc->ap;
 
 	qc->flags = 0;
@@ -5178,7 +5178,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 	struct ata_port *ap;
 	struct ata_link *link;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE));
 	ap = qc->ap;
 	link = qc->dev->link;
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index 1df9cb8e659e..eb71148a4a69 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ source "drivers/tty/Kconfig"
 
 config DEVMEM
 	bool "/dev/mem virtual device support"
-	default y
 	help
 	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device.
 	  The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
@@ -531,7 +530,6 @@ config TELCLOCK
 config DEVPORT
 	bool "/dev/port character device"
 	depends on ISA || PCI
-	default y
 	help
 	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
 	  device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 53e822793d46..c97b295338ce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -281,11 +281,20 @@
 /*
  * Configuration information
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
+#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT	18
+#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT	16
+#else
 #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT	12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
 #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT	10
+#endif
+#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
+#define SEC_XFER_SIZE		32768
+#else
 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE		512
+#endif
 #define EXTRACT_SIZE		10
 
 
@@ -294,9 +303,6 @@
 /*
  * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
  * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
- *
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
  */
 #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
 #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
@@ -361,15 +367,27 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
  */
 static struct poolinfo {
 	int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
-	int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
+#define S(x) \
+	.poolbitshift = ilog2(x)+5, \
+	.poolwords = (x), \
+	.poolbytes = (x)*4, \
+	.poolbits = (x)*32, \
+	.poolfracbits = (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
+	int tap[5];
+} __randomize_layout poolinfo_table[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
+	/* x^8192 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+	{ S(8192),	.tap = { 104,	76,	51,	25,	1 } },
+	/* x^2048 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+	{ S(2048),	.tap = { 26,	19,	14,	7,	1 } }
+#else
 	/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
 	/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
-	{ S(128),	104,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
+	{ S(128),	.tap = { 104,	76,	51,	25,	1 } },
 	/* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
 	/* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
-	{ S(32),	26,	19,	14,	7,	1 },
+	{ S(32),	.tap = { 26,	19,	14,	7,	1 } },
+#endif
 #if 0
 	/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1  -- 115 */
 	{ S(2048),	1638,	1231,	819,	411,	1 },
@@ -413,7 +431,7 @@ struct crng_state {
 	__u32		state[16];
 	unsigned long	init_time;
 	spinlock_t	lock;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 struct crng_state primary_crng = {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
@@ -475,7 +493,7 @@ struct entropy_store {
 	unsigned int initialized:1;
 	unsigned int last_data_init:1;
 	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
 			       size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
@@ -486,6 +504,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
 static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
 static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
 static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+/* this actually doesn't need latent entropy */
+static __u32 secondary_xfer_buffer[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
 
 static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
 	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
@@ -504,9 +524,78 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
 					push_to_pool),
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
+static __u32 const twist_table[64][4] = {
+	{ 0x6a09e668, 0xbb67ae86, 0x3c6ef373, 0xa54ff53a },
+	{ 0x510e5280, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ac, 0x5be0cd19 },
+	{ 0xcbbb9d5e, 0x629a292a, 0x9159015a, 0x152fecd9 },
+	{ 0x67332668, 0x8eb44a87, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x47b5481e },
+	{ 0xae5f9157, 0xcf6c85d4, 0x2f73477d, 0x6d1826cb },
+	{ 0x8b43d457, 0xe360b597, 0x1c456003, 0x6f196331 },
+	{ 0xd94ebeb2, 0x0cc4a612, 0x261dc1f3, 0x5815a7be },
+	{ 0x70b7ed68, 0xa1513c69, 0x44f93636, 0x720dcdfe },
+	{ 0xb467369e, 0xca320b76, 0x34e0d42e, 0x49c7d9be },
+	{ 0x87abb9f2, 0xc463a2fc, 0xec3fc3f4, 0x27277f6d },
+	{ 0x610bebf3, 0x7420b49f, 0xd1fd8a34, 0xe4773594 },
+	{ 0x092197f6, 0x1b530c96, 0x869d6343, 0xeee52e50 },
+	{ 0x1107668a, 0x21fba37c, 0x43ab9fb6, 0x75a9f91d },
+	{ 0x8630501a, 0xd7cd8174, 0x007fe010, 0x0379f514 },
+	{ 0x066b651b, 0x0764ab84, 0x0a4b06be, 0x0c3578c1 },
+	{ 0x0d2962a5, 0x11e039f4, 0x1857b7bf, 0x1a29bf2e },
+	{ 0x1b11a32f, 0x1cdf34e8, 0x23183042, 0x25b89093 },
+	{ 0x2a0c06a1, 0x2ae79843, 0x2c9cda69, 0x2f281f24 },
+	{ 0x32841259, 0x3502e64e, 0x377c9c21, 0x39204cda },
+	{ 0x3b91bf66, 0x3ecc38ca, 0x40665609, 0x43947938 },
+	{ 0x47830769, 0x484ae4b8, 0x4c2b2b75, 0x4cf03d21 },
+	{ 0x4f3cbb11, 0x50c2d3b5, 0x5308af16, 0x560a7a9a },
+	{ 0x5788d981, 0x584769b4, 0x59c34f06, 0x5e2d564c },
+	{ 0x6116d760, 0x62894c10, 0x6569b58c, 0x66d7b394 },
+	{ 0x68f9f8dc, 0x6d34f03d, 0x6de8372f, 0x742687a4 },
+	{ 0x76356021, 0x799d1235, 0x7ba455f4, 0x7da8d73b },
+	{ 0x7e546743, 0x80554bdc, 0x83a63a3c, 0x85a01e39 },
+	{ 0x879774ac, 0x883eac9f, 0x8a32aae0, 0x8c243210 },
+	{ 0x8d6e8781, 0x8e134b6f, 0x91ea5892, 0x95166fe4 },
+	{ 0x95b817e6, 0x96faa747, 0x98dca135, 0x9abc6593 },
+	{ 0x9b5bd55a, 0x9f136df7, 0xa04ebd79, 0xa225f6ed },
+	{ 0xa4970e49, 0xa79f5a6b, 0xaa0869af, 0xad06dcbd },
+	{ 0xaf68312e, 0xb12efe0b, 0xb2f3ef5b, 0xb420e03a },
+	{ 0xb6785656, 0xb837d738, 0xb9613115, 0xbbb18efb },
+	{ 0xbcd89621, 0xc0db3814, 0xc3b2f2a3, 0xc71638d9 },
+	{ 0xc7a6240f, 0xca73166e, 0xcb01f3ba, 0xcc1f293d },
+	{ 0xccad81c8, 0xcf72acaf, 0xd34c7258, 0xd4649b7a },
+	{ 0xd4f07147, 0xd607a013, 0xd9d3b47b, 0xdae803b5 },
+	{ 0xdb71ef1a, 0xdc854e24, 0xe1dcf0ea, 0xe2eca719 },
+	{ 0xe50a4ad8, 0xe7ac0990, 0xe9c46d3a, 0xeacfc33c },
+	{ 0xec5fb417, 0xedee611c, 0xf18bc533, 0xf292ef77 },
+	{ 0xf41cab36, 0xf5a531ec, 0xf7aeb45d, 0xf93474e9 },
+	{ 0xfc3c7559, 0xfd3e1962, 0xfebf9bc1, 0xff3fdbf2 },
+	{ 0x01bf3cab, 0x023ebd6b, 0x03bc8288, 0x06365a0f },
+	{ 0x06b4c1d2, 0x092afcc1, 0x09a8ad2c, 0x0b21093c },
+	{ 0x0f83d25e, 0x107c1074, 0x10f803d0, 0x11ef938d },
+	{ 0x136212e8, 0x14d390a4, 0x16beab25, 0x182dd7d5 },
+	{ 0x199c09bf, 0x1ed27f46, 0x1f4b2d3e, 0x21a502bc },
+	{ 0x23849e06, 0x25d9d3da, 0x273ef0ca, 0x28a326f6 },
+	{ 0x2a7cb5e4, 0x2d4019ba, 0x2e2b1e73, 0x2f8aec73 },
+	{ 0x30e9ddcc, 0x315ea828, 0x32bc75cf, 0x357587f0 },
+	{ 0x37b7de93, 0x3bc31ec6, 0x3c35b24a, 0x3d1a949b },
+	{ 0x3e713d15, 0x3ee347da, 0x4038e0bf, 0x411c2bae },
+	{ 0x418daf9a, 0x4270749e, 0x4516b0b0, 0x45876dcb },
+	{ 0x46d92246, 0x4e448a56, 0x4f9141c0, 0x50dd3e71 },
+	{ 0x5296c45b, 0x56738aac, 0x58961d02, 0x5b9010c1 },
+	{ 0x5c6913ae, 0x5cd577f2, 0x5dae0649, 0x5ef24aeb },
+	{ 0x60a199af, 0x6178ce9b, 0x61e44c97, 0x6326551c },
+	{ 0x65a86b29, 0x67bd7e12, 0x6827e41c, 0x68fc7925 },
+	{ 0x6966a836, 0x6a3acfa3, 0x6b78828a, 0x6df2017d },
+	{ 0x7068fdbb, 0x720c4495, 0x747f226b, 0x75b7a753 },
+	{ 0x7687a9e0, 0x77bf2d48, 0x795d98d4, 0x7a2c690b },
+	{ 0x7bc93fa8, 0x7c974690, 0x7f6653f3, 0x80333127 },
+	{ 0x81660244, 0x81cc2760, 0x829840e3, 0x83c9edd4 }
+};
+#else
 static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
 	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
 	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
+#endif
 
 /*
  * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
@@ -521,17 +610,14 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
 static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
 			    int nbytes)
 {
-	unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+	unsigned long i, n, t1, t2, tap[5];
 	int input_rotate;
 	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
 	const char *bytes = in;
 	__u32 w;
 
-	tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
-	tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
-	tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
-	tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
-	tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
+	for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
+		tap[n] = r->poolinfo->tap[n];
 
 	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
 	i = r->add_ptr;
@@ -543,14 +629,17 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
 
 		/* XOR in the various taps */
 		w ^= r->pool[i];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
+		for (n = 0; n < 5; n++)
+			w ^= r->pool[(i + tap[n]) & wordmask];
 
 		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_RANDOM
+		t1 = rol32(w, 14) & 0x1FFF;	// 0-63, 1111111111111
+		t2 = rol32(w, t1) & 0x3;	// 0-3, 11
+		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[t1][t2];
+#else
 		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+#endif
 
 		/*
 		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
@@ -588,7 +677,7 @@ struct fast_pool {
 	unsigned long	last;
 	unsigned short	reg_idx;
 	unsigned char	count;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
  * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
@@ -683,7 +772,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
 		/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
 
 		do {
-			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+			__u64 anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
 			unsigned int add =
 				((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
 
@@ -1061,7 +1150,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 
 		extract_crng(tmp);
 		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+		if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -1089,9 +1178,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 struct timer_rand_state {
 	cycles_t last_time;
 	long last_delta, last_delta2;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
+#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { .last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES };
 
 /*
  * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
@@ -1334,20 +1423,18 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
 
 static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	__u32	tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
-
 	int bytes = nbytes;
 
 	/* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
 	bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
 	/* but never more than the buffer size */
-	bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
+	bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(secondary_xfer_buffer));
 
 	trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
 				  ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
-	bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
+	bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes,
 				random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
-	mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
+	mix_pool_bytes(r, secondary_xfer_buffer, bytes);
 	credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
 }
 
@@ -1572,7 +1659,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
 
 		extract_buf(r, tmp);
 		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+		if (i > sizeof(tmp) || copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2276,7 +2363,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
 	};
 	unsigned int position;
 	spinlock_t batch_lock;
-};
+} __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
index e0a04bfc873e..ec93f827c599 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS
 
 config LEGACY_PTYS
 	bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support"
-	default y
 	---help---
 	  A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two
 	  halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index ac8025cd4a1f..a89e48f53fba 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	put_device(tty->dev);
 	kfree(tty->write_buf);
 	tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
+	put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
 	kfree(tty);
 }
 
@@ -2177,11 +2178,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
  *	FIXME: may race normal receive processing
  */
 
+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
+
 static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
 {
 	char ch, mbz = 0;
 	struct tty_ldisc *ld;
 
+	if (tiocsti_restrict &&
+		!ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev,
+			"Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (get_user(ch, p))
@@ -2865,6 +2874,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
 	tty->index = idx;
 	tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
 	tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
+	tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
 
 	return tty;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index 27486b0a027a..82689c97b660 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
 #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY	40	/* ns */
 #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX	65535	/* ns */
 
+extern int deny_new_usb;
+
 /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members
  * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can
  * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */
@@ -4961,6 +4963,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
 			goto done;
 		return;
 	}
+
+	if (deny_new_usb) {
+		dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
 	if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
 		unit_load = 150;
 	else
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index e5126fad57c5..2a59499ba24d 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;
 static int debugfs_mount_count;
 static bool debugfs_registered;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+extern int sysfs_restricted;
+#endif
+
 static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
@@ -517,6 +521,11 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
 	if (unlikely(!inode))
 		return failed_creating(dentry);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	if (sysfs_restricted)
+		inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU;
+	else
+#endif
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
 	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 561ea64829ec..5d40794103eb 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -320,6 +321,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma);
 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
+	if (randomize_va_space)
+		bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK;
 	return 0;
 err:
 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 327844fedf3d..c1b2eafa3b30 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@
 
 #define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX	(PATH_MAX - offsetof(struct filename, iname))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
+extern int fifo_restrictions;
+#endif
+
 struct filename *
 getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty)
 {
@@ -885,10 +889,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		path_put(&last->link);
 }
 
-int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0;
-int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
-int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly;
-int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly = 2;
+int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly = 2;
 
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
@@ -3252,6 +3256,32 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
 	return error;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Handles possibly restricted FIFO operations
+ * if the user doesn't own this directory.
+ */
+static int fifo_restricted(const struct dentry *dentry,
+                const struct vfsmount *mnt,
+				const struct dentry *dir,
+				const int flag,
+				const int acc_mode) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct inode *inode, *dir_inode;
+
+	cred = current_cred();
+	inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	dir_inode = d_backing_inode(dir);
+
+	if (fifo_restrictions && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) &&
+	    !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
+	    !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_inode->i_uid) &&
+	    !uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
+		return -EACCES;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Handle the last step of open()
  */
@@ -3370,6 +3400,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd,
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Only check if O_CREAT is specified, all other checks need to go
+	 *  into may_open().
+	 */
+	if (fifo_restricted(path.dentry, path.mnt, dir, open_flag, acc_mode)) {
+		path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * create/update audit record if it already exists.
 	 */
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index ac3e06367cb6..06a2e4cf4cc1 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG
 	bool
 	depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG
 	select CRC32
-	default y
diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig
index 817c02b13b1d..b8cd62b5cbc3 100644
--- a/fs/proc/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE
 config PROC_VMCORE
 	bool "/proc/vmcore support"
 	depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP
-	default y
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
 
diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
index f8e6fb2c3657..240c1432e18f 100644
--- a/fs/stat.c
+++ b/fs/stat.c
@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat)
 	stat->gid = inode->i_gid;
 	stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
 	stat->size = i_size_read(inode);
-	stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
-	stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
+	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
+		stat->atime = inode->i_ctime;
+		stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime;
+	} else {
+		stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
+		stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
+	}
 	stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
 	stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode);
 	stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks;
@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 	stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS;
 	request_mask &= STATX_ALL;
 	query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS;
-	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
-		return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask,
-					    query_flags);
+	if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
+		int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
+		if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
+			stat->atime = stat->ctime;
+			stat->mtime = stat->ctime;
+		}
+		return retval;
+	}
 
 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
index feeae8081c22..a507113bbd3b 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
 
 DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sysfs_symlink_target_lock);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+extern int sysfs_restricted;
+#endif
+
 void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
 {
 	char *buf;
@@ -40,11 +44,19 @@ void sysfs_warn_dup(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name)
 int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
 {
 	struct kernfs_node *parent, *kn;
+	const char* name;
+	umode_t mode;
 	kuid_t uid;
 	kgid_t gid;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	const char *parent_name;
+#endif
+
 	BUG_ON(!kobj);
 
+	name = kobject_name(kobj);
+
 	if (kobj->parent)
 		parent = kobj->parent->sd;
 	else
@@ -55,12 +67,30 @@ int sysfs_create_dir_ns(struct kobject *kobj, const void *ns)
 
 	kobject_get_ownership(kobj, &uid, &gid);
 
-	kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, kobject_name(kobj),
-				  S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, uid, gid,
-				  kobj, ns);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	if (sysfs_restricted) {
+		parent_name = parent->name;
+		mode = S_IRWXU;
+
+		if ((!strcmp(parent_name, "") && (!strcmp(name, "devices") ||
+			!strcmp(name, "fs"))) ||
+		    (!strcmp(parent_name, "devices") && !strcmp(name, "system")) ||
+		    (!strcmp(parent_name, "fs") && (!strcmp(name, "selinux") ||
+		    !strcmp(name, "fuse") || !strcmp(name, "ecryptfs"))) ||
+		    (!strcmp(parent_name, "system") && !strcmp(name, "cpu")))
+			mode |= S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
+	}
+	else
+		mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
+#else
+	mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
+#endif
+
+	kn = kernfs_create_dir_ns(parent, name, mode, uid, gid, kobj, ns);
+
 	if (IS_ERR(kn)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(kn) == -EEXIST)
-			sysfs_warn_dup(parent, kobject_name(kobj));
+			sysfs_warn_dup(parent, name);
 		return PTR_ERR(kn);
 	}
 
diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644
--- a/include/linux/cache.h
+++ b/include/linux/cache.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
 #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
 #endif
 
+#define __read_only __ro_after_init
+
 #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
 #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
+extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 #else
@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
 {
 	return true;
 }
+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+	return true;
+}
 static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
 	return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 92420009b9bc..9238f04686ce 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -3468,4 +3468,15 @@ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode);
 extern int vfs_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
 		       int advice);
 
+extern int device_sidechannel_restrict;
+
+static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	umode_t mode;
+	if (!device_sidechannel_restrict)
+		return false;
+	mode = inode->i_mode;
+	return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH)));
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index fd1ce10553bf..1905d2476d32 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	__u32 mask = FS_ACCESS;
 
+	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
+		return;
+
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
 
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_modify(struct file *file)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	__u32 mask = FS_MODIFY;
 
+	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
+		return;
+
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index f78d1e89593f..ff139ff8d3d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -553,9 +553,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order,
 extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
 extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
-void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size);
-void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
 
 #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \
 		__get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h
index 0690679832d4..b9394bc86fad 100644
--- a/include/linux/highmem.h
+++ b/include/linux/highmem.h
@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page)
 	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
 }
 
+static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page)
+{
+	void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+	BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE));
+	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+}
+
 static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page,
 	unsigned start1, unsigned end1,
 	unsigned start2, unsigned end2)
diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h
index eeceac3376fc..78ad558bce5f 100644
--- a/include/linux/interrupt.h
+++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS];
 
 struct softirq_action
 {
-	void	(*action)(struct softirq_action *);
+	void	(*action)(void);
 };
 
 asmlinkage void do_softirq(void);
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static inline void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *));
+extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void));
 extern void softirq_init(void);
 extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
index 069aa2ebef90..cb9e3637a620 100644
--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
 	void (*drop_ns)(void *);
 };
 
-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
 int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
 const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
 const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 45f10f5896b7..7f251a536293 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)
 }
 #endif
 
-extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node);
+extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
index 70b7123f38c7..09f3019489b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/percpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/percpu.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size,
 				pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn);
 #endif
 
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr);
 extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
 
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
 extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void);
 #endif
 
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp);
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata);
 extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index d8b4d31acd18..205c79491de3 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1194,6 +1194,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 
+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
+{
+	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
+}
+
 static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
 {
 	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index d6393413ef09..f11e06e87a29 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ void memcg_destroy_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *);
 /*
  * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators
  */
-void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
-void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
+void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
+void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2)));
 void kfree(const void *);
 void kzfree(const void *);
 size_t ksize(const void *);
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_index(size_t size)
 }
 #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
 
-void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
+void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
 void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *);
 
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
+void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
 #else
 static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
  * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of
  * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h.
  */
-static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
 		if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_size(unsigned int n)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
 {
 #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
index 3a1a1dbc6f49..ff38fec9eb76 100644
--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ struct kmem_cache {
 	unsigned long random;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+	unsigned long random_active;
+	unsigned long random_inactive;
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 	/*
 	 * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node.
diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
index f58e1ef76572..516caa40676e 100644
--- a/include/linux/string.h
+++ b/include/linux/string.h
@@ -238,10 +238,16 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
 void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter");
 void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1)
+#else
+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0)
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 {
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
@@ -251,7 +257,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
 {
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
 		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
 	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
@@ -262,7 +268,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
 {
 	__kernel_size_t ret;
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
 
 	/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
@@ -277,7 +283,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
 extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
 {
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
 	__kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
 	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
@@ -289,8 +295,8 @@ extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
 __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t ret;
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
 		return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
 	ret = strlen(q);
@@ -310,8 +316,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
 {
 	size_t p_len, copy_len;
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
 		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
 	p_len = strlen(p);
@@ -424,8 +430,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
 /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
 {
-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
 		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
 	memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index 248a137112e8..02a63bec41ca 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/llist.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 
 /*
@@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
 	/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
 	struct work_struct SAK_work;
 	struct tty_port *port;
+	struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
@@ -347,6 +349,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
 	struct list_head list;
 };
 
+extern int tiocsti_restrict;
+
 /* tty magic number */
 #define TTY_MAGIC		0x5401
 
diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
index 398e9c95cd61..baab7195306a 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
@@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
-extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
-extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
-extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot);
+extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
 			unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
 			pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
-			const void *caller);
+			const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
 static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
index e42d13b55cf3..3228bcfe7599 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ip.h
@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@
 
 #define IPVERSION	4
 #define MAXTTL		255
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+#define IPDEFTTL	128
+#else
 #define IPDEFTTL	64
+#endif
 
 #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0
 #define IPOPT_OLEN   1
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 47035b5a46f6..efbd3ac00d92 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ config USELIB
 config AUDIT
 	bool "Auditing support"
 	depends on NET
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
 	  kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
@@ -957,6 +958,22 @@ config USER_NS
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
+	bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
+	depends on USER_NS
+	default n
+	help
+	  When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
+	  new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
+	  has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
+	  exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
+	  paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
+
+	  This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
+	  kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config PID_NS
 	bool "PID Namespaces"
 	default y
@@ -1091,6 +1108,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE
 
 endchoice
 
+config LOCAL_INIT
+	bool "Zero uninitialized locals"
+	help
+	  Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length
+	  arrays. Requires compiler support.
+
 config HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
 	bool
 	help
@@ -1377,8 +1400,7 @@ config SHMEM
 	  which may be appropriate on small systems without swap.
 
 config AIO
-	bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT
-	default y
+	bool "Enable AIO support"
 	help
 	  This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used
 	  by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling
@@ -1595,7 +1617,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS
 
 config SLUB_DEBUG
 	default y
-	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT
+	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support"
 	depends on SLUB && SYSFS
 	help
 	  SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can
@@ -1619,7 +1641,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON
 
 config COMPAT_BRK
 	bool "Disable heap randomization"
-	default y
 	help
 	  Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
 	  also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
@@ -1666,7 +1687,6 @@ endchoice
 
 config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
 	bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
-	default y
 	help
 	  For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
 	  merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
@@ -1679,9 +1699,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
 	  command line.
 
 config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
-	default n
 	depends on SLAB || SLUB
 	bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
+	default y
 	help
 	  Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
 	  security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
@@ -1690,12 +1710,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
 config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
 	bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
 	depends on SLUB
+	default y
 	help
 	  Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
 	  other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
 	  sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
 	  freelist exploit methods.
 
+config SLAB_HARDENED
+	default y
+	depends on SLUB
+	bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure"
+	help
+          Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab
+          allocator.
+
+config SLAB_CANARY
+	depends on SLUB
+	depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+	bool "SLAB canaries"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing
+	  some performance and memory usage for security.
+
+	  Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations
+	  are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides
+	  basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+	  Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate
+	  non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero
+	  byte and provide basic double-free detection.
+
+config SLAB_SANITIZE
+	bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations"
+	depends on SLUB
+	default y
+	help
+	  Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
+	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
+
+	  For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact.
+
+config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY
+	depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE
+	default y
+	bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations"
+	help
+	  Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect
+	  write-after-free bugs.
+
 config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
 	default y
 	depends on SLUB && SMP
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1f08c38e604a..2c4f577a4317 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1630,6 +1630,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
 
 	if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
 		audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
+	else if (!audit_ever_enabled)
+		audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED;
+
 	if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
 		pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n",
 		       audit_default);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 36be400c3e65..50fa38718408 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
 /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */
 int bpf_jit_enable   __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON);
-int bpf_jit_harden   __read_mostly;
+int bpf_jit_harden   __read_mostly = 2;
 int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly;
 long bpf_jit_limit   __read_mostly;
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 596959288eb9..fb76f46d61ce 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock);
 static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock);
 
-int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1;
 
 static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = {
 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops)
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 7718d7dcadc7..8a4ce459da0a 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -432,6 +432,12 @@ bool capable(int cap)
 	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
+
+bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+	return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
 #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
 
 /**
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 8c70ee23fbe9..7c45b1e38bc0 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
+ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
+#else
 int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
+#endif
 
 /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
 int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@@ -10529,6 +10534,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 1a2d18e98bf9..f3a8e3df2e12 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/task.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
+#else
+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
@@ -1679,6 +1684,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
+	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	/*
 	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
 	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
@@ -2508,6 +2517,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
 	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
 		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
 
+	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			goto bad_unshare_out;
+	}
+
 	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
 	if (err)
 		goto bad_unshare_out;
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index bc6addd9152b..008be43f6cdd 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
+	if (uid_eq(current_uid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) {
+		printk(KERN_ALERT "denied attempt to auto-load module %.64s\n", module_name);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&kmod_concurrent_max) < 0) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("request_module: kmod_concurrent_max (%u) close to 0 (max_modprobes: %u), for module %s, throttling...",
 				    atomic_read(&kmod_concurrent_max),
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index f2635fc751d9..a4c445bf7f24 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void)
 
 void clear_free_pages(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO
+#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)
 	struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map;
 	unsigned long pfn;
 
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void)
 	}
 	memory_bm_position_reset(bm);
 	pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n");
-#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */
+#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
index befc9321a89c..61e19256560c 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
+++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static void __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_ctrlblk *rcp)
 	}
 }
 
-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
 {
 	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk);
 	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk);
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
index f7e89c989df7..527c170810fc 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c
+++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,7 @@ __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_state *rsp)
 /*
  * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU.
  */
-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
 {
 	struct rcu_state *rsp;
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index 86ccaaf0c1bf..f3103b3f1bb4 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -9719,7 +9719,7 @@ static int idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf)
  * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick.
  * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set).
  */
-static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void)
 {
 	struct rq *this_rq = this_rq();
 	enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ?
diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
index 6f584861d329..1943fe60f3b9 100644
--- a/kernel/softirq.c
+++ b/kernel/softirq.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(irq_cpustat_t, irq_stat);
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(irq_stat);
 #endif
 
-static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
+static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd);
 
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void)
 		kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr);
 
 		trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr);
-		h->action(h);
+		h->action();
 		trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr);
 		if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
 			pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n",
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr)
 	or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr);
 }
 
-void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
+void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void))
 {
 	softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
 }
@@ -497,8 +497,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule);
 
-static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
-				  struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
+static void tasklet_action_common(struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
 				  unsigned int softirq_nr)
 {
 	struct tasklet_struct *list;
@@ -535,14 +534,14 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
 	}
 }
 
-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void)
 {
-	tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
+	tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
 }
 
-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a)
+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void)
 {
-	tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
+	tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
 }
 
 void tasklet_init(struct tasklet_struct *t,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 4c4fd4339d33..10f5b0ecf5a4 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -99,12 +100,25 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
 
 /* External variables not in a header file. */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+int __read_mostly sysfs_restricted = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
+int __read_mostly fifo_restrictions = 1;
+#endif
 extern int suid_dumpable;
 #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
 extern int core_uses_pid;
 extern char core_pattern[];
 extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
+#endif
 extern int pid_max;
 extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
 extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
@@ -116,35 +130,35 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
-static int sixty = 60;
+static int sixty __read_only = 60;
 #endif
 
-static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
+static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1;
 
 static int zero;
-static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
-static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
-static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
-static unsigned long zero_ul;
-static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
-static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
-static int one_hundred = 100;
-static int one_thousand = 1000;
+static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1;
+static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2;
+static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4;
+static unsigned long zero_ul __read_only;
+static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1;
+static unsigned long long_max __read_only = LONG_MAX;
+static int one_hundred __read_only = 100;
+static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000;
 #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
-static int ten_thousand = 10000;
+static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
+static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024;
 #endif
 
 /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */
-static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
 
 /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
-static int maxolduid = 65535;
-static int minolduid;
+static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535;
+static int minolduid __read_only;
 
-static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
+static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX;
 static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
 
 /*
@@ -152,9 +166,12 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
  * and hung_task_check_interval_secs
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
-static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
+static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
 #endif
 
+int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
 #include <linux/inotify.h>
 #endif
@@ -298,19 +315,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
-static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
-static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
-static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns;			/* 0 usecs */
-static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
+static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only;			/* 0 usecs */
+static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
-static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
+static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
+static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION
-static int min_extfrag_threshold;
-static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000;
+static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only;
+static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000;
 #endif
 
 static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
@@ -516,6 +533,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+	{
+		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
+		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+	},
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
 	{
 		.procname	= "tainted",
@@ -864,6 +890,59 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.extra1		= &zero,
 		.extra2		= &two,
 	},
+#endif
+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
+	{
+		.procname	= "tiocsti_restrict",
+		.data		= &tiocsti_restrict,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
+	{
+		.procname	= "device_sidechannel_restrict",
+		.data		= &device_sidechannel_restrict,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
+	{
+		.procname	= "deny_new_usb",
+		.data		= &deny_new_usb,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	{
+		.procname	= "sysfs_restricted",
+		.data		= &sysfs_restricted,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_FIFO
+	{
+		.procname	= "fifo_restrictions",
+		.data		= &fifo_restrictions,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
 #endif
 	{
 		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index 7362554416fd..fb8902236deb 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now,
 	}
 }
 
-static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void)
 {
 	struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
 	unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index ae64cb819a9a..52f5a5dcd09d 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
 /*
  * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context.
  */
-static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void)
 {
 	struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]);
 
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 923414a246e9..107b17f0d528 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 
+/* sysctl */
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
+int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
+#else
+int unprivileged_userns_clone;
+#endif
+
 static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 46a910acce3f..5b60c663ac69 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs"
 
 config PANIC_ON_OOPS
 	bool "Panic on Oops"
+	default y
 	help
 	  Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
 	  has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
@@ -959,7 +960,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
 	  anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data
 	  corruption or other issues.
 
-	  Say N if unsure.
+	  Say Y if unsure.
 
 config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE
 	int
@@ -1328,6 +1329,7 @@ config DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
 config DEBUG_LIST
 	bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
 	  walking routines.
@@ -1983,6 +1985,7 @@ config MEMTEST
 config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
 	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
 	select DEBUG_LIST
+	default y
 	help
 	  Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
 	  data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
@@ -2022,6 +2025,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
 config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM
 	bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem"
 	depends on STRICT_DEVMEM
+	default y
 	---help---
 	  If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
 	  io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c
index 86a709954f5a..6f15787fcb1b 100644
--- a/lib/irq_poll.c
+++ b/lib/irq_poll.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete);
 
-static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll);
 	int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget;
diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index 97d86dc17c42..388257c2878b 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -978,9 +978,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add);
 
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock);
-static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES];
+static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init;
 
-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
 {
 	enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type;
 	int error;
diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
index e335bcafa9e4..f6334f882b1f 100644
--- a/lib/nlattr.c
+++ b/lib/nlattr.c
@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count)
 {
 	int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src));
 
+	BUG_ON(minlen < 0);
+
 	memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen);
 	if (count > minlen)
 		memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen);
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 812e59e13fe6..2c2104884c81 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
 	return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec);
 }
 
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2;
 
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index b457e94ae618..ec2440e66c72 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ config KSM
 config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
         int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on MMU
-        default 4096
+	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
+	default 65536
         help
 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
 	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index a98f09b83019..d1695e475b37 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk)
 
 	newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk);
 	oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk);
+	/* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */
+	if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+		if (brk == min_brk)
+			newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
+		if (mm->brk == min_brk)
+			oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
 	if (oldbrk == newbrk)
 		goto set_brk;
 
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index e5c610d711f3..12f96ff5ef0e 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -99,6 +100,15 @@ int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES];
 DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain);
 
+bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy;
+
+static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str)
+{
+	extra_latent_entropy = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
 volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
@@ -1055,6 +1065,13 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
 		debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page),
 					   PAGE_SIZE << order);
 	}
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+			clear_highpage(page + i);
+	}
+
 	arch_free_page(page, order);
 	kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
 	kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
@@ -1295,6 +1312,21 @@ static void __init __free_pages_boot_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 	__ClearPageReserved(p);
 	set_page_count(p, 0);
 
+	if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) {
+		unsigned long hash = 0;
+		size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash;
+		const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page);
+
+		for (index = 0; index < end; index++)
+			hash ^= hash + data[index];
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+		latent_entropy ^= hash;
+		add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
+#else
+		add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash));
+#endif
+	}
+
 	page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages;
 	set_page_refcounted(page);
 	__free_pages(page, order);
@@ -1884,8 +1916,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page)
 
 static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void)
 {
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) &&
-		page_poisoning_enabled();
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) ||
+		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled());
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
@@ -1942,6 +1974,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags
 
 	post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags);
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) {
+		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+			verify_zero_highpage(page + i);
+	}
+
 	if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO))
 		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
 			clear_highpage(page + i);
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 9632772e14be..802ff9ee8172 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -314,7 +314,11 @@ static inline bool is_root_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
 static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s,
 				      struct kmem_cache *p)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
+	return p == s;
+#else
 	return true;
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s)
@@ -366,18 +370,26 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
 	 * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root
 	 * will also be a constant.
 	 */
-	if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) &&
+	    !memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
 	    !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS))
 		return s;
 
 	page = virt_to_head_page(x);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
+	BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page));
+#endif
 	cachep = page->slab_cache;
 	if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s))
 		return cachep;
 
 	pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
 	       __func__, s->name, cachep->name);
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+	BUG_ON(1);
+#else
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+#endif
 	return s;
 }
 
@@ -402,7 +414,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s)
 	 * back there or track user information then we can
 	 * only use the space before that information.
 	 */
-	if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER))
+	if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
 		return s->inuse;
 	/*
 	 * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 39e382acb0b8..a87a9a2fdf4e 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@
 
 #include "slab.h"
 
-enum slab_state slab_state;
+enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init;
 LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
 DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
-struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
+struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
 /*
  * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
  */
-static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
+static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
 
 static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
 {
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 9c3937c5ce38..6b063a76c419 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON));
+}
+
+static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s);
+}
+
 void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
 {
 	if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
@@ -297,6 +307,35 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp)
 	*(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+{
+	if (s->offset)
+		return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
+	return object + s->inuse;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value)
+{
+	return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
+{
+	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
+	*canary = get_canary_value(canary, value);
+}
+
+static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
+{
+	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
+	BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value));
+}
+#else
+#define set_canary(s, object, value)
+#define check_canary(s, object, value)
+#endif
+
 /* Loop over all objects in a slab */
 #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \
 	for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \
@@ -469,13 +508,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
  * Debug settings:
  */
 #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON)
-static slab_flags_t slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
 #else
-static slab_flags_t slub_debug;
+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init;
 #endif
 
-static char *slub_debug_slabs;
-static int disable_higher_order_debug;
+static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init;
+static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init;
 
 /*
  * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata.  This memory lies
@@ -535,6 +574,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 	else
 		p = object + s->inuse;
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+		p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *);
+
 	return p + alloc;
 }
 
@@ -674,6 +716,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 	else
 		off = s->inuse;
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+		off += sizeof(void *);
+
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
 		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
 
@@ -803,6 +848,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 		/* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
 		off += sizeof(void *);
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+		off += sizeof(void *);
+
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
 		/* We also have user information there */
 		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -1417,8 +1465,9 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 				void *object)
 {
 	setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
+	set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
 	kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object);
-	if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
+	if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
 		kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
 		s->ctor(object);
 		kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
@@ -2700,9 +2749,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
 		stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
+	if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) {
+		size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
+		BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
+		if (s->ctor)
+			s->ctor(object);
+		if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
+			memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *));
+	} else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
 		memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
 
+	if (object) {
+		check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
+		set_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
+	}
+
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
 
 	return object;
@@ -2909,6 +2970,27 @@ static __always_inline void do_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	void *tail_obj = tail ? : head;
 	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
 	unsigned long tid;
+	bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) {
+		__maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
+		void *x = head;
+
+		while (1) {
+			check_canary(s, x, s->random_active);
+			set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive);
+
+			if (sanitize) {
+				memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset);
+				if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor)
+					s->ctor(x);
+			}
+			if (x == tail_obj)
+				break;
+			x = get_freepointer(s, x);
+		}
+	}
+
 redo:
 	/*
 	 * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab.
@@ -3085,7 +3167,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
 			  void **p)
 {
 	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
-	int i;
+	int i, k;
 
 	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
 	s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
@@ -3122,13 +3204,29 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
 	local_irq_enable();
 
 	/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
-	if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
+	if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
+		int j;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+			size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
+			BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
+			if (s->ctor)
+				s->ctor(p[j]);
+			if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
+				memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *));
+		}
+	} else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
 		int j;
 
 		for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
 			memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size);
 	}
 
+	for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
+		check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive);
+		set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active);
+	}
+
 	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p);
 	return i;
@@ -3160,9 +3258,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
  * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
  * take the list_lock.
  */
-static unsigned int slub_min_order;
-static unsigned int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
-static unsigned int slub_min_objects;
+static unsigned int slub_min_order __ro_after_init;
+static unsigned int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
+static unsigned int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init;
 
 /*
  * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
@@ -3334,6 +3432,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
 	init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
 	init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
 #endif
+	set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active);
 	kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
 		      GFP_KERNEL);
 	init_kmem_cache_node(n);
@@ -3490,6 +3589,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
 		size += sizeof(void *);
 	}
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+		size += sizeof(void *);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
 	if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
 		/*
@@ -3562,6 +3664,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
 	s->random = get_random_long();
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+	s->random_active = get_random_long();
+	s->random_inactive = get_random_long();
+#endif
 
 	if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
 		goto error;
@@ -3838,6 +3944,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
 		offset -= s->red_left_pad;
 	}
 
+	check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active);
+
 	/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
 	if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
 	    offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
@@ -3871,7 +3979,11 @@ static size_t __ksize(const void *object)
 	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
 
 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+		BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
+#else
 		WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page));
+#endif
 		return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page);
 	}
 
@@ -4731,7 +4843,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
 #define SO_TOTAL	(1 << SL_TOTAL)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
-static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
+static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
 
 static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str)
 {
diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
index 45fdbfb6b2a6..55ec851eb819 100644
--- a/mm/swap.c
+++ b/mm/swap.c
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
 	if (!PageHuge(page))
 		__page_cache_release(page);
 	dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
+	if (!PageHuge(page))
+		BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+			&& dtor != free_transhuge_page
+#endif
+		);
+
 	(*dtor)(page);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index c1a3baf16957..a6b3bba36e8a 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -4536,7 +4536,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni);
 
-static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void)
 {
 	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
 
@@ -6304,7 +6304,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll)
 	return work;
 }
 
-static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void)
 {
 	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
 	unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 6cec08cd0bb9..ffc74355a94d 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ static int net_msg_warn;	/* Unused, but still a sysctl */
 int sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net __read_mostly = 0;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+int sysctl_stealth_blackhole __read_mostly = 1;
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
 static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -505,6 +509,17 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= set_default_qdisc
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	{
+		.procname	= "ip_blackhole",
+		.data		= &sysctl_stealth_blackhole,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_NET */
 	{
 		.procname	= "netdev_budget",
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
index 32cae39cdff6..9141d7ae99b2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2
 
 config SYN_COOKIES
 	bool "IP: TCP syncookie support"
+	default y
 	---help---
 	  Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
 	  flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
index 4efa5e33513e..ae82ff1ea5e7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ struct icmp_control {
 	short   error;		/* This ICMP is classed as an error message */
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static const struct icmp_control icmp_pointers[NR_ICMP_TYPES+1];
 
 /*
@@ -934,6 +938,11 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct net *net;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
+		return true;
+#endif
+
 	net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
 	if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) {
 		struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
@@ -960,6 +969,12 @@ static bool icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb)
 static bool icmp_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) && !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
+		return true;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 *	Too short.
 	 */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
index 523d26f5e22e..10070b040661 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@
 	 ((in_dev)->mr_v2_seen && \
 	  time_before(jiffies, (in_dev)->mr_v2_seen)))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static int unsolicited_report_interval(struct in_device *in_dev)
 {
 	int interval_ms, interval_jiffies;
@@ -737,6 +741,11 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc,
 	__be32	dst;
 	int hlen, tlen;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
+		return -1;
+#endif
+
 	if (type == IGMPV3_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT)
 		return igmpv3_send_report(in_dev, pmc);
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 38b6d8f90a44..9c67d386df71 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -307,11 +307,13 @@ static void tcp_ecn_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
 		tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
 }
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
 static void tcp_ecn_rcv_syn(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
 {
 	if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || !th->cwr))
 		tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
 }
+#endif
 
 static bool tcp_ecn_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
 {
@@ -5921,6 +5923,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	    tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
 		goto discard_and_undo;
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
 	if (th->syn) {
 		/* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of
 		 * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs.
@@ -5972,6 +5975,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto discard;
 #endif
 	}
+#endif
 	/* "fifth, if neither of the SYN or RST bits is set then
 	 * drop the segment and return."
 	 */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 6da393016c11..e6171d1ea7c9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
 struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
@@ -1561,6 +1565,9 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 
 reset:
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
+#endif
 	tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb);
 discard:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -1709,6 +1716,27 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4))
 		goto discard_it;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
+	    (
+			th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
+			tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
+			tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
+			(
+				tcp_flag_word(th) &
+					(TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
+				tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
+			) ||
+			(
+				tcp_flag_word(th) &
+					(TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
+				tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
+			)
+		)
+	)
+		goto discard_it;
+#endif
+
 	/* An explanation is required here, I think.
 	 * Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction,
 	 * provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated.
@@ -1722,12 +1750,22 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 lookup:
 	sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
 			       th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
-	if (!sk)
+	if (!sk) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		ret = 1;
+#endif
+
 		goto no_tcp_socket;
+	}
 
 process:
-	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
+	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		ret = 2;
+#endif
+
 		goto do_time_wait;
+	}
 
 	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
 		struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
@@ -1841,6 +1879,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 bad_packet:
 		__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
 	} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
+						  (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
+#endif
+
 		tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb);
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index 7ba8a90772b0..8c359b649bcd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/busy_poll.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win)
 {
 	if (seq == s_win)
@@ -809,6 +813,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		 * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at
 		 * resetting legit local connections.
 		 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
+#endif
+
 		req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
 	} else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */
 		reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 0ef04cda1b27..6cb1efa826dc 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated);
 #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536
 #define PORTS_PER_CHAIN (MAX_UDP_PORTS / UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MIN)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 /* IPCB reference means this can not be used from early demux */
 static bool udp_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -2262,6 +2266,9 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
 		goto csum_error;
 
 	__UDP_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
+#endif
 	icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
index 6d14cbe443f8..4eeebbdc452e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 /*
  *	The ICMP socket(s). This is the most convenient way to flow control
  *	our ICMP output as well as maintain a clean interface throughout
@@ -848,6 +852,9 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST:
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
+#endif
 		if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all)
 			icmpv6_echo_reply(skb);
 		break;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index c5f4e89b6ff3..86375c9966ef 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@
 
 #include <trace/events/tcp.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static void	tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 static void	tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				      struct request_sock *req);
@@ -1356,6 +1360,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 
 reset:
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole))
+#endif
+
 	tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
 discard:
 	if (opt_skb)
@@ -1453,6 +1461,27 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4))
 		goto discard_it;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) &&
+	    (
+			th->res1 || !tcp_flag_word(th) ||
+			tcp_flag_word(th) == TCP_FLAG_PSH ||
+			tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_CWR | TCP_FLAG_ECE) ||
+			(
+				tcp_flag_word(th) &
+					(TCP_FLAG_SYN | TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
+				tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_URG
+			) ||
+			(
+				tcp_flag_word(th) &
+					(TCP_FLAG_FIN | TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
+				tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_FLAG_SYN
+			)
+		)
+	)
+		goto discard_it;
+#endif
+
 	if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo))
 		goto csum_error;
 
@@ -1463,12 +1492,22 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th),
 				th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), sdif,
 				&refcounted);
-	if (!sk)
+	if (!sk) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		ret = 1;
+#endif
+
 		goto no_tcp_socket;
+	}
 
 process:
-	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
+	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		ret = 2;
+#endif
+
 		goto do_time_wait;
+	}
 
 	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
 		struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
@@ -1576,6 +1615,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 bad_packet:
 		__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
 	} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+		if (!sysctl_stealth_blackhole || (ret == 1 &&
+						  (skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
+#endif
+
 		tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb);
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index 1979922bcf67..6a8a3666648f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@
 #include <trace/events/skb.h>
 #include "udp_impl.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+extern int sysctl_stealth_blackhole;
+#endif
+
 static bool udp6_lib_exact_dif_match(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 #if defined(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV)
@@ -863,6 +867,9 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
 		goto csum_error;
 
 	__UDP6_INC_STATS(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	if (!likely(sysctl_stealth_blackhole) || skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
+#endif
 	icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
 
 	kfree_skb(skb);
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
index cb0c889e13aa..305f52f58c1a 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
 	  is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
 	  irq processing.
 
+	  When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line,
+	  entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the
+	  runtime memory allocator is being initialized.  This costs even more
+	  slowdown of the boot process.
+
 	  Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
 	  secure!
 
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 91a80036c05d..41692ca62c98 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1;
 static int warn_unresolved = 0;
 /* How a symbol is exported */
 static int sec_mismatch_count = 0;
+static int writable_fptr_count = 0;
 static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1;
 static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0;
 /* ignore missing files */
@@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ enum mismatch {
 	ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT,
 	EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT,
 	EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
+	DATA_TO_TEXT
 };
 
 /**
@@ -1080,6 +1082,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = {
 	.good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL},
 	.mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
 	.handler = extable_mismatch_handler,
+},
+/* Do not reference code from writable data */
+{
+	.fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL },
+	.bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL },
+	.mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT
 }
 };
 
@@ -1267,10 +1275,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr,
 			continue;
 		if (!is_valid_name(elf, sym))
 			continue;
-		if (sym->st_value == addr)
-			return sym;
 		/* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */
 		d = sym->st_value - addr;
+		if (d == 0)
+			return sym;
 		if (d < 0)
 			d = addr - sym->st_value;
 		if (d < distance) {
@@ -1405,7 +1413,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
 	char *prl_from;
 	char *prl_to;
 
-	sec_mismatch_count++;
+	if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT)
+		writable_fptr_count++;
+	else
+		sec_mismatch_count++;
+
 	if (!sec_mismatch_verbose)
 		return;
 
@@ -1529,6 +1541,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
 		fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, "
 		      "we should never get here.");
 		break;
+	case DATA_TO_TEXT:
+#if 0
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		"The %s %s:%s references\n"
+		"the %s %s:%s%s\n",
+		from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p);
+#endif
+		break;
 	}
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 }
@@ -2540,6 +2560,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 	}
 	free(buf.p);
+	if (writable_fptr_count) {
+		if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) {
+			warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n"
+			     "To see full details build your kernel with:\n"
+			     "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n",
+			     writable_fptr_count);
+		}
+	}
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index d9aa521b5206..438acc17532e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig
 
 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
-	default n
+	default y
 	help
 	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
 	  syslog via dmesg(8).
@@ -18,10 +18,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+	depends on PERF_EVENTS
+	default y
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+	  changed.
+
+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
+	default y
+	help
+	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
+	  into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
+	  ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+
+	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+	  unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY
 	bool "Enable different security models"
 	depends on SYSFS
 	depends on MULTIUSER
+	default y
 	help
 	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
 	  configured into your kernel.
@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS
 config SECURITY_NETWORK
 	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
 	depends on SECURITY
+	default y
 	help
 	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
 	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
@@ -154,6 +179,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
 	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
 	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+	default y
 	help
 	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
 	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
@@ -166,7 +192,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
 	bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
 	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
-	default y
 	help
 	  This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
 	  to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
@@ -191,10 +216,36 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	default y
 	help
 	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
 	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
 
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
+	bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	depends on EXPERT
+	help
+	  Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects
+	  for common C string functions rather than only between objects.
+
+	  This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding.
+
+config PAGE_SANITIZE
+	bool "Sanitize pages"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
+	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
+
+config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY
+	bool "Verify sanitized pages"
+	depends on PAGE_SANITIZE
+	default y
+	help
+	  Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect
+	  write-after-free bugs.
+
 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
 	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
 	help
@@ -278,3 +329,128 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "Hardened Enhancements"
+
+config HARDENED_RANDOM
+	bool "Enhance the random number generator"
+	default n
+	help
+		Enabling this option enhances the Linux kernel random number generator.
+		This is done by:
+			- Increasing the pool size from 4096 bits to 262144 bits. ( 512B -> 32KB )
+			- Increasing the diffusion via the linear feedback shift register.
+			- Defines newer 64-bit polynomial fields for the input and output pools.
+
+		Overall, this enhances the total entropy available to the system and further
+		enhances the random number generator.
+
+
+config HARDENED_STEALTH_NETWORKING
+	bool "Enable stealth networking [GRSECURITY]"
+	default n
+	depends on NET
+	help
+		If you say Y here, neither TCP resets nor ICMP
+		destination-unreachable packets will be sent in response to packets
+		sent to ports for which no associated listening process exists.
+		This feature supports both IPV4 and IPV6 and exempts the
+		loopback interface from blackholing.  Enabling this feature
+		makes a host more resilient to DoS attacks and reduces network
+		visibility against scanners.
+
+		The blackhole feature as-implemented is equivalent to the FreeBSD
+		blackhole feature, as it prevents RST responses to all packets, not
+		just SYNs.  Under most application behavior this causes no
+		problems, but applications (like haproxy) may not close certain
+		connections in a way that cleanly terminates them on the remote
+		end, leaving the remote host in LAST_ACK state.  Because of this
+		side-effect and to prevent intentional LAST_ACK DoSes, this
+		feature also adds automatic mitigation against such attacks.
+		The mitigation drastically reduces the amount of time a socket
+		can spend in LAST_ACK state.  If you're using haproxy and not
+		all servers it connects to have this option enabled, consider
+		disabling this feature on the haproxy host.
+
+		If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with names
+		"ip_blackhole" will be created.
+		This sysctl, "ip_blackhole" takes the standard zero/non-zero
+		on/off toggle to enable or disable this feature.
+
+
+config HARDENED_NO_SIMULT_CONNECT
+	bool "Disable simultaneous TCP connections [GRSECURITY]"
+	default n
+	depends on NET
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, a feature by Willy Tarreau will be enabled that
+	  removes a weakness in Linux's strict implementation of TCP that
+	  allows two clients to connect to each other without either entering
+	  a listening state.  The weakness allows an attacker to easily prevent
+	  a client from connecting to a known server provided the source port
+	  for the connection is guessed correctly.
+
+	  As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from
+	  fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL,
+	  it should be eliminated by enabling this option.  Though Linux is
+	  one of few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it
+	  has no legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
+
+
+config HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict SysFS & DebugFS [GRSECURITY]"
+	default y
+	depends on SYSFS
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, sysfs (the pseudo-filesystem mounted at /sys) and
+	  any filesystem normally mounted under it (e.g. debugfs) will be
+	  mostly accessible only by root.  These filesystems generally provide access
+	  to hardware and debug information that isn't appropriate for unprivileged
+	  users of the system.  Sysfs and debugfs have also become a large source
+	  of new vulnerabilities, ranging from infoleaks to local compromise.
+	  There has been very little oversight with an eye toward security involved
+	  in adding new exporters of information to these filesystems, so their
+	  use is discouraged.
+	  To enable or disable this feature at runtime, use the sysctl
+	  kernel.sysfs_restricted.
+	  For reasons of compatibility, a few directories have been whitelisted
+	  for access by non-root users:
+	  /sys/fs/selinux
+	  /sys/fs/fuse
+	  /sys/devices/system/cpu
+
+
+config HARDENED_FIFO
+	bool "Restrict FIFO [GRSECURITY]"
+	default y
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
+	  own in world-writable +t directories (e.g. /tmp), unless the owner of
+	  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.  If the sysctl
+	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
+	  created.
+
+
+config HARDENED_MODULE_LOAD
+	bool "Harden module auto-loading [GRSECURITY]"
+	default y
+	depends on MODULES
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, module auto-loading in response to use of some
+	  feature implemented by an unloaded module will be restricted to
+	  root users.  Enabling this option helps defend against attacks
+	  by unprivileged users who abuse the auto-loading behavior to
+	  cause a vulnerable module to load that is then exploited.
+
+	  If this option prevents a legitimate use of auto-loading for a
+	  non-root user, the administrator can execute modprobe manually
+	  with the exact name of the module mentioned in the alert log.
+	  Alternatively, the administrator can add the module to the list
+	  of modules loaded at boot by modifying init scripts.
+
+	  Modification of init scripts will most likely be needed on
+	  Ubuntu servers with encrypted home directory support enabled,
+	  as the first non-root user logging in will cause the ecb(aes),
+	  ecb(aes)-all, cbc(aes), and cbc(aes)-all  modules to be loaded.
+
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
 	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
 	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
 	select NETWORK_SECMARK
-	default n
+	default y
 	help
 	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
 	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
 	  /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
 	  tools such as avcstat.
-
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
-	int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
-	range 0 1
-	default 0
-	help
-	  This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
-	  that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
-	  by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
-	  kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
-	  mmap and mprotect calls.  If this option is set to 0 (zero),
-	  SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
-	  by the kernel.  If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
-	  default to checking the protection requested by the application.
-	  The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
-	  'checkreqprot=' boot parameter.  It may also be changed at runtime
-	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c574285966f9..667cca9fcd78 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -135,18 +135,7 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
-static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
-	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-
-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
-{
-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
-
-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
-		selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+static const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
 
 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f3a5a138a096..d95f3c5fe6f0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -640,7 +640,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned int new_value;
@@ -664,10 +663,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return PTR_ERR(page);
 
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value)
 		goto out;
 
-	fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	kfree(page);
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 config SECURITY_YAMA
 	bool "Yama support"
 	depends on SECURITY
-	default n
+	default y
 	help
 	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
 	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 4e499b78569b..55bba37f9517 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd)
 	struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data;
 	struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SYSFS_RESTRICT
+	return 0;
+#endif
+
 	if (!debugfs_initialized())
 		return 0;